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ORIGINAL PAPERS

TO SIGMUND FREUD ON HIS SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY

The duty has fallen to me of conveying to Sigmund Freud on the occasion of his seventieth birthday the greetings and warm congratulations of this JOURNAL. It is not an easy matter to fulfil this honourable task. Freud is far too outstanding a figure for one who belongs to the circle of his followers and fellow-workers to be able to estimate him in comparison with other great personalities in the evolution of human culture and describe him in relation to his contemporaries. Moreover, his work speaks for itself; it needs no commentary, above all no eulogy. The creator of a science that is austerely honest and wages war on all hypocrisy would certainly dislike the dithyrambs with which it is customary on such occasions to acclaim the leader of a great movement. An objective description of his lifework, however—an enticing theme for an enthusiastic disciple—is superfluous, since the master himself has devoted to this purpose more than one essay which for detached and concrete presentation could not be surpassed. He has never withheld from publicity anything that he knows about the origin of his ideas; he has spoken frankly and fully about the vicissitudes his views have undergone and about the attitude of the present generation towards them. So far as his personality is concerned, he has completely taken the wind from the sails of that modern method of enquiry which attempts to gain fresh insight into the development of a scientist's views by studying the intimate details of his private life. In his *Traumdeutung* and *Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens* Freud has undertaken this task himself in a way that was previously unknown, and has not only indicated new lines of research for this kind of enquiry, but given for all time an example of a candour quite ruthless towards himself. He has also revealed unhesitatingly the 'secrets of the

laboratory', the inevitable vacillations and uncertainties that are usually so carefully kept hidden.

In view of this, the most logical course would be for us to forgo any sort of demonstration. I am well aware that it would best please the master if we went on quietly with our work without concerning ourselves with arbitrary periods of time and dates that in themselves mean nothing. We, his pupils, have learned from Freud himself that all modern celebrations are tributes offered in an exalted mood that give expression only to one side of an emotional impulse. It has not always been as now; there was a time when the hostile attitude against the man who had been raised to the throne was not dissembled either. It was Freud who taught us that the most highly honoured is regarded even to-day, though it be only unconsciously, with hate as well as love.

In spite of all this, we cannot resist the temptation to bow to convention by way of exception, against our better judgement, and make the birthday an occasion of expressly dedicating to their 'Director' this number of the JOURNAL, and also the number of the *Zeitschrift* and *Imago* which make their appearance on the same occasion. Anyone who glances through the annual volumes of these Journals will at once see, however, that every one of the previous numbers has been really dedicated to him; the contents of these volumes, apart from what the master himself has contributed, have simply been a continuation, confirmation or valuation of his teaching. The present numbers also, though more ceremonious than usual, do not therefore differ essentially from any of their predecessors; his fellow-workers are merely represented in them in rather more imposing numbers. But instead of inditing a formal introduction to these contributions, I intend to allow myself to set down in an unconnected sequence, as in free association, the feelings and thoughts that naturally arise in me on this occasion. I can take for granted that these thoughts will be common to many of those who are engaged in the same pursuit.

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In a paper in which I once attempted to form an estimate of Freud's *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie*, I stated my conclusion that this was a work of epoch-making importance in the evolution of science; it demolished the boundary walls between mental and natural science. In another paper I described Freud's discovery and exploration of the unconscious as a step forward in human progress, as the first time of functioning of a new sense-organ. One may be disposed to dismiss these assertions forthwith as the exaggerations and uncritical utter-

ances of an enthusiastic disciple ; the fact remains that they were not the outcome of any mood of jubilation, but were logical deductions formed from a long series of new accessions to knowledge.

Whether and when my prediction will be fulfilled, that a time will come when the whole world will speak of a pre-Freudian and a post-Freudian epoch, I cannot of course say ; it is twenty years now since I followed in his footsteps, and this conviction has not changed in the least. Certain it is that the life of a neurologist who has had the good fortune to be a contemporary of Freud's and, better still, to recognize his importance early in his career, is divided into pre-Freudian and post-Freudian periods—two stages that stand in sharpest contrast to one another. In my case at least, neurological work before Freud, apart from observations on the nerve fibres, which were interesting enough certainly on occasion, was a matter of histrionics, a perpetual profession of friendliness and knowledge to hundreds of neurotic patients whose symptoms were not in the least understood. One was ashamed—at any rate I was—to accept payment for this performance. Even to-day we cannot cure everyone, but we can assuredly help many ; and even when we are unsuccessful there remains the mitigating consideration that we have honestly endeavoured to gain knowledge of the neuroses by scientific methods, and can understand why it is impossible to help. We are exempted from the sorry task of promising comfort and aid with an air of professional omniscience ; indeed, we have finally and completely lost our skill in this art. Psychiatry, which was formerly a museum of abnormalities before which we stood in uncomprehending amazement, has become through Freud's discoveries a fertile field of scientific research, susceptible of coherent comprehension. Is it an exaggeration, then, to assert that Freud has added lustre and honour to our calling ? And is it not to be expected that we should be filled with lasting gratitude towards the man whose work has made this possible ? It may be a conventional formality to celebrate seventieth or eightieth birthdays, but for Freud's followers such a day is undoubtedly merely an opportunity of giving expression for once to feelings they have long cherished. Would it not be making a concession to the spirit of the age, which is inclined to be so shamefaced in the matter of emotional expression, if we continually suppressed these feelings ? We prefer to follow the example of antiquity and without shame to offer our master for once our open and hearty thanks for all he has bestowed on us.

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The day is not far distant when the whole medical profession will recognize that not only neurologists, but all who are concerned with the cure of disease, have ample cause to share these admittedly lyrical expressions of feeling. The knowledge of the part played in every kind of therapy by the mental relation of the patient to the physician and the possibility of systematically turning this to good account will gradually become the common possession of all medical men. The science of medicine, at present disintegrated by specialization, will once more be restored to unity. The physician will no longer be a dry technician of the laboratory and the dissecting-room; he will be a connoisseur of humanity in both health and sickness, a counsellor to whom everyone will turn with a well-founded hope of understanding and possibly of succour.

But signs are multiplying that the physician of the future will be able to count on much greater respect and recognition not only from his patients, but from the whole of society. The ethnologist and the sociologist, the historian and the statesman, the æsthete and the philologist, the pedagogue and the criminologist have even now to turn for information to the physician as the expert in the human soul, if they wish to base their special departments of study, which must ultimately rest in part on psychology, on a more secure foundation than the uncertain ground of arbitrary assumptions. There was once before a time when the physician was respected as the man of science; he it was who was highly learned in knowledge of all plants and animals and the properties of the 'elements', so far as they were then known. I venture to predict the approach of a similar age—an age of 'Iatro-philosophy', the foundation-stone of which has been laid by the work of Freud. Nor has Freud waited to advance in this direction until all the different schools became conversant with psycho-analysis. Compelled, with the aid of psycho-analysis alone, himself to solve problems connected with allied sciences which he encountered in dealing with nervous patients, he wrote his *Totem und Tabu*, a work that laid down new lines of approach in ethnology; while the sociology of the future will find his *Group-Psychology* indispensable. His book on *Wit* is the first attempt to construct a system of æsthetics on a psychological basis, and he has furnished innumerable suggestions relating to possibilities of progressive work in the domain of educational science.

As for the debt that psychology owes to psycho-analysis, the readers of this JOURNAL will hardly require me to waste many words on that. Is it not the fact that before the advent of Freud all scientific psycho-

logy was, in essence, merely a refined physiology of sensation, while the complexities of our mental life remained the undisputed territory of *belles lettres?* And was it not Freud who, by creating a theory of the instincts, by inaugurating a psychology of the ego, and by constructing a serviceable scheme of metapsychology, first raised psychology to the level of a science?

This enumeration of achievements, which is by no means complete, is enough to convince the most sceptical that not only his followers and his professional associates, but the whole learned world, have cause to rejoice that the master has reached his seventieth birthday in the full possession of his powers, and to wish that he may long be spared to carry on his great work.

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'So we are only to hear panegyrics after all', many will be thinking; 'what has become of the frankness we were promised about the difficulties and the disputes between the master and his disciples'? It is my duty, therefore, to add a few sentences on this topic, although I do not find it pleasant to come forward, so to speak, as a witness for the Crown, in connection with incidents which, while they are not without interest, are certainly very painful to all concerned. Let me say then that there is scarcely one of us who has not had to listen occasionally to hints and exhortations from the master which sometimes destroyed magnificent illusions and at the first moment gave rise to a sense of injury and depreciation. At the same time I must testify that Freud often gives us perfect liberty for a long while, and allows great latitude to individual idiosyncrasies, before he decides to interpose as a moderating influence, or to make decisive use of the means of defence at his command; he resorts to the latter course only when he is convinced that compliance would imperil the cause that to him is more important than anything else. Here he certainly admits of no compromise, and is ready to sacrifice, even though with heavy heart, personal ties and hopes that have become dear to him. In these things he is as severe towards himself as towards another. He watched with sympathetic interest one of his most gifted scholars developing along his own lines, until the latter advanced the claim that he could account for everything with his '*élan vital*.' Once several years ago I myself came forward with the theory that a death-instinct would explain all. Freud's verdict was not favourable to the idea and my faith in him enabled me to bow to his judgement; then one day there appeared *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, in which his theory of the interplay of death-instincts and life-instincts

does far more justice to the manifold facts of psychology and biology than my one-sided conception could accomplish. The idea of organic inferiority interested him as a very promising beginning for the somatic foundation of psycho-analysis. For years he accepted its author's rather peculiar mode of thought as part of the bargain ; but when it became clear that the latter was using psycho-analysis simply as a spring-board for a teleological philosophy, Freud gave up all collaboration with him. For a long time he overlooked even the scientific gambols of one of his followers, because he recognized his acute sense for sexual symbolism. The great majority of his adherents, however, have overcome the sensitiveness that is inevitable in this situation, and are convinced that all their legitimate personal efforts will sooner or later be accorded a place in Freudian psycho-analysis.

The exclusiveness of our professional interests should not prevent us on such a day from keeping in mind, too, the feelings of those who stand personally nearest to Freud, of his family above all, among whom Freud lives and works as a human being and not as a mythical figure, who guard with such solicitude a health so precious to us all, and to whom we owe so great a debt of gratitude for their care. The wide circle of sick people who have been dealt with by his means, and by it have found once more the strength to live, will also join with us in celebrating this memorable day ; and not less that still wider circle of sufferers who had kept their health, yet from whom Freud's knowledge has lifted a burden needlessly borne.

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Psycho-Analysis works ultimately through the deepening and enlarging of knowledge ; but, as I have attempted to show in a paper that appears in the following pages, knowledge can be enlarged and deepened only by love. The fact that Freud has succeeded in schooling us to endure more of the truth would alone assure him that a large and not unworthy section of humanity are thinking of him to-day with love.

S. Ferenczi.

THE ORIGIN AND STRUCTURE OF THE SUPER-EGO

BY

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It is desirable to state clearly at the outset that this paper is of a peculiarly tentative character. The special occasion for which it was written, and the exigency of a time limit, induced me to attack an intricate theme when my own opinions about it are the very reverse of mature. Indeed, the essential object of the present contribution is merely to define a little more closely some of the complex problems involved and to invite further discussion of them; I would attach only a very restricted validity to any positive suggestions that may emerge in the course of the present remarks. The subject itself is concerned with one of the most important contributions that Freud has made to the science of psycho-analysis he created, and the spectacle of the following attempt to apprehend his latest teachings will serve as well as any other to illustrate the ever-pioneering nature of Freud's work and the fact that his mind remains the youngest and freshest of any among us.

The particular problem to be considered here is that of the origin and actual structure of the super-ego, that is, the nature and genesis of the various trends composing it. As Freud himself says, 'In other matters—for instance, concerning the origin and function of the super-ego—a good deal remains insufficiently elucidated'.[1]

As to the validity and value of the conception itself there will be universal agreement, for the reasons Freud gave when he postulated it can be definitely confirmed in any character analysis, and perhaps in any properly completed analysis. Further, a number of formulations in regard to it would appear to be equally well established. Thus, the genesis of the super-ego is certainly connected with the passing of the Œdipus complex, and the nuclear and essential part of its composition may be regarded as the direct imprint made on the personality by the conflicts relating to this complex;[2] Freud neatly designates it as the heir of the Œdipus complex.[3] Much is known also about the relation of the super-ego to the outer world and to the other

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[1] *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, p. 250.

[2] *Das Ich und das Es*, 1923, S. 40, 60, etc.

[3] Op. cit., S. 43.

institutions of the mind. The function it exercises is perhaps its clearest feature. It is to criticise the ego and to cause pain to the latter whenever it tends to accept impulses proceeding from the repressed part of the *id*. In this connection we may note the improvement Freud has effected in the terminology relating to the idea of guilt. He would confine the expression ' consciousness of guilt ', or ' sense of guilt ', to the perception of guilt on the part of consciousness [4] and substitute that of ' need for punishment ' (*Strafbedürfnis*) when it concerns the unconscious ego, reserving ' criticism ' for the operation performed by the super-ego. The relation of both these active and passive aspects of the phenomenon to consciousness, however, is a very variable one ; either or both may be unconscious, the latter more often than the former.[5]

When, however, we leave these valuable broad generalizations and come to a closer study of the problems involved, a considerable number of awkward questions present themselves. To mention only a few at this point : How can we conceive of the same institution as being both an object that presents itself to the *id* to be loved instead of the parents [6] and as an active force criticising the ego ? If the super-ego arises from incorporating the abandoned love-object,[7] how comes it that in fact it is more often derived from the parent of the same sex ? If it is composed of elements taken from the ' moral ' non-sexual ego-instincts, as we should expect from the part it plays in the repression of the sexual incestuous ones, whence does it derive its sadistic, i.e. sexual, nature ? These and many other apparent contradictions need to be resolved. Finally, there is every reason to think that the concept of the super-ego is a nodal point where we may expect all the obscure problems of Œdipus complex and narcissism on the one hand, and hate and sadism on the other, to meet.

Before taking up the problems concerning the origin and structure of the super-ego, it is necessary to say something about its general relations, particularly the topographical ones. *Relation to the outer world, the ego and the id.* The ego is the part of the *id* that is altered by the influence of the outer world, and the super-ego is a differentiated part of the ego,[8] again one brought about under the influence of the

[4] Op. cit., S. 68.

[5] *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, p. 266.

[6] *Das Ich und das Es*, S. 34.

[7] Op. cit., S. 33, etc.

[8] Op. cit., S. 27, 31.

outer world. On the one hand we read[9] that the super-ego stands nearer to the *id* than does the ego, is independent of the latter and represents to it the demands of the *id*, though the *id* can also influence the ego directly as well as through the super-ego.[10] On the other hand it is just through its connection with the outer world, the reality demands of which it represents, that the super-ego gains its power of affecting the ego.[11] The full explanation seems to be that the super-ego in some obscure way combines influences from both the inner and the outer world, from the *id* and from external reality, and that these are then directed towards the ego.[12]

Relation to Consciousness.—Two statements of Freud's bear on this point. The super-ego may be for the greater part unconscious and inaccessible to the ego.[13] It dips deeply into the *id* and is therefore farther removed from consciousness than is the ego.[14] It is probable that the super-ego may be partly conscious, partly preconscious and partly unconscious; further that its relation to consciousness varies at different times. That it should be as a rule less conscious than is the ego may be explained by its relation to outer reality, for this relation was far closer in the past (in infancy) than it is in the present.

Relation to Repression.—It is the ego, not the super-ego, that performs the act of repression, though it commonly does so in obedience to the demands of the latter.[15] It is important, however, to note that, especially in hysteria, the ego can keep from consciousness, i.e. repress, the feeling of guilt provoked by the super-ego's attack on it.[16] It should be possible in the future to describe this in economic terms as a balance between different amounts of pleasure and pain.

Relation to External Love-object.—Freud writes[17]: 'If a sexual object has to be given up, there is not infrequently brought about in its place the change in the ego which one must describe, for instance in melancholia, as an erecting of the object within the ego,' and he adds 'the nearer closer conditions of this replacement are not yet

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[9] Op. cit., S. 43, 61, 67.

[10] Op. cit., S. 72.

[11] *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, pp. 251, 253.

[12] *Ibid.* Pp. 253, 264.

[13] *Das Ich und das Es*, S. 47.

[14] Op. cit., S. 61.

[15] Op. cit., S. 66.

[16] Loc. cit.

[17] Op. cit., S. 33.

known to us.' Throughout he appears to assume that the super-ego, which we know to be the heir of the Œdipus complex, results in this way from the incorporating of the parental figure that had to be given up in its sexual connection. But the evidence is fairly extensive that, though the super-ego may be derived from either parent and is commonly enough derived from both, it is normally and predominantly derived, not from the love-object that has been abandoned, but from the parent of the same sex. With the boy, for instance, it is derived in the main from the father, and when it is derived from the mother the chances are great that he will be homosexual. Freud himself points out this paradox,[18] but offers no explanation of it. The discussion of bisexuality that follows in the context doubtless explains the facts of there being two types and of their often being mixed, but it in no way accounts for the phenomenon of the more normal type in which the heterosexual person derives his super-ego from the parent of the same sex as himself. It would therefore seem that a necessary condition for the process of incorporation is that the object incorporated must have thwarted the love impulses of the subject.

If this reasoning is sound, then it can only be that the mechanism of super-ego formation normally follows the order which Freud has described in connection with the attitude of a homosexual towards his brothers,[19] namely, that original rivalry of a hostile kind was replaced by a friendly object-choice, which in its turn was replaced by identification. Applying this to the Œdipus situation, and taking again the case of the boy, we must assume that the super-ego usually arises from identification with the father where the initial hostile rivalry had been replaced by homosexual love. In the less usual and less normal case, that of the homosexual man, there are two possibilities open. Either the same mechanism as that just suggested holds good, which means that, the feminine component of his bisexuality being predominant, he deals with his jealous rivalry of his mother by a passing object love followed by identification with her, or else the identification is a means of dealing with hatred proceeding from the fact, characteristic of this type, that his castration fears are more closely connected with the mother than with the father. Both explanations accord with the law that the super-ego is derived from a thwarting object. The two explanations differ in that with the first congenital sexuality would

[18] Op. cit., S. 38.

[19] Op. cit., S. 45.

be the ultimate cause of the undue reaction to the mother, with the second this might or might not be so.

It will be seen that here stress is laid on *hostility* [20] being the essential condition of super-ego formation. This one may relate to the predominantly sadistic nature of the later super-ego, a matter which will be discussed presently. To recapitulate for the sake of clearness: it is suggested that the super-ego is derived from the thwarting parent, irrespective of whether this happens to be the primary love-object or not; normally it is a secondary love-object, the parent of the same sex.

The replacement of object-cathexis by identification brings about a profound change in the libidinal situation. The image thus incorporated into the (super-) ego serves itself as an object to the libidinal impulses proceeding from the *id*, so that more of them are directed towards the ego as a whole than previously; this constitutes what Freud terms 'secondary narcissism'.[21] Along with this goes a desexualization of the impulses, a kind of sublimation, and this important process gives rise to interesting problems. Freud hints that it is due to the giving up of sexual aims implied in the change from allo-erotic into narcissistic libido. To quote his exact words: 'The transformation of object-libido into narcissistic libido that takes place here evidently brings with it a giving up of sexual aims, a desexualization, i.e. a kind of sublimation.'[22] But narcissistic libido is still sexual, as is even an impulse inhibited in its aim (affection), and both in moral masochism and in the obsessional neurosis we see that the impulses concerned with the super-ego need not be desexualized; it is plain, further, that there are all degrees of desexualization. So that there must be some further factors at work to account for this interesting change when it occurs.

Two further clues are provided elsewhere by Freud. In the first place he points out that the super-ego is not simply a residuum of the object-choices, but also signifies an energetic reaction-formation against them. 'Its relation to the ego is not all comprehended in the exhortation "You ought to be like the father"; it also includes the prohibition "You may not be like the father" i.e., you may not do everything he does; many things are his prerogative'.[23] In other

[20] *Cf.* Freud's remarks on ambivalence in connection with melancholic identification (*Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, p. 161).

[21] *Das Ich und das Es*, S. 34.

[22] Loc. cit.

[23] Op. cit., S. 40.

words, the super-ego consists in the incorporation only of the 'moral', thwarting, and asexual elements of the object. The allo-erotic libido of the subject's *id* somehow accomplishes the extraordinary feat of substituting this loveless image for the previous love-object; by some magic he manages to love with all the strength of his being just that which he had most reason to hate and fear. It is very possible, however, that from the wreckage of his own desires he is able by means of the identification with the father to save at least in a vicarious way the object-relation which the latter bears to the mother; if so, this vicarious gratification would have to be much deeper in the unconscious than the super-ego.

A second and more valuable clue is afforded by the following considerations. If we enquire into the actual composition of the super-ego, the most obvious constituent to be perceived is sadism,[24] usually desexualized. It is presumably to be accounted for as a pregenital regression of the libido that is no longer allowed to be directed towards the love-object; we know that regression is a common sequel to frustration. But this is only the result of a reaction on the part of the endangered ego, which yields to the (castration) threat to its integrity and defends itself by repression of the incestuous impulses. This threat to the primary narcissism must also mobilize the non-sexual ego-instincts, notably hate and fear, and probably all those which I have grouped under the name of 'repulsion instincts'.[25] The problem that here arises is the relation of the two groups of instincts to each other—roughly speaking, of the hate group[26] to the love group. In *Das Ich und das Es*[27] Freud supposes that any previous connection between the two undergoes a process of 'de-fusion'. He takes for granted the desexualization of the libidinal impulses as a necessary consequence of the secondary narcissism and suggests that as the

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[24] The finding is not surprising when one reflects how sadistic and persecutory even ordinary (outwardly directed) morality often is; in the formation of the super-ego we have an example of the 'turning round upon the subject', which Freud described in connection with sadism as one of the vicissitudes of instincts (*Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, p. 70). Cf. *Das Ich und das Es*, S. 70, 71.

[25] Trans. of the 'VII. International Congress of Psychology', 1924, p. 231.

[26] Freud's 'death instinct'. I find myself unable to operate with this philosophical concept in a purely clinical discussion.

[27] S. 71.

result of this desexualization the libido loses its power to bind the aggressive tendencies, which are therefore set free; hence the cruelty of the super-ego. To me at least an alternative hypothesis which he had previously put forward in the *Triebe und Triebschicksale* essay [28] appeals as more likely. In speaking of ambivalence he shows illuminatingly how the ego instincts and sexual instincts mutually influence each other, and how they can form a unity during the pregenital phases of libidinal organization. 'When the sexual function is governed by the ego-instincts, as at the stage of the sadistic-anal organization, they impart the qualities of hate to the instinct's aim as well. . . . This admixture of hate in love is to be traced in part to those preliminary stages of love which have not been wholly outgrown, and in part is based upon reactions of aversion and repudiation on the part of the ego-instincts. . . . In both cases, therefore, the admixture of hate may be traced to the source of the self-preservation instincts. When a love-relationship with a given object is broken off, it is not infrequently succeeded by hate, so that we receive the impression of a transformation of love into hate. This descriptive characterization is amplified by the view that, when this happens, the hate which is motivated by considerations of reality is reinforced by a regression of the love to the sadistic preliminary stage, so that the hate acquires an erotic character and the continuity of a love-relation is ensured'. One may ask whether this does not describe the changes that occur when the super-ego is formed. That would mean a fusion, rather than a de-fusion, of the two groups. And it may be that the secret of the desexualization of the libidinal impulses, perhaps also the preceding regression of them to the anal-sadistic level, will be found in the influence on them of the hate impulses (ego instincts in general). Whether this holds good for the desexualization and sublimation which Freud [29] suggests occurs at every identification is, of course, another matter. On the other side the libido would give an erotic colouring to the ego impulses, so that the hate would come to partake of the quality of sadism and fuse with the sadism resulting from libidinal regression.

We may now attempt to describe schematically the changes that ensue on the passing of the Œdipus complex and the replacement of it by the super-ego..

A. *Ego Instincts.* These 'reactive' instincts are all stimulated

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[28] *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, p. 82.

[29] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 273.

by the unfriendly situation in the outer world (parents) that leads to the repression of the incestuous wishes. The hatred for the rival, the half of the Œdipus complex which is presently to be resolved by homosexual identification, arises later in time than these wishes.

Fear. The fear of castration constitutes the kernel of the dread which the ego displays in regard to the super-ego,[30] and this is evidently a displacement from the father. It is continued later as a sensitiveness to conscience, that is, as a sense of guilt.[31]

Hate. This is activated against whichever parent is felt to be the obstacle to the love impulses, whether that be the main love-object or not.

1. Part is repressed, but continues to be directed against the external object or subsequent substitutes for this.
2. Part fuses with the libidinal impulses and helps to give them their sadistic character. This part operates from the *id* via the super-ego and is directed against the actual ego whenever this tends to admit repressed libidinal or hate impulses of such a kind as to bring the risk of re-arousing the external disapproval and danger. This 'turning round upon the subject' of impulses previously directed against the parent is a defensive procedure designed to avert the wrath of the parent; it is akin to the mechanism of the self-imposed penance among religious people.

B. *Sexual Instincts.* As was indicated above, the ego defends itself against external danger by repressing the genital impulses directed towards the love-object. Regression to the anal-sadistic level ensues, but the relation of this process to the frustration and to the influence of the ego instincts is not clear. The libido is then re-distributed as follows:[32]

1. A part continues to be directed to the parents, both heterosexually and homosexually, but as a form of libido 'inhibited in its aim'. This is the ordinary affection felt by the child for its parents. It is apt to be weakened whenever the parent's conduct falls below the standard set by the super-ego, i.e. whenever the identification of parent and super-ego

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[30] *Das Ich und das Es*, S. 75.

[31] Loc. cit.

[32] It is doubtful if one can apply the term desexualization to the first two of these four groups.

is impaired. Where the affection consciously felt for the parent of the opposite sex is excessive one may suspect excessive identification with that parent, with subsequent homosexual subject-inversion (in Ferenczi's sense).

2. A part becomes secondary narcissism. This is another way in which the allo-erotic impulses can achieve indirect gratification, for the super-ego towards which they are here directed is in great part a substitute for the parent. In the case where this parent is of the same sex, which is the most frequent one, a previous deflection has taken place from heterosexuality towards homosexuality.
3. A part regresses and fuses with the hate instincts to constitute sadism. To begin with this is probably also directed from the *id* towards the super-ego, as a substitute for the hated parent, but it passes through the super-ego and is applied (apparently by it) to the ego itself. It operates in the way mentioned above in connection with hate. This part of the libido is normally desexualized, but the change varies greatly in completeness.
4. It is probable that other active components of the libido follow the same course as the last group. Thus in the attitude of the super-ego towards the ego, particularly in regard to such matters as duty, order, and the like, it is hard not to see traces of the anal component of the anal-sadistic phase. Similarly scoptophilic elements may perhaps be concerned in the careful ' watching ' exercised over the ego.

We thus see that the super-ego arises as a compromise between the desire to love and the desire to be loved. On the one hand it provides an object for the libidinal impulses of the *id* when the external object is no longer available, whereas on the other hand it represents the renouncing of incest which is the only condition under which the parents' approval (i.e. affection) can be retained.

THE PROBLEM OF ACCEPTANCE OF UNPLEASANT IDEAS: ADVANCES IN KNOWLEDGE OF THE SENSE OF REALITY

BY

S. FERENCZI

BUDAPEST

Not long after I first made acquaintance with psycho-analysis I encountered the problem of the sense of reality, a mode of mental functioning which seemed to be in sharp contrast to the tendency towards flight from ' pain ' and towards repression otherwise so universally demonstrable in mental life. By means of a kind of empathy into the infantile mind, I arrived at the following hypothesis. To a child kept immune from any pain the whole of existence must appear to be a unity—' monistic,' so to speak. Discrimination between ' good ' and ' bad ' things, ego and environment, inner and outer world, would only come later ; at this stage alien and hostile would therefore be identical.[1] In a subsequent work I attempted to reconstruct theoretically the principal stages in the development from the pleasure-principle to the reality-principle.[2] I assumed that before it has experienced its first disappointments a child believes itself to be unconditionally omnipotent, and further that it clings to this feeling of omnipotence, even when the effectiveness of its power in the fulfilment of its wishes is bound up with the observance of certain conditions. It is only the growing number and complexity of these conditions that compel it to surrender the feeling of omnipotence and to recognize reality generally. In describing this development, however, nothing could at that time be said of the inner processes that must accompany this remarkable and important transformation ; our knowledge of the deeper foundations of the mind—especially of instinctual life—was still too undeveloped to allow of this. Since then Freud's penetrating researches into instinctual life and his discoveries

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[1] The child will learn ' to distinguish from his ego the malicious things, forming an outer world, that do not obey his will ', i.e. he will distinguish subjective contents of his mind (feelings) from those which reach him objectively (sensations). ' Introjection und Transference ' (1909), *Contributions to Psycho-analysis*.

[2] ' Stages in the Development of the Sense of Reality ' (1913), loc. cit.

in the analysis of the ego have brought us nearer to this goal [3]; but we were still unable satisfactorily to bridge the gap between instinctual life and intellectual life. It was plain that we still needed that supreme simplification into which Freud has been at last able to reduce the multiplicity of instinctual phenomena; I refer to his view concerning the instinctual polarity that lies at the basis of all life—his doctrine of the life-instinct (Eros) and the death-instinct or destruction-instinct.[4] Yet not until one of Freud's latest works appeared—'Die Verneinung,'[5] under which modest title lies concealed the beginnings of a psychology of the thought-processes, founded on biology—have the hitherto scattered fragments of our knowledge been gathered together. As always, here once more Freud takes his stand on the sure ground of psycho-analytical experience, and is extremely cautious in generalization. Following in his footsteps, I shall attempt once more to deal with the problem of the sense of reality in the light of his discovery.

Freud has discovered the psychological act of a *negation of reality* to be a transition-phase between ignoring and accepting reality; the alien and therefore hostile outer world becomes capable of entering consciousness, in spite of 'pain,' when it is supplied with the minus prefix of negation, i.e. when it is *denied*. In negativism, the tendency to abolish things, we see still at work the repressing forces which in the primary processes lead to a complete ignoring of whatever is 'painful'; negative hallucinatory ignoring is no longer successful; the 'pain' is no longer ignored, but becomes the subject-matter of perception as a negation. The question naturally arises at once: what must take place in order that the final obstacle to acceptance may be also removed from the path, and the affirmation of an unpleasant idea (i.e. the complete disappearance of the tendency to repression) made possible?

The suspicion also arises immediately that this is a question that is not to be easily answered; but since Freud's discovery this, at least, is clear from the outset: the affirmation of an unpleasant idea is never a simple thing, but is always a two-fold mental act. First an attempt is made to deny it as a fact, then a fresh effort has to be made to negate this negation, so that the positive, the recognition of evil, may really be assumed always to result from two negatives. To find anything comparable to this in the familiar realm of psycho-analysis we should

[3] *Group-Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921). *Das Ich und das Es* (1923).

[4] *Beyond the Pleasure-Principle* (1920).

[5] *Imago*, 1925.

have to draw an analogy between complete denial and the mental state of a child who still ignores everything unpleasant. In the same way I endeavoured some time ago to show that the fixation-point of the psychoses is to be found at this stage,[6] and I explained the uninhibited capacity for constant euphoria that is found in cases of megalomanic paralysis as a regression to this phase.[7] The stage of negation has an analogy, as Freud has shown, in the behaviour of a patient during treatment, and especially in a neurosis, which is similarly the result of a half-successful or unsuccessful repression and is actually always a negative—the negative of a perversion. The process by which recognition or affirmation of something unpleasant is finally reached goes on before our eyes, as the result of our therapeutic efforts when we cure a neurosis, and, if we pay attention to the details of the curative process, we shall be able to form some idea of the process of acceptance as well.

We note, then, that at the height of the transference the patient unresistingly accepts even what is most painful; clearly he finds in the feeling of pleasure accompanying the transference-love a consolation for the pain that this acceptance would otherwise have cost him. But if, at the close of the treatment, when the transference also has to be renounced, the patient were not successful in gradually finding for this renunciation too a substitute and consolation in reality, no matter how sublimated that substitute might be, there would undoubtedly follow a relapse into negation, i.e. into neurosis. In this connection we are involuntarily reminded of a very fruitful work by Victor Tausk, an analyst whose too early death we all deplore. In his 'Compensation as a Means of Discounting the Motive of Repression'[8] he adduced the weakening of the motives of repression by compensation as a condition of the cure. In a similar fashion we must suspect the presence of a compensation even in the very first appearance of an acceptance of something unpleasant; indeed in no other way can we conceive of its originating in the mind, for this moves always in the direction of least resistance, i.e. according to the pleasure-principle. As a matter of fact we find as early as in Freud's *Traumdeutung* a passage which explains in a similar manner the transformation of a primary into a secondary process. He tells us there that a hungry baby tries at first to

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[6] 'Stages in the Development of the Sense of Reality'.

[7] *Zur Psychoanalyse der paralytischen Geistesstörung.*

[8] International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 1924.

procure satisfaction by a kind of hallucination ; and only when this fails does it make those manifestations of ' pain ' that lead to a real satisfaction as their result. We see that here for the first time the mental mode of reaction seems to be conditioned by a quantitative factor. The recognition of the hostile environment is unpleasant, but at the moment non-recognition of it is still more painful ; consequently the less painful becomes relatively pleasurable, and, as such, can be accepted. It is only when we take into consideration the fact of compensation and avoidance of a still greater ' pain,' that we are able in any way to understand the possibility of an affirmation of ' pain ' without being compelled to renounce the universal validity of the search for pleasure as the fundamental psychical trend. But by doing so we are clearly postulating the intervention of a new instrument into the mental mechanism—a sort of reckoning-machine, the installation of which confronts us again with fresh and possibly still more puzzling enigmas.

We shall return later to the problem of psychical mathematics ; meanwhile let us consider the mental content of the materials in relation to which a baby accomplishes the acceptance of reality. When Freud tells us that a human being ceaselessly or at rhythmic intervals observes his environment by ' feeling after ', ' handling ' and ' tasting ' little samples of it, he clearly takes a baby's procedure when it misses and feels after its mother's breast as the prototype of all subsequent thought-processes. A similar train of thought led me in my bio-analytical paper [9] to assume that smelling or sniffing the surrounding world shows a still greater likeness to the act of thinking, since it allows of finer and more minute samples being tested. Oral incorporation is carried out only when the result of the test is favourable. The intellectual difference between a child that puts everything indiscriminately into its mouth and one that only turns to things that smell pleasantly is therefore quite an important one.

Let us keep, however, to the example of the baby that wants to suck. Let us assume that up till now it has always been appeased in good time, and that this is its first experience of the ' pain ' of hunger and thirst ; what probably takes place in its mind ? In its primal, narcissistic self-assurance it has hitherto only known itself ; it has known nothing of the existence of objects outside itself, which, of

[9] *Versuch einer Genitaltheorie.* (Internationale Psycho-Analytische Bibliothek, Vol. XV).

course, include even the mother, and could therefore have no feelings towards them, either friendly or hostile. There apparently occurs—possibly in connection with the physiological destruction produced in the organic tissues by the absence of nutrition—an ' instinctual defusion ' in the mental life as well, which finds expression first of all in unco-ordinated motor discharge and in crying—manifestations which we may quite well compare with expressions of rage in adults. When after long waiting and screaming the mother's breast is regained, this no longer has the effect of an indifferent thing which is always there when it is wanted, so that its existence does not need to be recognized ; it has become *an object of love and hate*, of hate because of its being temporarily unobtainable, and of love because after this loss it offers a still more intense satisfaction. In any case it certainly becomes at the same time, although no doubt very obscurely, the subject of a ' concrete idea '. This example illustrates, it seems to me, the following very important sentences in Freud's paper, ' Die Verneinung ' : ' The first and most immediate aim of testing the reality of things is not to find in reality an object corresponding to the thing represented, but to find it *again*, to be convinced that it is still there,' and ' We recognize as a condition for the testing of reality that objects which formerly had brought satisfaction must have been lost.' [10] We are only tempted to add further that the ambivalence indicated above, i.e. instinctual defusion, is an absolutely necessary condition for the coming into existence of a concrete idea. Things that always love us, i.e. that constantly satisfy all our needs, we do not notice as such, we simply reckon them as part of our subjective ego ; things which are and always have been hostile to us, we simply deny ; but to those things which do not yield unconditionally to our desires, which we love because they bring us satisfaction, and hate because they do not submit to us in everything, we attach special mental marks, memory-traces with the quality of objectivity, and we are glad when we find them again in reality, i.e. when we are able to love them once more. And when we hate an object but cannot suppress it so completely as to be able to deny it permanently, our taking notice of its existence shows that we want really to love it, but are only prevented from doing so by the ' maliciousness of the object '. The savage is therefore only logical

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[10] In my *Genitaltheorie* I trace back the feeling of gratification—the feeling of attaining *erotic reality*—to a similar recurrence of finding *again* and recognizing *again*.

when after killing his enemy he shows him the greatest love and honour. He is simply demonstrating that what he likes best of all is to be left in peace ; he wants to live in undisturbed harmony with his environment, but is prevented from doing so by the existence of a ' disturbing object '. When this obstacle appears it leads to a defusion of his instincts, so that the aggressive, destructive component comes to the fore. After his revenge is satisfied the other—the love-component—seeks satisfaction. It seems as if the two classes of instincts neutralize each other when the ego is in a state of rest, like the positive and negative currents in an electrically inactive body, and as if, in just the same way, special external influences were needed to separate the two currents and thus render them once more capable of action. The emergence of ambivalence would thus be a kind of protective device, instituting the capacity for active resistance in general, which, like the mental phenomenon accompanying it, recognition of the objective world, signifies one of the means of obtaining mastery over it.

We perceive, however, that while ambivalence no doubt leads to acceptance of the existence of things, it does not carry us as far as objective contemplation ; on the contrary, things become alternately the objects of passionate hate and equally passionate love. In order that ' objectivity ' may be obtained it is necessary for the instincts that have been released to be inhibited, i.e. again mixed with one another, a fresh instinctual fusion thus taking place after recognition has been achieved. This is probably the mental process which guarantees the inhibition and postponement of action until the external reality has been identified with the ' thought-reality ' (Freud) ; the capacity for objective judgement and action is thus essentially a capacity of the tendencies of loving and hating for neutralizing one another—a statement that certainly sounds very like a platitude. I think, however, that we can in all seriousness assume that the mutual binding of attracting and repelling forces is a process of mental energy at work in every compromise-formation, and in every objective observation, and that the maxim *sine ira et sine studio* must be replaced by another, namely, that for the objective contemplation of things, full scope must be given to an *equal amount* both of *ira* and of *studium*.

Clearly, then, there are stages in the development of the capacity for objectivity too. In my article on the development of the sense of reality I described the gradual surrender of personal omnipotence, and its transference to other higher powers (nurses, parents, gods). I called this the period of omnipotence by means of magic gestures and words ;

as the last stage, that of insight derived from painful experience, I regarded the final and complete surrender of omnipotence—the scientific stage, so to speak, of our recognition of the world. In psychoanalytical phraseology, I called the first phase of all, in which the ego alone exists and includes in itself the whole world of experience, the period of introjection ; the second phase, in which omnipotence is ascribed to external powers, the period of projection ; the last stage of development might be thought of as the stage in which both mechanisms are employed in equal measure or in mutual compensation. This sequence corresponded roughly to the representation of human development broadly outlined in Freud's *Totem und Tabu* as a succession of magical, religious and scientific stages. When, however, I attempted much later to bring some light to bear critically on the manner in which our present-day science is working, I was compelled to assume that, if science is really to remain objective, it must work alternately as pure psychology and pure natural science,[11] and must verify both our inner and outer experience by analogies taken from both points of view; this implies an oscillation between projection and introjection. I called this the ' utraquism ' of all true scientific work. In philosophy ultra-idealistic solipsism means a relapse into egocentric infantilism ; the purely materialistic psychophobe standpoint signifies a regression to the exaggerations of the projection-phase ; while Freud's maintenance of a dualism completely fulfils the utraquistic demand.

We are justified in hoping that Freud's discovery of negation as a transition-stage between denial and acceptance of what is unpleasant, will help us to a better understanding of these developmental stages and their sequence, besides simplifying our view of them. The first painful step towards recognition of the external world is certainly the knowledge that some of the ' good things ' do not belong to the ego, and must be distinguished from it as the ' outer world ' (the mother's breast). Almost at the same time a human being has to learn that something unpleasant, that is, ' bad ', can take place within him (in the ego itself, so to speak) which cannot be shaken off either by hallucination or in any other way (hunger, thirst). A further advance is made when he learns to endure absolute deprivation from without, i.e. when he recognizes that there are also things that must be relinquished for good and all ; the process parallel to this is the recognition of repressed wishes while realization of them is at the same time

[11] Introduction to my *Genitaltheorie*.

renounced. Since, as we know now, a quota of Eros, i.e. of love, is necessary for this recognition, and since this addition is inconceivable without introjection, i.e. identification, we are forced to say that recognition of the surrounding world is actually a partial realization of the Christian imperative ' Love your enemies.' It is true that the opposition which the psycho-analytical doctrine of instinct meets with certainly proves that reconciliation with our inner foe is the most difficult task that humanity is called upon to accomplish.

When we attempt to bring our fresh knowledge into connection with the topographical system of Freudian metapsychology, we surmise that at the stage of absolute solipsism only Pcpt-Cs, i.e. the perceptual superficies of the mind, is functioning ; the period of negation coincides with the formation of Ucs repressed strata ; the conscious acceptance of the outer world requires further that hyper-cathexis of which we are made capable only by the institution of another psychical system—the preconscious (Pcs)—interposed between the Ucs and the Cs. In accordance with the fundamental law of biogenesis the racial history of the evolution of the mind is thus repeated in the psychical development of the individual ; for the serial sequence here described is the same as that by which we must imagine the progressive evolution of psychical systems in organisms.

In organic development too we find prototypes of the progressive adaptation of living creatures to the reality of the external world. There are primitive organisms that seem to have remained at the narcissistic stage ; they wait passively for the satisfaction of their needs, and if this is denied them permanently they simply perish. They are still much nearer to the point of emergence from the unorganic, and on that account their instinct of destruction has a shorter path to travel back, i.e. it is much stronger. At the next stage the organism is able to thrust off parts of itself that cause pain and in this way save its life (autotomy) ; I once called this sort of sequestration a physiological prototype of the process of repression. Not until after further development is the faculty for adaptation to reality created—an organic recognition of the environment, so to speak ; very fine examples of this can be seen in the mode of life of organisms that are symbiotically united ; but the fact is patent in every other act of adaptation. In connection with my ' bio-analytical ' point of view, we can accordingly distinguish even in the organic between primary and secondary processes—processes, that is, which in the realm of the mind we regard as stages in intellectual development. That

would mean, however, that in a certain degree and sense the organic also possesses a kind of reckoning-machine, which is concerned not simply with qualities of pleasure and 'pain', but also with quantities. To be sure, organic adaptation is characterized by a certain inflexibility, seen in the reflex processes which are undoubtedly purposive but immutable, while the capacity for adaptation shows a continual readiness to recognize new realities and the capacity to inhibit action until the act of thinking is completed. Groddeck is therefore right in regarding the organic id as intelligent; but he shows bias when he overlooks the difference in degree between the intelligence of the ego and that of the id.

In this connection we may instance the fact that in organic pathology too we have an opportunity of seeing the work of negation (autotomy) and adaptation in operation. I have already attempted to trace certain processes of organic healing (of wounds, etc.) to the flow of a current of libido (Eros) to the injured place.[12]

We must not disguise from ourselves that all these considerations still furnish no satisfactory explanation of the fact that, both in organic and in psychical adaptation to the real environment, portions of the hostile outer world are, with the assistance of Eros, reckoned as part of the ego, and on the other hand, loved portions of the ego itself are given up. Possibly here we may have recourse to the more or less psychological explanation that even the actual renunciation of a pleasure and the recognition of something unpleasant are always only 'provisional', as it were; it is obedience under protest, so to speak, with the mental reservation of a *restitutio in integrum*. This may hold good in very many cases; there is evidence for it in the capacity for regression to modes of reaction that have long since been surmounted and are even archaic—a capacity that is preserved potentially and in special circumstances brought into operation. What looks like adaptation would thus be only an attitude of interminable waiting and hoping for the return of the 'good old times', differing fundamentally therefore only in degree from the behaviour of the rotiferæ which remain dried-up for years waiting for moisture. We must not forget, however, that there is also such a thing as a real and irreparable loss of organs and portions of organs, and that in the psychical realm also complete renunciation without any compensation exists. Such optimistic explanations therefore really do not help us; we must have recourse

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[12] *Hysterie und Pathoneurosen.*

to the Freudian doctrine of instinct, which shows that there are cases in which the destruction-instinct turns against the subject's own person, indeed, that the tendency to self-destruction, to death, is the more primary, and has been directed outwards only in the course of development. We may suppose that whenever adaptation is achieved, a similar, as it were masochistic, alteration in the direction of aggression plays a part. Further, I have already pointed out above that the surrender of loved parts of the ego and the introjection of the non-ego are parallel processes ; and that we are able to love (recognize) objects only by a sacrifice of our narcissism, which is after all but a fresh illustration of the well-known psycho-analytical fact that all object-love takes place at the expense of narcissism.

The remarkable thing about this self-destruction is that here (in adaptation, in the recognition of the surrounding world, in the forming of objective judgements) destruction does in actual fact become the ' cause of being '.[13] A partial destruction of the ego is tolerated, but only for the purpose of constructing out of what remains an ego capable of still greater resistance. This is similar to the phenomena noted in the ingenious attempts of Jacques Loeb to stimulate unfertilized eggs to development by the action of chemicals, i.e. without fertilization : the chemicals disorganize the outer layers of the egg, but out of the detritus a protective bladder (sheath) is formed, which puts a stop to further injury. In the same way the Eros liberated by instinctual defusion converts destruction into growth, into a further development of the parts that have been protected. I admit that it is very hazardous to apply organic analogies immediately to the psychical : let it serve for my excuse that I am doing it deliberately, and only with regard to so-called ' ultimate problems ', where, as I have explained elsewhere, analytical judgements take us no further, and where we have to search for analogies in other fields in order to form a synthetic judgement. Psycho-analysis, like every psychology, in its attempts to dig to the depths must strike somewhere on the rock of the organic. I have no hesitation in regarding even memory-traces as scars, so to speak, of traumatic impressions, i.e., as products of the destructive instinct, which, however, the unresting Eros nevertheless understands how to employ for its own ends, i.e. for the preservation of life. Out of these it shapes a new psychical system, which enables the ego to orientate itself more correctly in its environment, and to form sounder judge-

[13] Cf. S. Spielrein, ' Die Destruction als Ursache des Werdens ', *Jahrbuch für Psycho-Analyse*, IV, 1912.

ments. In fact it is only the destructive instinct that 'wills evil', while it is Eros that 'creates good' out of it.

I have spoken once or twice about a reckoning-machine, the existence of which I assumed as an auxiliary organ of the sense of reality. This idea really belongs to another connection, which to my mind explains the scientific mathematical and logical sense, but I should like to make a reference, although briefly, to it here. I can make a very useful beginning with the double meaning of the word 'reckon'. When the tendency to set aside the surrounding world by means of repression or denial is given up, we begin to *reckon* with it, i.e. to recognize it as a fact. A further advance in the art of reckoning is, in my opinion, the development of the power to choose between two objects that occasion either more or less unpleasantness, or to choose between two modes of action that can result in either more or less unpleasantness. The whole process of thinking would then be such a work of reckoning—to a large extent unconscious, and interposed between the sensory apparatus and motility. In this process, as in modern reckoning-machines, it is practically the result alone that comes into conscious view, while the memory-traces with which the actual work has been performed remain concealed, i.e. unconscious. We can dimly surmise that even the simplest act of thinking rests on an indefinite number of unconscious reckoning-operations, in which presumably every kind of arithmetical simplification (algebra, differential calculus) is employed; and that thinking in speech-symbols represents the ultimate integration of this complicated reckoning-faculty. I believe, too, in all seriousness that the sense for mathematics and logic depends upon the presence or absence of the capacity for perceiving this reckoning and thinking activity, though it is also performed unconsciously by those who do not seem to possess the mathematical or logical faculty in the slightest degree. The musical faculty might be ascribed to a similar introversion (self-perception of emotional stirrings, lyricism) as well as the scientific interest in psychology.

Whether and how far a given person forms 'correct' judgements (i.e. the ability to reckon the future beforehand) probably depends on the degree of development this reckoning-machine has reached. The primary elements with which these reckonings are performed are our memories, but these themselves represent a sum of sensory impressions and therefore ultimately are reactions to various stimuli of different strength. Thus psychical mathematics would only be a continuation of 'organic mathematics'.

However this may be, the essential thing in the development of a sense of reality is, as Freud has shown, the interpolation of an inhibitory mechanism into the psychical apparatus ; negation is only the last desperate effort of the pleasure-principle to check the advance to a knowledge of reality. The ultimate forming of a judgement, however, resulting from the work of reckoning here postulated, represents an inner discharge, a re-orientation of our emotional attitude to things and to our ideas of them, the direction of this new orientation determining the path taken by action either immediately or some time afterwards. Recognition of the surrounding world, i.e. affirmation of the existence of something unpleasant, is, however, only possible after defence against objects which cause ' pain ' and denial of them are given up, and their stimuli, incorporated into the ego, transformed into inner impulses. The power that effects this transformation is the Eros that is liberated through instinctual defusion.

THE FLIGHT FROM WOMANHOOD: THE MASCULINITY-COMPLEX IN WOMEN, AS VIEWED BY MEN AND BY WOMEN

BY

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In some of his latest works Freud has drawn attention with increasing urgency to a certain one-sidedness in our analytical researches. I refer to the fact that till quite recently the mind of boys and men only was taken as the object of investigation.

The reason of this is obvious. Psycho-analysis is the creation of a male genius, and almost all those who have developed his ideas have been men. It is only right and reasonable that they should evolve more easily a masculine psychology and understand more of the development of men than of women.

A momentous step towards the understanding of the specifically feminine was made by Freud himself in discovering the existence of penis-envy, and soon after the work of van Ophuijsen and Abraham shewed how large a part this factor plays in the development of women and in the formation of their neuroses. The significance of penis-envy has been extended quite recently by the hypothesis of the ' phallic phase '. By this we mean that in the infantile genital organization in both sexes only one genital organ, namely the male, plays any part, and that it is just this which distinguishes the infantile organization from the final genital organization of the adult.[1] According to this theory, the clitoris is conceived of as a phallus, and we assume that little girls as well as boys attach to the clitoris in the first instance exactly the same value as to the penis.[2]

The effect of this phase is partly to inhibit and partly to promote the subsequent development. Helene Deutsch has demonstrated principally the inhibiting effects. She is of opinion that, at the beginning of every new sexual function (e.g. at the beginning of puberty, of sexual intercourse, of pregnancy and child-birth), this phase is re-animated and has to be overcome every time before a

[1] Freud : ' The Infantile Genital Organization of the Libido '. *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, No. XX.

[2] H. Deutsch : *Psychoanalyse der weiblichen Sexualfunktionen*, 1925.

feminine attitude can be attained. Freud has elaborated her exposition on the positive side, for he believes that it is only penis-envy and the overcoming of it which gives rise to the desire for a child and thus forms the love-bond to the father.[3]

The question now arises whether these hypotheses have helped to make our insight into feminine development (insight which Freud himself has stated to be unsatisfactory and incomplete) more satisfactory and clearer.

Science has often found it fruitful to look at long familiar facts from a fresh point of view. Otherwise there is a danger that we shall involuntarily continue to classify all new observations amongst the same clearly defined groups of ideas.

The new point of view of which I wish to speak came to me by way of philosophy, in some essays by Georg Simmel.[4] The point which Simmel makes there and which has been in many ways elaborated since, especially from the feminine side,[5] is this: Our whole civilization is a masculine civilization. The State, the laws, morality, religion and the sciences are the creation of men. Simmel by no means deduces from these facts, as is commonly done by other writers, an inferiority in women, but he first of all gives considerable breadth and depth to this conception of a masculine civilization: 'The requirements of art, patriotism, morality in general and social ideas in particular, correctness in practical judgement and objectivity in theoretical knowledge, the energy and the profundity of life—all these are categories which belong as it were in their form and their claims to humanity in general, but in their actual historical configuration they are masculine throughout. Supposing that we describe these things, viewed as absolute ideas, by the single word "objective", we then find that in the history of our race the equation objective = masculine is a valid one.'

Now Simmel thinks that the reason why it is so difficult to recognize these historical facts is that the very standards by which mankind has estimated the values of male and female nature are 'not neutral, arising out of the difference of the sexes, but in themselves essentially

[3] Freud: 'Einige psychische Folgen der anatomischen Geschlechtsunterschiede'. *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanaluse*, Bd. XI, 1925.

[4] Georg Simmel: *Philosophische Kultur.*

[5] Cf. in particular Vaerting: *Männliche Eigenart im Frauenstaat und Weibliche Eigenart im Männerstaat.*

masculine.' 'We do not believe in a purely "human" civilization, into which the question of sex does not enter, for the very reason that prevents any such civilization from in fact existing, namely, the (so to speak) naïve identification of the concept "human being"[6] and the concept "man",[7] which in many languages even causes the same word to be used for the two concepts. For the moment I will leave it undetermined whether this masculine character of the fundamentals of our civilization has its origin in the essential nature of the sexes or only in a certain preponderance of force in men, which is not really bound up with the question of civilization. In any case this is the reason why in the most varying fields inadequate achievements are contemptuously called "feminine", while distinguished achievements on the part of women are called "masculine" as an expression of praise.'

Like all sciences and all valuations, the psychology of women has hitherto been considered only from the point of view of men. It is inevitable that the man's position of advantage should cause objective validity to be attributed to his subjective, affective relations to the woman, and according to Delius[8] the psychology of women hitherto does actually represent a deposit of the desires and disappointments of men.

An additional and very important factor in the situation is that women have adapted themselves to the wishes of men and felt as if their adaptation were their true nature. That is, they see or saw themselves in the way that their men's wishes demanded of them; unconsciously they yielded to the suggestion of masculine thought.

If we are clear about the extent to which all our being, thinking and doing conform to these masculine standards, we can see how difficult it is for the individual man and also for the individual woman really to shake off this mode of thought.

The question then is how far analytical psychology also, when its researches have women for their object, is under the spell of this way of thinking, in so far as it has not yet wholly left behind the stage in which frankly and as a matter of course masculine development only was considered. In other words, how far has the evolution of women, as depicted to us to-day by analysis, been measured by masculine

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[6] German *Mensch*.

[7] German *Mann*.

[8] Delius: *Vom Erwachen der Frau*.

standards and how far therefore does this picture not fail to present quite accurately the real nature of women.

If we look at the matter from this point of view our first impression is a surprising one. The present analytical picture of feminine development (whether that picture be correct or not) differs in no case by a hair's breadth from the typical ideas which the boy has of the girl.

We are familiar with the ideas which the boy entertains. I will therefore only sketch them in a few succinct phrases, and for the sake of comparison will place in a parallel column our ideas of the development of women.

The Boy's Ideas:	*Our Ideas of Feminine Development:*
Naïve assumption that girls as well as boys possess a penis.	For both sexes it is only the male genital which plays any part.
Realization of the absence of the penis.	Sad discovery of the absence of the penis.
Idea that the girl is a castrated, mutilated boy.	Belief of the girl that she once possessed a penis and lost it by castration.
Belief that the girl has suffered punishment which also threatens him.	Castration is conceived of as the infliction of punishment.
The girl is regarded as inferior.	The girl regards herself as inferior. Penis-envy.
The boy is unable to imagine how the girl can ever get over this loss or envy.	The girl never gets over the sense of deficiency and inferiority and has constantly to master afresh her desire to be a man.
The boy dreads her envy.	The girl desires throughout life to avenge herself on the man for possessing something which she lacks.

The existence of this over-exact agreement is certainly no criterion of its objective correctness. It is quite possible that the infantile genital organization of the little girl might bear as striking a resemblance to that of the boy as has up till now been assumed.

But it is surely calculated to make us think and take other possibilities into consideration. For instance, we might follow Georg

Simmel's train of thought and reflect whether it is likely that female adaptation to the male structure should take place at so early a period and in so high a degree that the specific nature of a little girl is overwhelmed by it. Later I will return for a moment to the point that it does actually seem to me probable that this infection with a masculine point of view occurs in childhood. But it does not seem to me clear off-hand how everything bestowed by nature could be thus absorbed into it and leave no trace. And so we must return to the question I have already raised: whether the remarkable parallelism which I have indicated may not perhaps be the expression of a one-sidedness in our observations, due to their being made from the man's point of view.

Such a suggestion immediately encounters an inner protest, for we remind ourselves of the sure ground of experience upon which analytical research has always been founded. But at the same time our theoretical scientific knowledge tells us that this ground is not altogether trustworthy, but that all experience by its very nature contains a subjective factor. Thus, even our analytical experience is derived from direct observation of the material which our patients bring to analysis in free associations, dreams and symptoms and from the interpretations which we make or the conclusions which we draw from this material. Therefore, even when the technique is correctly applied, there is in theory the possibility of variations in this experience.

Now, if we try to free our minds from this masculine mode of thought, nearly all the problems of feminine psychology take on a different appearance.

The first thing that strikes us is that it is always, or principally, the genital difference between the sexes which has been made the cardinal point in the analytical conception and that we have left out of consideration the other great biological difference, namely, the different parts played by men and by women in the function of reproduction.

The influence of the man's point of view in the conception of motherhood is most clearly revealed in Ferenczi's extremely brilliant genital theory.[9] His view is that the real incitement to coitus, its true, ultimate meaning for both sexes, is to be sought in the desire to return to the mother's womb. During a period of contest man acquired the privilege of really penetrating once more, by means of his genital organ, into a uterus. The woman, who was formerly in the subordinate

[9] Ferenczi, *Versuch einer Genitaltheorie*, 1924.

position, was obliged to adapt her organization to this organic situation and was provided with certain compensations. She had to ' content herself ' with substitutes of the nature of phantasy and above all with harbouring the child, whose bliss she shares. At the most, it is only in the act of birth that she perhaps has potentialities of pleasure which are denied to the man.[10]

According to this view the psychic situation of a woman would certainly not be a very pleasurable one. She lacks any real primal impulse to coitus, or at least she is debarred from all direct—even if only partial—fulfilment. If this is so, the impulse towards coitus and pleasure in it must undoubtedly be less for her than for the man. For it is only indirectly, by circuitous ways, that she attains to a certain fulfilment of the primal longing—i.e. partly by the roundabout way of masochistic conversion and partly by identification with the child which she may conceive. These, however, are merely ' compensatory devices '. The only thing in which she ultimately has the advantage over the man is the, surely very questionable, pleasure in the act of birth.

At this point I, as a woman, ask in amazement, and what about motherhood? And the blissful consciousness of bearing a new life within oneself? And the ineffable happiness of the increasing expectation of the appearance of this new being? And the joy when it finally makes its appearance and one holds it for the first time in one's arms? And the deep pleasurable feeling of satisfaction in suckling it and the happiness of the whole period when the infant needs her care?

Ferenczi has expressed the opinion in conversation that in that primal period of conflict which ended so grievously for the female, the male as victor imposed upon her the burden of motherhood and all that it involves.

Certainly, regarded from the standpoint of the social struggle, motherhood *may* be a handicap. It is certainly so at the present time, but it is much less certain that it was so in times when human beings were closer to nature.

Moreover, we explain penis-envy itself by its biological relations and not by social factors; on the contrary, we are accustomed without more ado to construe the woman's sense of being at a disadvantage socially as the rationalization of her penis-envy.

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[10] Cf. also Helene Deutsch, *Psychoanalyse der Weiblichen Sexualfunktionem*; and Groddeck, *Das Buch vom Es.*

But from the biological point of view woman has in motherhood, or in the capacity for motherhood, a quite indisputable and by no means negligible physiological superiority. This is most clearly reflected in the unconscious of the male psyche in the boy's intense envy of motherhood. We are familiar with this envy as such, but it has hardly received due consideration as a dynamic factor. When one begins, as I did, to analyse men only after a fairly long experience of analysing women, one receives a most surprising impression of the intensity of this envy of pregnancy, child-birth and motherhood, as well as of the breasts and of the act of suckling.

In the light of this impression derived from analysis one must naturally enquire whether an unconscious masculine tendency to depreciation is not expressing itself intellectually in the above-mentioned view of motherhood? This depreciation would run as follows: In reality women do simply desire the penis; when all is said and done motherhood is only a burden which makes the struggle for existence harder, and men may be glad that they have not to bear it.

When Helene Deutsch writes that the masculinity-complex in women plays a much greater part than the femininity-complex in man, she would seem to overlook the fact that the masculine envy is clearly capable of more successful sublimation than the penis-envy of the girl, and that it certainly serves as one, if not as the essential, driving force in the setting-up of cultural values.

Language itself points to this origin of cultural productivity. In the historic times which are known to us this productivity has undoubtedly been incomparably greater in men than in women. Is not the tremendous strength in men of the impulse to creative work in every field precisely due to their feeling of playing a relatively small part in the creation of living beings, which constantly impels them to an over-compensation in achievement?

If we are right in making this connection we are confronted with the problem why no corresponding impulse to compensate herself for her penis-envy is found in woman? There are two possibilities; either the envy of the woman is absolutely less than that of the man or it is less successfully worked off in some other way. We could bring forward facts in support of either supposition.

In favour of the greater intensity of the man's envy we might point out that an actual anatomical disadvantage on the side of the woman exists only from the point of view of the pregenital levels of organiza-

tion.[11] From that of the genital organization of adult women there is no disadvantage, for obviously the capacity of women for coitus is not less but simply other than that of men. On the other hand, the part of the man in reproduction is ultimately less than that of the woman.

Further, we observe that men are evidently under a greater necessity to depreciate women than conversely. The realization that the dogma of the inferiority of women had its origin in an unconscious male tendency could only dawn upon us after a doubt had arisen whether in fact this view were justified in reality. But if there actually are in men tendencies to depreciate women behind this conviction of feminine inferiority, we must infer that this unconscious impulse to depreciation is a very powerful one.

Further, there is much to be said in favour of the view that women work off their penis-envy less successfully than men from a cultural point of view. We know that in the most favourable case this envy is transmuted into the desire for a husband and child, and probably by this very transmutation it forfeits the greater part of its power as an incentive to sublimation. In unfavourable cases, however, as I shall presently shew in greater detail, it is burdened with a sense of guilt instead of being able to be employed fruitfully, whilst the man's incapacity for motherhood is probably felt simply as an inferiority and can develop its full driving power without inhibition.

In this discussion I have already touched on a problem which Freud has recently brought into the foreground of interest : [12] namely, the question of the origin and operation of the desire for a child. In the course of the last decade our attitude towards this problem has changed. I may therefore be permitted to describe briefly the beginning and the end of this historical evolution.

The original hypothesis [13] was that penis-envy gave a libidinal reinforcement both to the wish for a child and the wish for the man, but that the latter wish arose independently of the former. Subsequently the accent became more and more displaced on to the penis-envy, till in his most recent work on this problem Freud expressed the

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[11] S. Horney, ' On the Genesis of the Castration-complex in Women ', International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Vol. V, 1924.

[12] Freud : ' Über einige psychische Folgen der anatomischen Geschlechtsunterschiede '.

[13] Freud : ' On the Transformation of Instincts with special reference to Anal Erotism '. *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, No. XVI.

conjecture that the wish for the child arose only through penis-envy and the disappointment over the lack of the penis in general, and that the tender attachment to the father came into existence only by this circuitous route—by way of the desire for the penis and the desire for the child.

This latter hypothesis obviously originated in the need to explain psychologically the biological principle of heterosexual attraction. This corresponds to the problem formulated by Groddeck, who says that it is natural that the boy should retain the mother as a love-object, ' but how is it that the little girl becomes attached to the opposite sex ? '[14]

In order to approach this problem we must first of all realize that our empirical material with regard to the masculinity-complex in women is derived from two sources of very different importance. The first is the direct observation of children, in which the subjective factor plays a relatively insignificant part. Every little girl who has not been intimidated displays penis-envy frankly and without embarrassment. We see that the presence of this envy is typical and understand quite well why this is so ; we understand how the narcissistic mortification of possessing less than the boy is reinforced by a series of disadvantages arising out of the different pregenital cathexes : the manifest privileges of the boy in connection with urethral erotism, the scoptophilic instinct, and onanism.[15]

I should like to suggest that we should apply the term *primary* to the little girl's penis-envy which is obviously based simply on the anatomical difference.

The second source upon which our experience draws is to be found in the analytical material produced by adult women. Naturally it is more difficult to form a judgement on this, and there is therefore more scope for the subjective element. We see here in the first instance that penis-envy operates as a factor of enormous dynamic power. We see patients rejecting their female functions, their unconscious motive in so doing being the desire to be male. We meet with phantasies of which the content is : ' I once had a penis ; I am a man who has been castrated and mutilated ', from which proceed feelings of inferiority and which have for after-effect all manner of obstinate hypochondriacal

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[14] Groddeck : *Das Buch vom Es.*

[15] I have dealt with this subject in greater detail in my paper ' On the Genesis of the Castration-complex in Women '.

ideas. We see a marked attitude of hostility towards men, sometimes taking the form of depreciation and sometimes of a desire to castrate or maim them, and we see how the whole destinies of certain women are determined by this factor.

It was natural to conclude—and especially natural because of the male orientation of our thinking—that we could link these impressions on to the primary penis-envy and to reason *a posteriori* that this envy must possess an enormous intensity, an enormous dynamic power, seeing that it evidently gave rise to such effects. Here we overlooked the fact, more in our general estimation of the situation than in details, that this desire to be a man, so familiar to us from the analyses of adult women, had only very little to do with that early, infantile, primary penis-envy, but that it is a secondary formation embodying all that has miscarried in the development towards womanhood.

From beginning to end my experience has proved to me with unchanging clearness that the Œdipus complex in women leads (not only in extreme cases where the subject has come to grief, but *regularly*) to a regression to penis-envy, naturally in every possible degree and shade. The difference between the outcome of the male and the female Œdipus complexes seems to me in average cases to be as follows. In boys the mother as a sexual object is renounced owing to the fear of castration, but the male rôle itself is not only affirmed in further development but is actually over-emphasized in the reaction to the fear of castration. We see this clearly in the latency and pre-pubertal period in boys and generally in later life as well. Girls, on the other hand, not only renounce the father as a sexual object but simultaneously recoil from the feminine rôle altogether.

In order to understand this flight from womanhood we must consider the facts relating to early infantile onanism, which is the physical expression of the excitations due to the Œdipus complex.

Here again the situation is much clearer in boys, or perhaps we simply know more about it. Are these facts so mysterious to us in girls only because we have always looked at them through the eyes of men? It seems rather like it when we do not even concede to little girls a specific form of onanism but without more ado describe their auto-erotic activities as male; and when we conceive of the difference, which surely must exist, as being that of a negative to a positive, i.e. in the case of anxiety about onanism, that the difference is that between a castration threatened and castration that has actually taken place! My analytical experience makes it most decidedly

possible that little girls have a specific feminine form of onanism (which incidentally differs in technique from that of boys), even if we assume that the little girl practises exclusively clitoral masturbation, an assumption which seems to me by no means certain. And I do not see why, in spite of its past evolution, it should not be conceded that the clitoris legitimately belongs to and forms an integral part of the female genital apparatus.

Whether in the early phase of the girl's genital development she has organic vaginal sensations is a matter remarkably difficult to determine from the analytical material produced by adult women. In a whole series of cases I have been inclined to conclude that this is so and later I shall quote the material upon which I base this conclusion. That such sensations should occur seems to me theoretically very probable for the following reasons. Undoubtedly the familiar phantasies that an excessively large penis is effecting forcible penetration, producing pain and hæmorrhage and threatening to destroy something, go to shew that the little girl bases her Œdipus phantasies most realistically (in accordance with the plastic concrete thinking of childhood) on the disproportion in size between father and child. I think too that both the Œdipus phantasies and also the logically ensuing dread of an internal, i.e. vaginal injury go to show that the vagina as well as the clitoris must be assumed to play a part in the early infantile genital organization of women.[16] One might even infer from the later phenomena of frigidity that the vaginal zone has actually a stronger cathexis (arising out of anxiety and attempts at defence) than the clitoris, and this because the incestuous wishes are referred to the vagina with the unerring accuracy of the unconscious. From this point of view frigidity must be regarded as an attempt to ward off the phantasies so full of danger to the ego. And this would also throw a new light on the unconscious pleasurable feelings which, as various authors have maintained, occur at parturition or, alternatively, on the dread of childbirth. For (just because of the disproportion between the vagina and the baby and because of the pain to which this gives rise) parturition would be calculated to a far greater extent than subsequent sexual intercourse to stand to the unconscious for a realiza-

[16] Since the possibility of such a connection occurred to me I have learnt to construe in this sense, i.e. as representing the dread of vaginal injury, many phenomena which I was previously content to interpret as castration-phantasies in the male sense.

tion of those early incest-phantasies, a realization to which no guilt is attached. The female genital anxiety, like the castration-dread of boys, invariably bears the impress of feelings of guilt and it is to them that it owes its lasting influence.

A further factor in the situation, and one which works in the same direction, is a certain consequence of the anatomical difference between the sexes. I mean that the boy can inspect his genital to see whether the dreaded consequences of onanism are taking place; the girl, on the other hand, is literally in the dark on this point and remains in complete uncertainty. Naturally this possibility of a reality-test does not weigh with boys in cases where the castration-anxiety is acute, but in the slighter cases of fear, which are practically more important because they are more frequent, I think that this difference is very important. At any rate the analytical material which has come to light in women whom I have analysed has led me to conclude that this factor plays a considerable part in feminine mental life and that it contributes to the peculiar inner uncertainty so often met with in women.

Under the pressure of this anxiety the girl now takes refuge in a fictitious male rôle.

What is the economic gain of this flight? Here I would refer to an experience which probably all analysts have had: they find that the desire to be a man is generally admitted comparatively willingly and that, when once it is accepted, it is clung to tenaciously, the reason being the desire to avoid the realization of libidinal wishes and phantasies in connection with the father. Thus the wish to be a man subserves the repression of these feminine wishes or the resistance against their being brought to light. This constantly recurring, typical experience compels us, if we are true to analytical principles, to conclude that the phantasies of being a man were at an earlier period devised for the very purpose of securing the subject against libidinal wishes in connection with the father. The fiction of maleness enabled the girl to escape from the female rôle now burdened with guilt and anxiety. It is true that this attempt to deviate from her own line to that of the male inevitably brings about a sense of inferiority, for the girl begins to measure herself by pretensions and values which are foreign to her specific biological nature and confronted with which she cannot but feel herself inadequate.

Although this sense of inferiority is very tormenting, analytical experience emphatically shews us that the ego can tolerate it more

easily than the sense of guilt associated with the feminine attitude, and hence it is undoubtedly a gain for the ego when the girl flees from the Scylla of the sense of guilt to the Charybdis of the sense of inferiority.

For the sake of completeness I will add a reference to the other gain which, as we know, accrues to women from the process of identification with the father which takes place at the same time. I know of nothing with reference to the importance of this process itself to add to what I have already said in my earlier work.

We know that this very process of identification with the father is one answer to the question why the flight from feminine wishes in regard to the father always leads to the adoption of a masculine attitude. Some reflections connected with what has already been said reveals another point of view which throws some light on this question.

We know that, whenever the libido encounters a barrier in its development, an earlier phase of organization is regressively activated. Now according to Freud's latest work penis-envy forms the preliminary stage to the true object-love for the father. And so this train of thought suggested by Freud helps us to some comprehension of the inner necessity by which the libido flows back precisely to this preliminary stage whenever and in so far as it is driven back by the incest-barrier.

I agree in principle with Freud's notion that the girl develops towards object-love by way of penis-envy, but I think that the nature of this evolution might also be pictured differently.

For when we see how large a part of its strength accrues to primary penis-envy only by retrogression from the Œdipus complex, we must resist the temptation to interpret in the light of penis-envy the manifestations of so elementary a principle of nature as that of the mutual attraction of the sexes.

Whereupon, being confronted with the question how we should conceive psychologically of this primal, biological principle, we should again have to confess ignorance. Indeed, in this respect the conjecture forces itself more and more strongly upon me that perhaps the causal connection may be the exact converse and that it is just the attraction to the opposite sex, operating from a very early period, which draws the libidinal interest of the little girl to the penis. This interest, in accordance with the level of development reached, acts at first in an auto-erotic and narcissistic manner, as I have described before. If we view these relations thus, fresh problems would logically present

themselves with regard to the origin of the male Œdipus complex, but I wish to postpone these for a later paper. But, if penis-envy were the first expression of that mysterious attraction of the sexes, there would be nothing to wonder at either when analysis discloses its existence in a yet deeper layer than that in which the desire for a child and the tender attachment to the father occur. The way to this tender attitude towards the father would be prepared not simply by disappointment in regard to the penis but in another way as well. We should then instead have to conceive of the libidinal interest in the penis as a kind of ' partial love ', to use Abraham's term.[17] Such love, he says, always forms a preliminary stage to true object-love. We might explain the process too by an analogy from later life : I refer to the fact that admiring envy is specially calculated to lead to an attitude of love.

With regard to the extraordinary ease with which this regression takes place I must mention the analytical discovery [18] that in the associations of female patients the narcissistic desire to possess the penis and the object-libidinal longing for it are often so interwoven that one hesitates as to the sense in which the words ' desire for it ' [19] are meant.

One word more about the castration-phantasies proper, which have given their name to the whole complex because they are the most striking part of it. According to my theory of feminine development I am obliged to regard these phantasies also as a secondary formation. I picture their origin as follows : when the woman takes refuge in the fictitious male rôle her feminine genital anxiety is to some extent translated into male terms—the fear of vaginal injury becomes a phantasy of castration. The girl gains by this conversion, for she exchanges the uncertainty of her expectation of punishment (an uncertainty conditioned by her anatomical formation) for a concrete idea. Moreover, the castration-phantasy too is under the shadow of the old sense of guilt—and the penis is desired as a proof of guiltlessness.

Now these typical motives for flight into the male rôle—motives whose origin is the Œdipus complex—are reinforced and supported by the actual disadvantage under which women labour in social life. Of

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[17] Abraham : *Versuch einer Entwicklungsgeschichte der Libido*, 1924.

[18] Freud referred to this in *The Taboo of Virginity*.

[19] German : *Haben-Wollen*.

course we must recognize that the desire to be a man, when it springs from this last source, is a peculiarly suitable form of rationalization of those unconscious motives. But we must not forget that this disadvantage is actually a piece of reality and that it is immensely greater than most women are aware of.

Georg Simmel says in this connection that ' the greater importance attaching to the male sociologically is probably due to his position of superior strength ', and that historically the relation of the sexes may be crudely described as that of master and slave. Here, as always, it is ' one of the privileges of the master that he has not constantly to think that he is master, whilst the position of the slave is such that he can never forget it '.

Here we probably have the explanation also of the under-estimation of this factor in analytical literature. In actual fact a girl is exposed from birth onwards to the suggestion—inevitable, whether conveyed brutally or delicately—of her inferiority, an experience which must constantly stimulate her masculinity complex.

There is one further consideration. Owing to the hitherto purely masculine character of our civilization it has been much harder for women to achieve any sublimation which should really satisfy their nature, for all the ordinary professions have been filled by men. This again must have exercised an influence upon women's feelings of inferiority, for naturally they could not accomplish the same as men in these masculine professions and so it appeared that there was a basis in fact for their inferiority. It seems to me impossible to judge to how great a degree the unconscious motives for the flight from womanhood are reinforced by the actual social subordination of women. One might conceive of the connection as an interaction of psychic and social factors. But I can only indicate these problems here, for they are so grave and so important that they require a separate investigation.

The same factors must have quite a different effect on the man's development. On the one hand they lead to a much stronger repression of his feminine wishes, in that these bear the stigma of inferiority ; on the other hand it is far easier for him successfully to sublimate them.

In the foregoing discussion I have put a construction upon certain problems of feminine psychology which in many points differs from the views hitherto current. It is possible and even probable that the picture I have drawn is one-sided from the opposite point of view. But my primary intention in this paper was to indicate a possible source of error arising out of the sex of the observer, and by so doing

to make a step forward towards the goal which we are all striving to reach : to get beyond the subjectivity of the masculine or the feminine standpoint and to obtain a picture of the mental development of woman which shall be truer to the facts of her nature—with its specific qualities and its differences from that of man—than any we have hitherto achieved.

NEUROSIS AND THE WHOLE PERSONALITY[1]

BY

FRANZ ALEXANDER

In any wider survey of the development of our views on psycho-neurotic disease the line of this development is found to be characterized by the ever-increasing consideration given to the illness as an expression of the whole personality. It is only fair to recognize that our science has aimed at this from the very beginning. But it is in this particular direction that Freud's latest theoretical work denotes an advance; it has contributed pre-eminently towards an understanding of the mental manifestations of disease in their relation to the personality as a whole. Freud's attempted reconstruction of the structure of the mental apparatus is no speculation. It is a necessary consequence of the empirical material obtained from analysis; it is ever being confirmed by the experience gained in individual cases, and it indicates the way for further investigation of the structure of this apparatus in detail.

The path of progress in psycho-analysis might be characterized just as well by stating that, whereas in the first instance our interest was directed principally to the repressed material, to the manifestations of the repressed instinctual impulses, we are gradually occupying ourselves more and more with the nature of the repressing agent itself, with the motivations and the trajectories of repression. Speaking rather crudely, yet expressing all that is essential, we might say: at first we got to know the repressed, nowadays we are getting to know the repressing factor. We first grasped the subject-matter of the language of the unconscious, whilst now we are seeking to understand its grammar, its construction. It is not quite accurate to say that at first we investigated the libido and nowadays we explore the ego, because the repressing agent makes use of the libido itself. To take the example of moral masochism: we are concerned here not with differences of quality but above all with divergent directions. We could say that whilst the manifestations of the repressed are centrifugal, those of the repressing agent are centripetal. That is also why the manifestations of repressed libido are more violent, more evident, whilst the effects of

[1] A Paper delivered at the Ninth International Psychoanalytic Congress at Homburg, September, 1925.

repression, which is directed inward dynamically, are less evident and often only to be inferred by deduction. That does not imply that this aspect of our science is a mere speculation ; at the most it must frequently make use of deduction from empirical facts, but in this respect it is no more speculative than, let us say, the atomic theory, which frames its conceptions about the structure of matter without ever being able to verify them by direct observation.

The impression grows that investigation of the repressing agent is bound up with even greater difficulties—and, it must and should be said, with greater resistances—than the exploration of the repressed content of the mind. Not only do we find evidence of this resistance in the fact that chronologically the manifestations of the libido were understood first ; but it is more especially noticeable during treatment whenever the unconscious need of punishment, the most characteristic manifestation of the repressing factor, is stirred. The cause of this peculiarly severe resistance is clear. We have long known that a neurotic symptom is the result of a repression that has miscarried. It is the repressing factor that is itself responsible for the non-success of the repression. Freud's observation on the intimate connection between the super-ego and the id may for our purposes be translated into an accusation against the super-ego of having entered into a secret alliance with the id in the neuroses. There is no need to discuss the point that by the agent of repression in the psycho-neuroses we mean the super-ego ; this clearly follows from Freud's conception of the super-ego as the agency set up for the repression of the Œdipus complex. In the neuroses its task is imperfectly fulfilled ; it cannot deny its origin in the id. It imposes penalties which are often drastic and nevertheless it cannot prevent unmodified manifestations of the id finding much more forcible expression than among normal persons. The impression becomes inevitable that it is because of these very punishments, because of this suffering that the neurotic feels he has acquired the right to cling to his ego-dystonic tendencies. However this may be, in the neurotic personality the balance is displaced towards the repressed, the unadulterated id has obtained greater power, even though its manifestations be limited to the life of phantasy and to the formation of symptoms. For this change we shall place the responsibility in the first place on the repressing agency itself.

It necessarily follows, however, even from this consideration that it is not sufficient to unveil the hidden meaning of the symptoms ; on the contrary, the structure of the neurosis can be radically attacked

therapeutically only when the mechanism of the symptom-formation is discovered, when those psychic concatenations that have made possible the formation of symptoms have become conscious. I would call this the economic analysis of the whole personality. The neurosis can only be fundamentally abolished by unmasking the secret alliance between the repressing and the repressed tendencies. The key to all increase in the therapeutic efficacy of our method lies hidden here. Hence this place, the innermost line of defence of the resistances, is the most difficult to occupy. From here a view is obtained of the most private, unofficial attitude of the ego, i.e. the attitude of its governing responsible element towards those impulses which it is by necessity compelled to surrender. Its official attitude is of course known ; the neurosis is regarded as an illness and the person wishes to be rid of it. The tenacity with which the symptoms are retained shows us, however, that this does not represent the ultimate attitude of the entire personality. Let me illustrate the state of affairs by an analogy from political life where the situation in the mind of the individual appears as if magnified under the microscope. The excesses, the lawless actions of an extreme opposition wing are of less interest in any survey of the internal politics of a country than the question how such activities can occur despite all official disclaimers from the responsible leaders. The suspicion is aroused of a secret understanding between the extremists and the party in power, any profound change in the situation being brought about only when this secret alliance is laid bare.

Before beginning my indictment of the repressing factor on account of the part it plays in the formation of neurosis, I must try to describe it as clearly as possible ; but, thanks to our well-grounded knowledge of the process of repression, I can do this very briefly. Two characteristics give us all that is most significant about the repressing factor. Repression is an unconscious process and thus its trajectories are also unconscious ; they deviate from the standpoint of the conscious personality. We are acquainted also with *conscious* inhibitory processes which, contrasted with unconscious repression, we call suppression, renunciation, etc. The distinction between the trajectories of the repressing forces and those of the conscious ego is most clearly observed in the fact that in general more is repressed than would be demanded by consciousness. To take the most striking example, sexual repression: the entire sexual life, even that directed towards exogamous objects, is cramped by the incestuous desires. The cause of this arbitrary excess of repression lies in the genesis of the repressing

agent, whose formation goes back to earliest childhood, thus corresponding to the mental attitude of the child at that time. I have elsewhere explained how the agent of repression becomes gradually more rigid, automatic, ever losing more and more contact with the external world. I called it an introjected legal code of bygone days, which like every such code is conservative.[2] Whilst the conscious ego undergoes further development and liberates itself from sexual restrictions as well as from infantile objects, the repressing agent, especially that of the neurotic, opposes to the claims of sexuality the old prohibitions, the old spirit, maintains the atmosphere of the nursery and so keeps alive a portion of the past.

This description of the repressing agent does not put us in a position to demonstrate in it any secret encouragement of the repressed tendencies. Its origin from the Œdipus complex lays it open to suspicion, it is true ; still a former criminal can become a good policeman. At the most we can so far reproach the super-ego with a certain conservatism but not with a specious neurosis designed to further secret motives. At the most a cramped, hyper-moral character would result from these traits, but not the manifold symptoms of a neurosis with all its opportunities for suffering. Nevertheless the germ of neurosis-formation is found in these qualities of the super-ego. This conservative harshness of the super-ego has momentous consequences for the internal politics of the mind.

When we consider the process by which a neurosis is formed we are struck by the connection existing between the tendencies to self-punishment and the wishes rejected as incompatible with the ego. The connection is so obvious that Freud recognized it from the outset, although the economic laws concealed beneath had not yet been grasped. We gather that the masking, symbolic or otherwise, of a repressed tendency does not alone suffice to enable it to obtain discharge in the form of a symptom, but that the craving for punishment must simultaneously be satisfied. We thus see that the symptom has frequently a double meaning, self-punishment and an ego-dystonic instinctual meaning. For simplicity's sake we could say that the symptom is at the same time id-syntonic and super-ego-syntonic. In other cases these two conflicting tendencies are distributed into two or more correlated symptoms which arise simultaneously. The scope of

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[2] ' Metapsychological Description of the Process of Cure ', International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Vol. VI.

this paper will not permit me to enter into details. In a series of lectures delivered at the Berlin Psycho-Analytical Institute I have attempted to demonstrate these conditions in the various forms of neuroses. Without going into details, however, it will be enough if I recall the structure of the obsessional neurosis or of manic-depressive conditions, where the relationships are most clearly recognizable. I have compared the obsessional neurotic with a conscientious merchant who carefully enters all his debts and liabilities, taking care that the two sides of his book-keeping are always balanced. The obsessional neurotic takes equal care that the symptoms of which the content is masochistic and self-punishing always balance the sadistic ego-dystonic manifestations. On the other hand, he uses all surplus self-punishments, surplus sufferings, as an offset for indulgence of his sadistic desires. In this compulsive way he often makes reparation with the ' right ' hand for the transgressions performed by his wicked left hand.

Everyone knows Freud's conception of the correlation between manic and depressive phases. The revolutionary frenzy of the manic phase follows the super-ego's reign of terror, its fury against the ego ; the tyranny of the super-ego in melancholia serves as a justification for the excesses of the id in mania.

In any particular symptom of hysteria the manifestation of the need for punishment is often less obvious ; it is all the more noticeable in the demeanour of the patient as a whole. We must not forget the chief characteristic of a neurotic symptom : that it signifies suffering. Suffering is the common currency in which all claims of conscience are paid off, as Freud pointed out at the Berlin Congress. It is precisely this which makes the nature of the illness at all comprehensible. Neurosis is an illness and illness implies suffering. We must not lose ourselves in the analysis of the particular symptoms and so overlook the consideration of the patient as a whole. This is a mistake we may leave to our colleagues in medicine. The object of the hysteric's every expression is to proclaim her suffering. The whole of her histrionics is to demonstrate her suffering to those about her. And this irresistible need to publish her suffering is above all an expression of unconscious feelings of guilt. The greater these feelings the greater must be the symptoms of distress. And the more the hysteric suffers the more claims she makes on those around her. She has paid off her liabilities with her sufferings and now she can proceed to make demands. The pre-analytic physician and the intuitions of her relatives both discerned this meaning in the neurosis and in consequence they called it an

imaginary illness. They meant that the neurotic suffers without adequate (or more accurately it might be said without ' apparent ') cause, and herself manufactures her own suffering. They divined too that this suffering has a purpose, namely, to justify the patient's asocial isolation. Many a physician cannot bear neurotics, and treats them impatiently and unkindly, which is his reaction to this secret meaning of the suffering, unconsciously divined. The simple fact of suffering being endured has in itself the greatest economic significance in hysteria, because the need for punishment is often poorly represented in the content of the symptoms.

In outlining the nosological demarcation of the neurotic character I have described a similar law.[3] Whilst the neurotic is simultaneously non-moral and hyper-moral in his *symptoms*, the neurotic character is alternately on the brink of criminality or self-destruction in the *conduct of his life*. He does not live out his hostilities, his asocial tendencies in symptoms, but in deeds ; in contrast with the criminal, however, he does not await the verdict of society but is himself his own judge. Just as impulsively as he gives way to his asocial tendencies does he behave, unconsciously yet tendentiously, in all the important situations of his life, and he himself is the secret arbiter of the tragic justice meted out by his destiny. He may acquire, as did one of my patients, thanks to his absence of inhibitions, enormous fortunes, to lose them again just as quickly with unvarying uniformity under the pressure of conscience. And then the game began over again. Wealth and poverty alternated in his life, just as the phases of mania and melancholia do in certain neurotics and from the same motives.

I have been able to observe this connection, at once invariable and highly significant, between the need of punishment and the repressed contents of the mind most clearly and in greatest detail in two dreams or a series of dreams occurring in the same night.[4] Since my first publication a much greater number of series of dreams thus economically connected has been submitted to investigation. In such pairs of dreams it frequently happens that the one is a punishment-dream, the other a particularly obvious wish-dream (often an emission-dream) with an ego-dystonic content. The economic connection between the two is peculiarly close and it consists in this : that the punishment-

[3] ' The Castration Complex and the Formation of Character ', International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Vol. IV.

[4] F. Alexander, ' Dreams in Pairs and Series ', International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Vol. VI.

dream occurs first and thus enables the wish-dream to take place, since the punishment-dream brings more than enough assuagement of the need for punishment, so that the repressed tendency can then come to expression, often with scarce a disguise, because the censorship is no longer troubled by moral considerations. In other cases the order of succession is reversed. After an obvious wish-dream with an ego-dystonic meaning there remains, so to say, a moral tension which must be allayed by a punishment-dream. I am disposed to say that one cannot sleep peacefully either with unsatisfied repressed wishes or with a bad conscience. A bad conscience, which is a dynamic force just as much as an unsatisfied wish, must receive absolution through a punishment-dream in order that it may no longer disturb sleep. This is the simplest explanation of punishment-dreams.

Daily life often furnishes the clearest confirmation of this law. A neurotic sufferer under my observation was run over by a car and severely injured; the 'accident' was clearly intentional. The next day not only had his depression vanished but his hatred against his father, which had been greatly inhibited up till that moment, broke through in unbridled fury. 'Now I have paid off everything', he said, 'now I can give father a piece of my mind'. And he forthwith set out to claim from his father his share of the family property. The suffering he had gone through broke down all the barriers of repression, his self-punishment released him from all feelings of guilt in respect of his father, which had hitherto inhibited his hostility. The debt had been paid in suffering.

In a serious case of obsessional neurosis of ten years' standing a spontaneous cure occurred when the patient accepted from a relative a subordinate position so badly paid that with the most strenuous overwork he could scarcely support his family. This relative, who was the centre of his guilt complex and to whom he was linked by an unconscious envy, a repetition of the father-complex, freely exploited the patient's masochistic devotion. He was without any symptoms as long as he was engaged in this slavery, but fell ill again when, his fate changing, he had made himself independent and had obtained a much better position both materially and socially. His conscience begrudged him this independent, care-free life; it demanded punishment, found it for a time in his hard conditions and, when fate removed them, produced it in his neurosis. In such cases it would really seem that there is no escape for the neurotic sufferer; he must bear his cross. This is the explanation of the wonderful cures of the apostles; they

liberated sick men from their oppressive sense of sin. Christ, by taking the sins of mankind upon himself, freed mankind from suffering. Guilt and suffering are inseparably associated in the mind.

As a result we find that in the civilization of to-day the moral factor has just the same dynamic and economic importance as the repressed instincts. The moral centre is a ' power-station ', a dynamic factor ; fully to understand mankind we must know these manifestations just as well as the manifestations of the repressed instincts, repressed indeed by the force of this moral power-station. Freud expressed this fact in the classic formula that ' Mankind is not only more immoral but also more moral than it believes itself to be.' Viewing mankind from the purely libidinal side gives a one-sided picture. If my assertion should prove correct that a neurosis, every neurosis indeed, depends upon a pathological relation between the repressing agency and the repressed, a special knowledge of these morbid relations becomes of great therapeutic value.[5]

The nature of this relation can be reconstructed on the basis of the theory of neurosis and dreams which I shall briefly outline here. The meaning of this connection forces itself upon us more especially in the pairs of dreams, but hardly less so in the symptom-formation of an

[5] Th. Reik, in his valuable *Geständiszwang und Strafbedürfniss*, has made the first connected attempt to present the importance of the need for punishment based on Freud's ego-theory ; the work is specially valuable in the sphere of ego-psychology. Reik regards the urge to confession as a compromise-formation between the urge of the repressed material towards manifestation and the need for punishment. Confession is after all a recognition of guilt and leads to punishment. An interesting result of his investigations is the penetrating psychological observation that, by openly confessing his sins, the criminal not merely replaces the inner judge in his own mind, the super-ego, the secret ally of the repressed tendencies, but also the judge in the world without, thus accomplishing a step towards social life. But the symptoms of the neurotic, too, in so far as they signify confession, even though it be unsuccessful, veiled and not recognizable by the patient's environment, betray at least the attempt to relinquish his asocial isolation, to communicate his repressed wish to his environment. Confession is a renunciation of condemnation by one's own super-ego in favour of condemnation by one's fellow-men. In my experience Reik over-estimates the confessional character of the neurotic symptom—the obsessional neurotic betrays his symptoms unwillingly, making use of them instead for his own ends. Reik's exposition is all the same a most penetrating addition to the psychology of the neuroses.

obsessional neurosis, in the excessive significance of suffering in hysteria, in the periodicity of manic-depressive conditions, and in the alternating fate of neurotic characters. The hyper-morality, the hyper-severity, of the neurotic's conscience serves the purpose of the repressive tendencies, in that the punishments imposed, the suffering, the masochistic inverse of the symptoms, in themselves furnish a moral justification for an irruption of the repressed. The hyper-severity and injustice towards himself of the neurotic's conscience, which handicaps him so greatly in action, induces an over-heated revolutionary atmosphere within the mind. The neurotic symptom is an attempt to throw off the burden, the sign of a disturbed equipoise ; but it is an attempt which comes nearer to the claims of the id. The repressed fulfils itself more powerfully in its original form because the pressure is too great, and because the efficiency, one might say the moral accoutrements, of the inhibiting factor are impaired by reason of the suffering that it causes. The core of the whole psychology of the neuroses is contained in the sentence that guilt is redeemed through punishment, through suffering. Through self-punishment, through suffering, the mind of the neurotic is enabled to cling to the objects which the ego has renounced and even to its pregenital aggressive basic attitude. Every such regression to the sadistic stage provokes an exacerbation of the sense of guilt, which in turn calls for renewed suffering ; this leads to further development of the neurosis, by a mechanism similar to that of uncompensated cardiac trouble. This also explains why a neurotic patient holds so tenaciously to the autonomy of his inner legal code and to the execution of the punishment. He can cling to primitive and condemned tendencies while his conscience displays this attitude ; he undergoes punishment and suffering at the dictate of conscience so that he may still cling to that which makes him feel guilty.

The analytic cure is thus not terminated when the repressed material has become conscious. The patient must also renounce his need for punishment ; he must relinquish the punitive spirit of his inner court of justice. As long as the mechanism of compensation for guilt through suffering is in action, the path to the formation of new symptoms is open, however thoroughly the meaning of the patient's symptoms may have been discovered. Not only the meaning of the material but the whole meaning of the symptom-formation must become conscious.

It is not symptoms that must be healed but the neurotic mind with the whole of its psychical appurtenances ; as it is it is comparable only

to an educationist who believes he fulfils all his educational duties by apportioning punishments. Since we know that the super-ego arises during the period of education, it is not very daring to find a causal connection between the neurosis and this spirit which dominates not only education but our modern penal system of justice.

The relations here described between the parts of the mental apparatus can be formulated, divested of its psychological content, in a purely economic law. Such a formulation must assuredly be welcome to those who have preserved some feeling of reverence for the mechanistic scientific conceptions in which we were all brought up, and so only unwillingly subscribe to a psychological reconstruction of the mind entailing such a far-reaching ' personification ' of its components.

Our old classical dynamic construction that the mental processes are compromise-formations between ego-syntonic and ego-dystonic instinctual tendencies, which still holds good in essence, must above all be modified by replacing the term ' ego-syntonic ' by ' super-ego-syntonic ' ; implying that the *unconscious* is responsible for the effective moral demands and for repression in general. We thus assume that the mental apparatus comprises two great unconscious forces working in opposite directions : the instinctual, motility-seeking, centrifugal tendencies of the id, and the centripetal inhibitory tendencies of the repressing agent with its moral and masochistic content. This latter centre of force can be conceived of as an extension of the moral pressure of society into the internal region of the ego, as a phenomenon of adaptation, the adaptation of mankind to the civilization which mankind has created. Every process within the mind is subject to the working of both the forces. And so we see that in neurosis there is no stable equilibrium between these two forces, but that manifestations take place simultaneously or alternatively either by reinforcement of the centripetal pressure, that is, the hyper-morality of the neurotic, or, in reaction thereto, by reinforcement of the centrifugal tendencies of the id, which is expressed in a return of the repressed. Conversely, we note also in the reciprocal process how the irruption of the repressed causes in turn a reactive aggravation of the punishment-tendencies. This phenomenon might also be expressed thus : in the normal person a qualitatively new tendency—sublimation—is formed, arising from a fusion of the two antagonistic forces, i.e. instincts are ' domesticated ' and their activity directed to the external world ; whereas in the neurotic the aboriginal unmodified tendencies persist side by side, the crudely masochistic and the primitive ego-dystonic, this endless

oscillation to and fro being mutually destructive. The result is the indifference of the neurotic towards the external world.

This leads to a revision of our ideas on symptom-formation ; we have hitherto conceived that this was sufficiently explained through the symbolic or other disguise of its secret meaning. But we now see that another important economic factor is necessary, namely, a weakening in the efficiency of the repressing agency, as I have attempted to show. The essence of the weakening consists in this : the super-ego forfeits its efficacy in repression owing to the all-embracing penal system by which it carries out its task of controlling and repressing the instincts. Punishment imposed, its duty is fulfilled and it can now close its eyes to the sallies of the id. If we take the unconscious nature of repression seriously it must be obvious that the disguise of its latent meaning does not suffice to explain symptom-formation. Disguising the meaning is only of importance to consciousness, serving to shelter the condemned tendency from the conscious ego's refusal to countenance it. For the unconscious censorship, for the real repressing agent, this disguise has no value. The best proof of this is that although the meaning be disguised feelings of guilt do arise. The repressing agent understands the language of the unconscious and is not taken in. It imposes punishment for wishes which cannot enter consciousness at all or only in disguise. We cannot explain the unconscious need of punishment unless we are prepared to accept an unconscious moral agency which is in direct contact with the unconscious and this agency is not one to be deceived by any mechanism of concealment ; it must be placated by suffering.

We have almost an experimental proof of the great economic value attaching to feelings of guilt and self-punishment in symptom-formation beside the accompanying concealment of meaning, a proof which is a common phenomenon in treatment and which must be known to most psycho-analysts ; I mean a kind of temporary ' negative therapeutic reaction '. When the work of interpretation is progressing well, the meaning of the symptoms or of the transference-situation very convincingly brought home, there occurs very frequently, perhaps during every analysis, a period when the patient seems to turn with full force against himself ; it may be by means of repeated parapraxes, which can on occasion even bring about severe bodily injuries, or by professional or occupational mistakes, or even by organic diseases psychically determined. It is as if the patient were to answer sulkily to our explanations about the ego-dystonic part of his individuality :

'I believe all you say, it is quite true. I am a scoundrel but don't *I* punish *myself* sufficiently and what more can you ask of me?' The deep narcissistic basis of this autonomic penal system is made impressively clear to us on these occasions.

In concluding this survey it is impossible to ignore a problem which has hitherto been treated somewhat cavalierly by psycho-analysts: the problem of health. We know that in the ultimate result all our actions are manifestations, even though modified manifestations, of the id, that our sublimations are derived from the Œdipus complex, and here we have been at pains to show that the repressing factor is not to be imposed upon in this regard. It detects smuggled goods however well concealed and demands payment of the duty. How is it that sublimations and so-called normal behaviour excite no feelings of guilt, that these have not to be paid for in suffering. Therapeutically put, the question would be: What is the change in the instinctual life which we, or rather the patient's conscience, demand of him so as to excite no sense of guilt? It is obvious that the standpoint of the conscious ego representing reality must be carried into action. But that in truth says nothing. It is clear that this problem is really nothing less than the psychology of morality. Upon this point Freud has really already said all that is essential: that the content of the neuroses will change with a change in the moral attitude of society. Thus there is nothing of great import to say. As far as its content is concerned, a change in the instinctual life which would make it in keeping with the ego would conform to the prevailing prejudices and convictions, in a word, to the contemporary state of society, and does not constitute any true psychological problem for the therapeutist. But the therapeutic aim is a practical one, and often where this comes to an end there the most entrancing problems to the unpractical curiosity of the scientific worker begin. Allow me to make an attempt, not indeed to solve this problem, but at least to throw light upon it.

So far as the unsublimated instinctual life is concerned, the answer is easy and known to all of us. We see again and again that attainment of the genital stage, the positive erotic relation to exogamic objects, signifies a resolution of the sense of guilt and the acquiescence of the deepest unconscious layers of the conscience. But the question is not so readily answered in the sphere of social relationships, of sublimations. Following up a hint of Freud's, Sachs has attempted to solve the problem in respect of the art of literature in a highly interesting manner. In his view it is the social factor which distinguishes writing

from phantasy-weaving, and it is precisely this social factor, of communicating to others and overstepping the bounds of one's own personality, that dissipates the sense of guilt—the fact that an effect is made upon others in a positive way. I believe, however, that this idea is of more universal validity, that it is not applicable only to writing but holds good for every cultural activity, for every sublimation which has any relation to others. I regard social efficiency as a derivative of genitality ; I see it as the erotic factor in Freud's sense, the principle of Eros which welds individuals into larger units, mankind into society. When Rank speaks of a biological sense of guilt representing the claims of the species, I should regard it as the task of the social conscience, which is more easily conceived of psychologically, to protect social behaviour and the sublimated impulses by sanctioning these developments of Eros and by reacting against the impulses of destruction with feelings of guilt. In the sense in which Abraham speaks of the ' genital ' character we can also speak of a ' genital stage ' in social conduct. In point of fact the artist's creative difficulties show how the interest which should be dedicated to the work is replaced by more narcissistically-toned emotions, such as feelings of rivalry, questions of prestige, grievances about technique, and feelings of inferiority ; in short, how the genital character of creation is overlaid by the symptom-complex of the conflict with the father. A social act silences the feelings of guilt ; it has in the normal man an economic function similar to that of suffering in the neurotically sick. But the neurotic pays with a coin of narcissistic value—he is able to draw from his suffering masochistic pleasure—whilst an act that is socially directed is an active performance that can be of use to others. A new creative work, in any sphere, is a representation of new life, a creation of Eros, leading to forgiveness for even the primal crime. I am led to think of the Tannhäuser *motif*, the very earliest version of which is reproduced in an African tale in Frobenius' collection. A judge pardons a murderer who has committed incest, on condition that the withered branch with which the murder was committed (a symbol of the instinct of destruction after it has been wholly divested of Eros) puts forth new shoots. The primal law of human conscience is contained in this sentence : that life extinguished can only be expiated by life renewed. And it is in accordance with *this* law that Eros becomes the successor to the instinct of destruction, which in Freud's view points out to Eros the way ; Eros follows the destructive instinct in order to mingle with it and repair its ravages.

PROJECTION

BY

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For years now both psychiatry and psychology have been faced with the question : How does it happen that in the case of one part of our mental processes we transfer the cause to an external world, while we localize the other part within ourselves ? This externalization-process is called projection. The first group comprises our sense-perceptions ; the second, our internal mental processes.

As is the case with so many other mental processes, actuality has been given to this psychological question by psychopathology. This is due not only to the fact that projection occurs with greater frequency and strength in pathological life, but also to the fact that it occurs in phenomena which are regarded in normal life as belonging to the internal mental processes.

We shall begin this short paper with a review of the cases of pathological projection.

In hallucination the occurrence of projection is at once evident. Here the patient declares that he perceives something, while we assume that it is a process in his internal mental life that is taking place. How is it possible—the question has been asked ever since psychiatry existed—for the patient to confound, in so pronounced a fashion, his internal and his external life ? The older psychiatry explained this crudely by assuming that the excitation-process in the cerebral cortex was reflected from the periphery. Perhaps Wernicke's disjunction-hypothesis is rather less naïve. He assumes that there takes place in the cerebrum a kind of reflection from the sensorial surface of the brain on to a hypothetical disjunction-area, and that in this way the excitation-process is strengthened. Both these hypotheses are too simple to be seriously discussed.

In autochthonous delusion the patient asserts that thoughts spring up in him which, unlike his other thoughts, have not been caused or willed by himself ; they have been evoked by something outside of him, without his desiring them and without his being able to control them. As Wernicke has already pointed out, this shows a very strong likeness to hallucination. In the latter, however, the mental process

is reproduced in images, while in autochthonous delusion the thought-character is preserved.

Delusion of reference also shows projection. A certain mental disposition, which need not at present be described more particularly, causes the patient to notice peculiar connections and relations between the external world and his person, which do not correspond to normal objective observation, i.e. in this case also the outer world has been altered. In ordinary delusion-formation we have similar conditions ; here, too, the external world has undergone a transformation—with the delusion of persecution in the sense of an injury to personal interests, with megalomania in the sense of an advancement of them. In every delusion a projection takes place, and the patient seeks the cause, not in an alteration in his internal mental life, but in an altered attitude of the external world to his personality.

Projection is, however, also demonstrable in cases which much more closely approach the normal. The environment undergoes alteration in abnormal persons, although in a less degree. While this does not become completely objective, as it does in delusion, and can, to a certain extent, be corrected, it nevertheless unmistakably externalizes an internal mental process.

We find, therefore, in all these cases, which are either entirely or partially pathological, the noteworthy fact that mental processes normally considered as caused within ourselves are projected by the patient and transferred into the external world. We can also say here that it is precisely the externalization in these phenomena that is considered pathological by the normal man.

Yet projection considered in itself is not a pathological phenomenon, since it also occurs extensively in normal mental life. Something else must be present in the cases mentioned above to justify our regarding them as pathologically symptomatic.

We turn now to normal mental life, and emphasize the fact that we can divide our mental functions into two large classes : 1. our sense-perceptions, and 2. our memories (images), thoughts, will-processes, and the accompanying feelings. Only the former are projected ; the latter form our inner world, and are opposed to the former ; and the question arises : What can be the reason of this very peculiar, and also very characteristic, behaviour ?

A perception is just as much a mental process as a thought ; why then is a perception localized without and a thought within ? What is the meaning of these two attributes : ' within ' and ' without ' ?

The difference between a projected and a non-projected mental world is quite definite. We are never in any doubt as to whether we are perceiving, or imagining or thinking anything, and the difference cannot be explained by the varying intensity of either process. There are strong ideas and weak perceptions. A perception can be gradually weakened until it disappears beneath the threshold, but an idea will never result from it. Conversely a strengthened idea will never become a perception.

When we experience a thought or any other mental process, if we can follow it more or less deeply to its origin, we find either one or several other thoughts that have awakened the first. We discover in this way a series, varying in length, of inner mental processes, which precede the conscious thought. At the end we arrive at a perception which was projected into the external world.

We cannot do the same for perception ; in this case we are not able to indicate a series of mental processes that can be taken as the cause of perception. When we open our eyes or experience any other sense-perception, we have to see what is before our eyes, or feel what touches our skin. We are absolutely unable to influence our perceptions in the same way as we influence our internal mental processes ; these latter are partly subjected to our will, we have called them forth ourselves, and have them in our power ; they are literally our possession.

This difference between a perception and an inner mental process is of profound importance, and we are always directly aware of it. It is the cause of our distinguishing instantly and unhesitatingly between the two and never being in error about them. Perception is not caused by ourselves ; it is a non-ego ; it is only the memory-image it leaves behind that becomes an internal process, belonging to the ego, and can be recalled at will. The external world is, however, also a non-ego. We cannot influence it directly, at the most we can only do so indirectly.

It is obvious that this distinction must be of vast importance for our mental life, and that it is suited to be used in clarifying our knowledge of the difference between the two kinds of mental processes.

Mental life begins phylogenetically and ontogenetically with perceptions ; the internal mental world which arises later is developed from our perceptions and from memory-images. Hence there is a period in which only perceptions (sensations) and memory-images are present. This explains why children and primitive races project so much more frequently and vividly than we do.

We turn now once more to the domain of pathology, i.e. to those phenomena which in normal life are regarded as internal mental processes, but in pathological states are transferred to the external world.

Freudian psycho-analysis has taught us that in all these cases the cause of the inner mental process is to be found in the unconscious, and therefore in a region that is withdrawn from the reach of our conscious mental activities. The unconscious is, however, also the unknown; it is a sphere that is entirely withdrawn from our will, and is in this respect quite comparable to the external world. Here again, therefore, we have an example of a mental process the cause of which resides in a non-ego and is for that reason not located in the person himself, but is shifted into an external world. A delusional thought can be altered just as little as a perception; the former is projected quite like a perception, and as a perception, after sufficient repetition, is permanently accepted as valid, so a delusional thought and every internal mental process that is projected must be conceived and employed as objective truth.

As we have already said, this outward projection presupposes an alteration in the external world. Subjectively the person remains unchanged; and this again explains why all knowledge of being ill has been lost in the case of every projection, whether delusional idea or hallucination.

We have pointed out that in the case of normal perception there is a sharp line of demarcation between the external and the internal psychical process. There is never any doubt about our distinguishing between a perception and an idea; there are no transition-stages between them. These occur quite often, however, in pathology.

An amnesia, varying both as regards intensity and locality, is always presupposed in the unconscious. Freud has already dealt in a lucid manner with the obsessional processes. In these a very peculiar form of amnesia takes place. The compulsion is not projected, but is localized in the personality itself, and in line with this there is also the knowledge of being ill. There is always projection in hysteria and schizophrenia. As Freud has rightly shown, compulsion is not accompanied by complete amnesia—at least not in the usual sense of a loss of memories. The patient remembers everything, but the connection between the memory and the symptoms has been lost. Hence the reason for the absence of projection; there is no defect, there is simply the omission of an associative link with a single complex, namely, with the symptom of the disease. In other ways the original cause of

illness can still be reached from consciousness. The patient suffering from obsession has a kind of partial lesion, the cause of illness has not become quite unconscious. Hence the more deeply unconscious the cause is, the stronger is the feeling of projection, and the more pronounced the appearance of objective reality. In the delusion of schizophrenia a far more remote regression takes place; it goes back to the hereditary unconscious, common to us all—to the collective unconscious of Jung.

Even the purely affective delusion of manic-depressive psychosis is less projected than that of schizophrenia. In contrast to obsession these diseases affect the whole personality; everything is either gloomy or gaily-coloured, while in every case of obsessional neurosis only a part of the personality is affected. There always remains another part which is normal and judges the pathological part. Manic-depressive psychosis and schizophrenia have this feature of the general character of the disturbance in common. They differ, however, in respect to the part played by the affective factors. In manic-depressive psychosis these alone are primarily effective; they play only a subordinate part in influencing the content of the internal psychical processes.

Only the light that Freudian psycho-analysis has brought us has made it possible for me to take this view of the projection of internal psychical processes and their transformation into objective mental processes.

Summary

1. Projection is an externalization of a psychical process. This does not mean that the psychical process itself is not within us, but merely that its cause is located outside.

2. This externalization leads to the distinction between an internal and an external mental world.

3. It is characteristic of psychoses that psychical processes which are normally regarded as taking place within the personality, are transferred outwards.

4. This pathological projection, so far as the mechanism of its origin is concerned, coincides with normal projection.

5. An internal mental process is projected when the cause of its origin is not known by the personality, i.e. when it is located in the unconscious, and the person has no control over it. The completeness

of the projection is in direct proportion to the particular unconscious region influencing consciousness, i.e. to the remoteness of the regression.

6. Projection considered psychologically and psychopathologically means ' having no influence on a psychical process '.

THE GENESIS OF THE FEMININE SUPER-EGO

BY

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According to Freud the Œdipus-complex of a boy is wrecked on castration-anxiety. The presupposition here is that a boy seeks to take his father's place, is threatened in consequence with the loss of his penis, and tries to put himself in the place of his mother. The male child, in order to save himself from castration, identifies himself with the authority of the parents, especially with that of the father, and of the incest-prohibition associated with the father's personality. By this identification he builds up his super-ego, which spurs him on and gives him the power to oppose and overcome the Œdipus-wishes.

The question is: What takes the place of castration-anxiety in the case of a girl? Does she possess anything equivalent to this, giving her power in the same degree to form a super-ego? According to Freud, the influences of education and of threatened loss of affection have far more effect in driving a girl to abandon the Œdipus-complex and form a super-ego than on a boy.

Now I believe I can show that it is probable that a girl possesses something which can be regarded as perhaps completely equivalent to a boy's castration-anxiety. I find this equivalent in the infantile femininity of a little girl, and, as compared with a boy's, in the more pronounced masochistic and passive attitude that is contained in it from the outset. This view is based, it is true, on a certain rectification of the conception we have hitherto held, namely, that the original type of sexuality in the female child is masculine.

I have the impression that we have not only emphasised this too exclusively, but have considered is as too primary. I believe rather that already at a very early stage expression is given in a little girl's mind to her feminine nature, and that the mode of this expression corresponds to an unconscious knowledge of the passive part of the female genital apparatus, i.e. of the vagina; further, that the penis-envy indicates a reaction-formation (though also a very early one) against this knowledge and against the passive attitude.

In order to form a proper estimate of this, we must refer to an important relation that the two great systems in the mind—the ego

and the id—bear to one another. From the outset the function and endeavour of the ego is to be active, all the more because it has a life-long difficulty in achieving a full and fruitful activity, since, indeed, it really never reaches and never can reach, in this regard, a satisfying result. The differentiation of the ego from the id must be placed at a very early period; and at this point there begins the struggle of the ego for activity against the claims of the id. It has to rise up and defend itself from the exactions of the id, and escape from the danger of being overmastered by it.

The relation of the ego to its id, however, reveals an important difference between the two sexes. The demand of the masculine id, so far as its sexual striving is concerned, tends, as it develops, towards overpowering the woman, while the demand of the feminine id, on the other hand, tends towards being overpowered by the man.

This means that the ego, in its concern for activity, can find in the masculine sexual striving which has an active purpose a support, a trend in the direction of its own aims; while in the feminine trend which is directed towards a passive aim it must see an opposing force, a danger, and not a support. This noteworthy difference in the relation of the ego to the masculine and the feminine id is of the most decisive importance for the question we are considering.

If we are right in asserting that a little girl shows so soon a primary, passive attitude corresponding to an unconscious knowledge of the passive part of her genital apparatus, then this passive attitude constitutes an equivalent to the castration-anxiety of a boy. As the latter finds protection against the threatened passivity (of castration) in the increased activity of the ego that results from the formation of the super-ego, so a girl, by establishing the reaction-formation of the super-ego, finds protection against the incestuous trend that also appears as a danger to her ego because it involves her being overpowered.

If she were to yield to the incestuous trend, the result would be a danger of violation by her father and of the loss of her mother's love. In addition there would also be a loss of the father's love, in so far as a girl sees in him a judge, a ruler, and a representative of every law-giving power.

In the case of a girl the reaction-formation of the super-ego finds ground already prepared, which is lacking—at least in the same sense—in the case of a boy, viz.: the penis-envy, or, better, the penis-phantasy. This we have already suggested as the first reaction-formation against

the primary, passive, masochistic attitude of a girl which is regarded as a danger by the infantile ego. The female child's phantasy of the possession of a penis continues to exist unconsciously beneath the conscious, rationalizing idea that she once possessed a penis ' only ' it has been taken away, and is an expression of the need to cancel out the primary feminine attitude. This cancelling reaction-formation of the penis-ideal is essential for the feminine ideal-ego ; on this foundation the girl's super-ego can be established later on.

If we emphasize the indestructible feminine phantasy of the possession of a penis, and if we admit, as we ought to do, the *psychical* reality of the imagined penis in the case of a girl alongside the corporeal reality of the penis in the case of the boy, then we can speak positively of a feminine castration-anxiety as well as of a masculine. Many adult women, in their parapraxes and dreams, behave entirely ' as if ' they possess a member, the loss of which they have constantly to fear. This ' deprivation-anxiety ' connected with the possible loss of a penis is, unless I am deceived, at least as great as the castration-anxiety of men ; indeed it is, if anything, greater.

This dreaded loss of an imagined penis is the infantile precursor, and later on the nucleus, of the loss of the feminine super-ego, an ego-formation which provides security against the passively feminine wish to be violated already adumbrated in infancy. This wish—regarded always in the light of the ego's tendencies to activity and independence —signifies for the ego a greater danger than the actively-masculine wish to violate ; for this can be regarded by the ego as a danger only in special circumstances, e.g. when it exists simultaneously with a conflict against an overpowering rival (the castrating father) or with a passively homosexual attitude. Apart from such complications it tends in the same direction as the activity of the ego.

The infantile ego, which is confronted with the task of overcoming the Œdipus complex, is, in comparison with the ego of the adult, still weak and only in process of formation. Yet it finds itself faced with greater difficulties than those with which the adult has to deal ; for though the sexual impulses of the infantile ego are actually weaker than those of the adult, yet they are relatively stronger. The principal objects towards which they are directed, and by which they are roused, are the all-powerful parents. Hence there comes into being a relation of the ego to the id, which, so far as concerns the greatness of the danger threatening the ego from the id, can never be found again at any later period. A boy is guided by the danger of castration, a

girl by that of violation by the overpowering father. Both protect themselves against these dangers by the reaction-formation of the super-ego. No urgency of equal importance exists any longer in adult life.

A large number of questions arise from what has been submitted here : What are the empirical foundations and the theoretical supports for the assertion of a primary infantile passively-feminine attitude ? What place is to be given to this conception in the theory of the stages of libidinal organization ? What significance, in this connection, has the phallic stage of organization for a girl ? Does the penis-wish exist only as a reaction-formation, or is there also a primary form of it ? Has it one or several meanings ? What is the relation of the developmental sequence penis-wish—child-wish to the attitude of a girl to her father ? [1] What significance for the formation of the super-ego have the actively-masculine and the passively-feminine trends in the processes of identification and desexualization, and what is their relation to the psychical systems ? Limits of space, however, compel us to content ourselves with what has been said, and to await a further opportunity for consideration of all these conclusions and hypotheses.[2]

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[1] Cf. Freud, ' Einige psychische Folgen des anatomischen Geschlechtsunterschiedes ', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. XI, 1925.

[2] After reading in manuscript a paper by Karen Horney, ' The Flight from Womanhood ', which she read some time ago before the Berlin Society, I cannot omit a reference to the fact that, while there is considerable difference between her work and mine and even occasional contradiction, several striking and gratifying points of agreement are to be noticed. E.g. in her paper a girl's ' dread of vaginal injury ' is paralleled by the boy's castration-anxiety, and a girl's violation-anxiety is ' the equivalent of a boy's castration-anxiety ' ; her idea also that the ' masculine phantasy ' is a security against libidinal wishes towards the father partly coincides with my conception of the ' penis-phantasy ' as a reaction-formation against the wishes to be violated by the father that expose the ego to danger. This agreement seems to me all the more noteworthy from the fact that both of us not only support our statements by independent observations made in the course of analytic practice, but evidently reach our common ground by following individually lines of thought that are quite different.

A PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR IN THE ÆTIOLOGY OF DESCENSUS UTERI, LACERATION OF THE PERINEUM AND VAGINISMUS

BY

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Gynæcology is chiefly concerned with the physical condition and position of the genital organs. Sometimes psycho-analysis is able to contribute an interpretation of the phenomena in terms of libido and explain the present conditions in terms of the patient's past love attachments and his capacity to renounce infantile sexuality for an exogamous genital gratification. The physiology of use must be supplemented by a ' physiology of pleasure ' (Ferenczi).

In the psycho-analytical literature we read of the genitalization of other organs and learn something of the changes so produced, but little has been said of the changes in the genitals themselves when not acting as the central erotic organ of the body. Recent investigations have led me to think that weakness of the pelvic floor and of the suspending ligaments of the uterus may be evidence that the genital stage has not been reached or maintained, and that loss of ' tone ' in these tissues is a sign of ' degenitalization '. A case to illustrate this point.

A woman of twenty-seven, six years married, suffered from horror of intercourse—she feared something terrible would happen to herself and to her husband ; she was also constipated, having no ' power ' to expel fæces, and did not perceive the call to stool. She developed prolapse, and was treated with douches, pessaries and pads, but without relief ; she was convinced the treatment would do her no good. In the course of time her fears diminished to some extent and consenting to coitus she had a child, but it died soon after birth. She conceived the idea that she had suffocated it *in utero* by pressing on the umbilical cord with a vaginal nozzle used as an enema nozzle. Her dread of sexual relations returned, and the bearing-down pain and dragging sensations and heaviness in the legs grew worse. The analysis of the horror of intercourse led to the discovery of unconscious phantasies of strangling, squeezing, and ' nipping ' her husband's and father's penis ; any activity of the pelvic floor was sufficient to evoke these terrible thoughts, whether the activity was in sexual intercourse

or in the contraction of the pelvic muscles when at stool. She felt it ' terribly wrong ' to move these parts in any way, actively or passively. They suffered from a hysterical paresis. This may account for the beginning of the prolapse, but it does not explain one feature of her response to it. After the purpose of the treatment with pessaries became clear to her, she felt convinced that treatment would do her no good, for, as analysis showed, she saw in the descent of the uterus the possibility of obtaining a protruding genital which she had envied in her brother. The gynæcologists' efforts were being defeated by an unconscious wish, or rather several: the need for self-punishment expressed in the continuance of the pains, ' which were like labour pains ' (and like them gratifying to the unconscious !), and by the cancellation of the castration-complex by growing the coveted organ herself. The case is interesting because it shows that in a branch of medicine where physical factors are usually regarded as providing a complete explanation of the condition, psychological factors prove to be of great importance. Are there other departments of the subject where psychical factors may be added to the ætiology of a ' physical ' disorder ?

No one acquainted with psycho-analysis doubts the hysterical basis of vaginismus, which is one of the most striking examples of lack of psycho-sexual adaptation to a partner. But in the whole period of pregnancy we find hysterical manifestations, vomiting in the early months and ' false alarms ' at imagined parturitions in the later ones. We are therefore led to examine parturition itself to see what neurotic manifestations may be found there. But first a word on normal labour. The uterine contractions exert a force proportional to the resistance of the lower genital canal ; ' the perineum is able to bear all the force *instinctively* exerted without injury ', as Denman [1] wrote nearly a hundred years ago ; but if the woman, from excitement or from pain, begins to use all her force to end the labour speedily we know that there is grave risk of laceration of the perineum. At this juncture, if the diagnosis of a normal presentation has been made, and the course has been regular, the obstetrician begins to render active assistance, he calms the patient and directs her when to exert force and when to desist. In other terms, he supplies the allo-erotic element required to make a unified psycho-sexual response to the genital

[1] Thomas Denman : ' An Introduction to the Practice of Midwifery ', London, 6th Ed., 1829, p. 135.

stimulus. For this reason no doubt many women who would choose a gynæcologist of their own sex prefer a male obstetrician. Some women in labour behave 'hysterically', as the saying goes, they exert their force at the wrong time and do not respond to the advice of the physician, they do not take the tempo of their voluntary exertions from the rhythm of the uterine contractions nor from the bidding of their obstetrician. The sexual element in the situation, the genital relation to a father-imago, places a greater strain on their super-ego than it will bear, the patient loses touch with him in the act of birth as she did with his forerunner, the husband, at the time of conception, and, disregarding injury and extra pain, she behaves regressively, expelling the child, as she expels fæces, with force and without delicacy. One writer [2] has found a correlation between laceration of the perineum, 'abnormal resistance', and vaginismus, one which supports the theoretical view here put forward.

In a preliminary and short communication these remarks must suffice to indicate a new field of work awaiting exploration. In conclusion a quotation from a gynæcologist: [3] 'Wir alle empfinden es als unwissenschaftlich diagnostisch, von einem Tumor zu sprechen, erst die Art des Tumors gibt der Diagnose wissenschaftlichen Untergrund, aber wir scheuen uns nicht, von nervösen, nervös labilen und hysterischen Frauen zu reden, ohne auch nur den Versuch zu machen, den Zusammenhang zwischen diesen psychischen Abnormalitäten und dem Genitaltraktus feiner zu analysieren.' With the delicate scientific procedure devised by Professor Freud—the analysis of the transference in the psycho-analytical situation—a beginning has been made in the analysis of the relations between psychical abnormality and the disorders of the genital tract.

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[2] Jean Antoine Remy Fétis: 'Des ruptures de la cloison recto-vaginale au cours de l'accouchement. Leurs rapports avec la résistance anormale de périnée et le vaginisme.' Thèse de Bateau, 1923.

[3] Professor Wilhelm Liepmann: *Vortrag vor der* 18. *Versammlung der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Gynäkologie. Archiv. für Gynäkologie*, 1923, Bd. 120, S. 271.

SCHIZOPHRENIC AND CREATIVE THINKING

BY

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Up to the present time psycho-analysis has not been applied to the psychology of thought. This is due to the nature of the psycho-analytic method, which was developed for the purpose of investigating unconscious content, that is, of examining the mode of function of mental strata which, phylogenetically older, underlie the layer of co-ordinated thought-processes. This more archaic function can be observed in dream-processes and in schizophrenia. From this point of view psycho-analysis is not called upon to make any comment on the laws regulating thought, which is a matter for experimental research; the relation of the individual phenomena of thought to unconscious processes is, however, a subject which concerns it, as is also the expression of instinctual functioning through the creation of thought-images.

For the purposes of this brief study, the intention of which is mainly to point out certain problems, we shall adopt the familiar procedure of examining pathological manifestations. We do so, not because we share the general impression that there is only a quantitative difference between the normal and the pathological or that a pathological state merely magnifies what can be observed in normal life. On the contrary, we believe that, although they are often difficult to formulate, there are many important qualitative differences on both sides which are easily overlooked on account of the quite striking analogies. We start from pathological data because we hope in this way to elucidate some aspects of the problem, not because we hope to explain all its aspects.

Considering first of all schizophrenic forms of thought, we find that paranoidal and hebephrenic forms, although not the only types, are nevertheless the most striking and the most fully described. To illustrate the paranoidal type we shall select the most thoroughly analysed example of paranoia, viz. Freud's dissection of Schreber's delusional system.[1]

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[1] Freud, *Collected Papers*, Vol. III.

The main element of Schreber's paranoidal system was his belief that he had been turned into a woman who was to play an important part in the regulation of cosmic affairs, who would in fact be essential for the world's salvation. Unhampered by any considerations of general validity, we may proceed to study this very typical example apart from the other elements in the delusion.

The first point to be recognized concerning this pathological idea is the feminine attitude ; regarded from the point of view of instinctual life, the phantasy is a homosexual one. As Freud has shown, this change of attitude had already been indicated in various ways before the outbreak of the actual psychosis. We can therefore regard a regression to homosexuality as the first phase in the formation of Schreber's delusional idea. At this stage there are obviously many avenues open : a regression of this type can be seen in the case of obvious perversions as well as in some neuroses, and to indicate how these paths diverge it is necessary to single out certain specific manifestations in the development of the delusion.

A second point in the formation of the paranoic idea is the manner in which this mode of instinctual functioning is experienced : it is not regarded as a process occurring within the individual's own personality, if we may use the term, but as a result of external influence. By displacement of the ego-boundaries, to adopt the current phraseology, a variation in object-cognition occurs : an internal manifestation is regarded as external. An analogous mechanism of projection is seen in the normal individual, where instinctual activity is often regarded as something foreign to the ego, as an influence to which one submits or which one rejects. Familiar expressions, e.g. ' it came over me ', ' it carried me away ', betray this attitude, and psycho-analysis has found an apt term for this in designating instinctual life as the ' it ' (id). The analogy is, however, too limited : the id of a normal person is more foreign to his ego than his conscious will, it is less a subject than an object. Notwithstanding this, a normal person always knows that he should not seek for ' it ' outside his own personality. The paranoiac does so.

So far we can recognize in the formation of the delusional thought-system a regressive outbreak of passive homosexuality and the variation in object-relations characteristic of schizophrenia. Taken by itself the first would run : I become—instinctually—a woman ' : the second is modified to : ' I am changed—by external means—into a woman '. To this formula is added a subjective interpretation

which expands an isolated thought into a religious system: ' this sexual change in me will bring about the world's salvation '.

This third step discloses the paranoiac's desire to co-ordinate his experience with his cosmology. He cannot bear simply to accept the situation; he must immediately fashion some theory to explain it. His idea of world-redemption and the part played by his change into a woman is a theory produced in order to co-ordinate and satisfactorily explain his new experience. This dovetailing of experience into a wider concatenation brings about the specific paranoidal reaction. Borrowing an expression from the psychology of ' shape ' (*Gestalt*), we may speak of structures being ' seen into ' (*hineinsehen*) the outer world (or of internal processes being experienced externally). We would suggest that any hypertrophy of this tendency should be called hypergnosis in contradistinction to agnosis or diminished perception of ' shape '.

Hypergnosis must be present to give the impression of a paranoidal picture: in its absence the displacement of ego-boundaries is suggestive merely of schizophrenia, never of paranoia. The significance of hypergnosis as a *differentia specifica* of paranoia can be illustrated by a case reported by Kronfeld: a catatonic patient remarked, concerning the confused and chaotic impressions he had experienced in the catatonic state, that the chaos had been outside him and not inside him. In this case definite experiences and the perception of them existed outside the ego-boundary, yet the third stage of delusional formation was absent, viz. the ' seeing into ' (*hineinsehen*). Had he been hypergnostic he would have co-ordinated the experiences projected into the outside world, either as well-regulated sensory perceptions (visual and auditory hallucinations) or as theoretical elaborations (a delusional system). Mere displacement of ego-boundaries without hypergnosis brings about a schizophrenic but not a paranoidal state.

So far we have distinguished in the development of a paranoid system the stages of experience, of the process of its projection and of a hypergnostic co-ordination of it into a cosmology. Our presentation is so far incomplete that it takes no account of paranoid systems dealing ostensibly with abstractions and not, as in Schreber's case, with his own person. Apart from paranoiacs with delusions of persecution, jealousy or redemption, there are cases with inventive mania, cosmological theories, ideas of world-reformation, physical discoveries, and many more. The connection between these forms and the forms previously described lies in the word ' ostensibly '. As a matter of fact,

analysis shows that judgements on matters external to the ego represent in deeper layers judgements concerning personal experiences. Paranoic theories are not concerned immediately with the original material but with presentations which by a process of displacement are substituted for the original material. The idea can then be kept from consciousness, whereas in the simpler type first described, e.g. Schreber's case, the ego-dystonic content, e.g. phantasies of passive homosexual outrage, appear directly in consciousness. As an example of the second type let us analyse briefly a distorted idea from a confusional case.

A patient with mild schizophrenia is entirely absorbed with the subject of parental conflict. Hardly any other idea occurs to him except by way of his parents' attitude to it. The origin of this conflict was the son's rebellion against the strict religious and patriarchal views of his parents, particularly of his mother. His life is one constant repetition of situations of rupture and reconciliation with them. On occasions of rupture he is usually stuporose and ceases all activities, but after successful reconciliation his energies return, merely to prepare for the next catastrophe.

This patient has elaborated a philosophical system which absorbs most of his activity and which he regards as of the first importance. In such a highly-educated person (a physician) his philosophical system must appear doubly trivial, barren and crazy. His main idea runs that fundamentally there can be nothing but agreement between science and religion; this has always been apparent to him and he seems to have regarded the idea almost as a revelation.

From what sources does he derive his evidence? He may at some time or other have heard of the scholastic theses on this subject; but how can this truth be accompanied with such intense conviction unless it is related to some equally profound experience? The experience, it seems, must be his perpetual bondage to his parents, above all to his mother. He feels in some dim way that love alone could control his peculiar and often extremely reprehensible conduct and has a foreboding that, unlike other men, his bondage will never yield to that degree of independence which is a prerequisite of tender feeling. And this experience of compulsive dependence which he does not admit—it is manifested by open revolt and by violent accusations against his parents, coloured largely with guilt-feeling—becomes apparent to him only in the distorted form of his main thesis. Religion represents the pious and strict mother, who implanted profound conscientious scruples in her son with regard to his adoption of the profession of

medicine ; he himself represents natural science. The unity of religion and science is for him no mere shibboleth ; his is a lasting conviction, because it is based on experience—not of course an ' experience ' of the unity between science and religion but of the unity of the persons from which this allegory is built up.

Here then is an example of the instinctual language being translated into terms of cultural life : one of the factors in the process seems to be the wish to repudiate the facts of instinctual life, hence a kind of repression. The thought we have just analysed is not actually paranoid in nature : the element of projection of the fundamental experience into the outer world is lacking. Had such an element been present the experience would not have been formulated as ' my parents and myself constitute an indissoluble unity ' but rather ' external forces compel me to be one with my parents '. The thought-translation would then run somewhat as follows : ' scientific principles are modified by external influences, perhaps by some apparatus, in such a way that they are at one with religion ' ; the thought would then be definitely paranoic. Although not paranoic in the strict sense of the term (the fundamental experience does not appear to be homosexual), this analysed thought will serve to illustrate the process of ' translation '.

We are now in a position to reduce the processes of delusion-formation to their elements. Some definite experience is internally objectivated and, owing to the individual's hypergnostic tendency, becomes the foundation of a system ; either foundations are formed to support the experience or the experience is converted into a generalization. In this way the experience itself may not be represented, its place being taken by translations, seemingly different in content, derived from any suitable spheres of ideation. In this instance the seemingly paranoic formation is merely a copy of the original one.

We may now attempt to differentiate between the mechanisms of obsessive thoughts and delusional thoughts respectively. We cannot do so in terms of content, since typical delusional ideas, e.g. of redemption or persecution, can appear as true obsessive thoughts in cases of pure obsessional neurosis. The obsessive and the delusional form are distinguished phenomenologically by the existence of evidence of the experience. In the latter instance evidence is advanced and there exists a state of complete refractoriness to corrective modification ; in the former the thought obtrudes itself in a compulsive way, but is discredited by the subject who exhibits ambivalence and doubt. We believe that underlying this difference there is another concerning the

unequivocal nature of the experience. The other processes of paranoidal thought-formation are also observed in obsessional neuroses (with certain minor differences) but the underlying experience appears to be contradictory and in no sense unequivocal instinctually. In Schreber's case, had a complete break-through of homosexuality not occurred, had the opposing tendencies been strong enough to lead to open conflict, the experience would *ceteris paribus*—variation of experience of object and hypergnosis—have led to the presentation of the content of his delusion in the form of obsessive thoughts, phantasies of homosexual assault of an extremely compulsive nature, phantasies of redemption recurring persistently in spite of repudiation, etc.

It would be quite wrong to attempt to explain the difference between obsession and delusion on the grounds of a stronger sense for reality-testing. For in the presence of other characteristic factors, an unequivocal experience invariably routs the reality-censor (one has only to think how frequently delusional thoughts persist in personalities otherwise completely intact). To put the matter more correctly, every delusional thought has passed the reality-censor and is based on a true experience. The generalizations and theoretical superstructures are alone false. We must not of course ignore the fact that the degree of capacity for generalization and theoretical naivity is not much in excess of that displayed in daily life by most other people of the same cultural development.

The distinctions we have drawn between obsession and delusion enable us to explain why obsessional thoughts frequently acquire a delusional form, and why an obsessional neurosis may develop into paranoia. In all such cases an experience originally contradictory, associated with conflict and represented in obsessive thoughts, is gradually divested of conflict and comes to be accepted *in toto* by the individual. We shall shortly have occasion to describe the modifications in the ego-ideal which precede this change.

The factors in delusional formation which we have so far described seem to be essential ones but do not cover the whole ground. For when Schreber was looking for some construction by means of which he could co-ordinate his altered instinctual life into a cosmic scheme, there were undoubtedly numerous possibilities open to him. It still remains unexplained why his theoretical venture took the particular form of a delusion of redemption having a characteristic megalomaniac pattern. It is only by study of the alterations taking place

in the ego-ideal that we can get a more precise idea of the course of events.

That the homosexual tendencies forced their way into action and consciousness implies a breakdown of the corresponding part of the ego-ideal; the prohibition 'I must not love men' must first of all be removed. Does this imply a breakdown in the ego-ideal?

One gathers that the process is not one of demolition but rather of an internal rearrangement of layers. The original prohibition of homosexuality is not swept aside in the rush of the instinctual drive without substitution; in fact it secures a considerable amount of compensation. The moral component of the ego-ideal certainly comes greatly weakened out of the conflict, but only after the narcissistic component has been developed in a highly-civilised manner as a compensation. To Schreber himself the new demand of the ego-ideal ran 'I must be the Saviour of Humanity'; so that he could afford to be easy over the breakdown of his ideal in another direction, viz. 'Even if I have homosexual ideas, they do not signify the same for me as for others: in my case it is no mere instinctual gratification but a fate which falls on me along with this my function of saviour.'

It is perfectly clear from a study of Schreber's ideas that this compensatory process played a decisive part in forming the content of his delusion. As Freud has shown, Schreber did not in the first instance explain his experience on the saviour-hypothesis but connected it with the much more direct assumption that he was molested sexually. This tendency did not, however, develop any further; it lacked the narcissistic compensation necessary for a breakdown of the moral ideal. Schreber's idea was that all attempts to change his sex for unnatural purposes (i.e. in order to satisfy some person's sexual desire) had completely miscarried, whereas his castration for purposes in keeping with natural law (i.e. as a method of world-redemption) seemed to him a quite reasonable outcome of the conflict.

This compensation, which itself proves the existence of narcissistic fixations, alone enabled the instinctual drive to break through; moreover, this process in the ego-ideal explains why amongst many possible theories this particular delusional idea arose in his mind. The ultimate form of the delusion must reproduce this process in the ego-ideal; the new delusion must be made to tally with fresh demands on the part of the ideal. Hence we must amplify our original presentation of the origin of delusional thinking, in that the content of the idea is

definitely decided by a rearrangement of the elements in the ego-ideal permitting the fundamental experience to be worked out.

We have already exceeded the limits of a description of paranoid thought-formation: the example we have given in illustration of 'translation' of an instinctual situation and our investigation of obsessive thoughts have carried us beyond our original theme. They enable us, however, to arrive at a generalization which brings us to the real thesis of this paper. In our opinion this mechanism of paranoid thought-formation can be regarded as a prototype of the mechanism of creative thinking and of normal thought-processes generally.

We believe that it is in keeping with psycho-analytical experience to assume that non-delusional true creative thinking is also based on an experience. The inclination for some particular subject and fixation on these thoughts arise solely from the experience; contradiction in the experience gives rise to doubt concerning the thought-formations, whilst what is unequivocal in the experience produces the evidence for the thought-processes and the unalterable conviction regarding them.

We can also observe in non-delusional thought the second factor, viz. projection.[2] A certain degree of objectivation is present in all thought, although of course in normal cases it does not go beyond the boundaries of the ego. It is our belief that objectivation is not a result of thought-operations but that objectivation of the experience is a prerequisite of the appearance of thought-elaboration.

Hypergnosis invariably plays a part in the development of creative thinking: a hidden connection must be grasped. We might call this a developed perception of 'shape.' This can be correlated with the usual form of perception of 'shape' by means of a simple observation. In the case of visual thinkers productive ideas are often perceived in optical 'shape'-forms whilst analogous 'shape'-experiences are recorded by auditory and motor types.

The translation of experience into thought-content must, in accordance with our theory, also occur in normal thinking. At any rate this certainly happens when the thoughts relate to matters other than the subject's own instinctual life.

Hence we must assume that certain displacements also occur normally within the ego-ideal. The possibility of experience, its

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[2] Sándor Radó was the first to observe that creative thought owes its origin to a projection of self-perceptions (*Imago*, Bd. VIII, 1922).

ultimate translation and transferred representation imply very slight retrogressions and compensatory-formations in the ego-ideal, although these are not so archaic in nature or so obvious as in the simple case of the Schreber delusion.

And this outline must serve also as a basis for the normal processes of thought, in so far as these are concerned with completed thought-presentations. We may assume that in such instances there is some variation in the intensity and perhaps in the content of the fundamental experience, that there are minor degrees of difference in objectivation and that the process of hypergnosis is less marked.

We are now in a position to consider the difference between paranoidal and true creative thinking, and this leads to the further question whether in psychological mechanisms of thought-formation it is possible to distinguish between true and false. The latter problem is beyond the scope of our present discussion, since it takes us from the region of psychology to theories of cognition and cannot be clearly formulated without some such theoretical basis. As we are limited here to purely psychological considerations, we can only present certain common, possibly typical differences between paranoidal and correct thinking, without of course claiming that these have universal application or are incapable of other interpretation.

In the first place, can it be said that a preference for one definite form of experience (the homosexual form) is typical of paranoidal thinking only? This could be decided only after abundant analytical investigation of the processes of creative thinking. Again, may there not be some typical difference in the degree of projection which determines whether only relative objectivation of the experience takes place without overstepping ego-boundaries or whether displacement into the outer world occurs? We may hazard the guess that projection of the latter sort is the basis of any weakening of the reality-censorship. It disturbs the whole context of the experience, which then appears to the individual to be purely environmental and yet in opposition to external reality. A condition has arisen which we describe as a case of reality-censorship, since the external world as experienced by the individual no longer coincides with the actual external reality. The basis for this profound variation of objective experience appears to be a regression to the early period of development in which numerous isolated ego-instincts had not yet been unified by more developed ego-instincts and when ego-boundaries were correspondingly vague.

Our assumption that damaged reality-testing is due to the injury of ego-boundaries in the process of experiencing individual experience gains some support from an analogous process occurring in normal life. Whenever a minor injury of ego-boundaries occurs in a normal person and makes him seek for the explanation of his fate outside his own person, a weakening of the reality-testing faculty occurs. Actual facts are re-interpreted and external reality is seen in a false light.

Moreover, typical differences between paranoidal and normal thinking appear to relate to the functioning of the ego-ideal. Disintegration of the ideal is never so extensive in the case of normal thinking and above all compensation-formation never involves the same primitive narcissistic stages as it does in paranoia.

We have so far dealt more with paranoidal and creative thinking, approaching the latter problem by way of the former. We have still to consider two varieties of schizophrenic thinking, paranoid and heboid. We term 'heboid' that form of disordered and confused thinking which flies from one idea to another. The pathological form of this is seen in the hebephrenic 'flight of ideas', which is in curious contrast to the ordered thinking of paranoia. In our opinion this manifestation can be best understood on the assumption that it consists of numerous fragments of paranoidal formation, each one rapidly displacing the last, none of them being carried to a conclusion. We may take it that there is here a rapid change of significant experiences and that the source of this change is to be found in a kind of dissipation of libido. Heboid thinking is then to be regarded (with the differences noted above) as a pathological prototype of that variety of normal thought which is called inconsequent, never keeping to one subject for any length of time.

In sharp contrast to the schizophrenic types is a variety of thinking seen in a pathological form in amentia. In contrast to the types already described the fragmented thought-formations of such patients indicate a reduced appreciation of 'shape', or, to keep to our terminology, a kind of hypergnosis. It is characterized by an incapacity to synthesize experience. This too has its counterpart in normal life.

Within the limits of this contribution we have not been able to deal with every form of pathological thinking nor to give a full description of the corresponding normal types. We have had to content ourselves with provisory formulations of a theory concerning the functional dependence of thought-processes on instinctual life. The

results of investigation of the processes of ordered thinking which have been reached by thought-psychologists have not been referred to here. Doubtless there are many points of view common to both methods of approach which will have to be considered and given proper valuation in any future comprehensive theory of thought.

A 'TECHNICAL' FORM OF RESISTANCE

BY

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Psycho-analytical writers have long since familiarized us with the fact that newly acquired impressions can be made use of for purposes of unconscious presentation. The process of symbol-formation affords us perhaps the most striking illustration of this phenomenon. The Zeppelin and aeroplane, for example, have in recent years come to be included in the long list of accepted phallic symbols, and in the course of everyday analysis one can scarcely fail to meet with individual adaptations of current ideas in the expression of unconscious thinking. Due appreciation of this fact can lighten the task of interpretation considerably, but it is easy to see that the situation can be exploited as a means of resistance. Patients who cover their most powerful emotional resistances by a seemingly ready acceptance of psycho-analytical theory are especially prone to turn such displacements to advantage. It need hardly be said that their acceptance is of a purely intellectualistic sort.

Resistance of this type can, at one time or another, be observed in almost every case, but there are two groups in which it becomes a serious obstacle to progress. The first consists of obsessional types who have a *flair* for symbol-reading and a genius for interpretative theorizing, provided, of course, that no attempt is made to bring their own interpretations 'home to roost' in the emotional sense. The second group includes patients who are undertaking analysis for professional purposes. Here again, although no major symptoms may be present, it is usual to find some evidence of an obsessional disposition amongst those who fortify themselves against analytic progress by the 'appeal to theory'. In both groups the situations used as resistances are very much the same. The patient strives to control his own analysis, to cavil at interpretations or to substitute interpretations of his own, to check each day's work by a theoretical foot-rule and in every possible way to express his negative transference in theoretical guise. As is to be expected, their rationalizations are very strong and they are quite convinced that this theoretical control and criticism is based on the purest scientific interest and is exercised solely with a view to advancing their analysis. It is rare to find that

they have any insight into the actual libido-play at the moment. Transference is regarded as a theoretical concept with at the most a merely intellectual significance in their own case. Actually their everyday lives are full of repetitive situations by means of which they obtain displaced emotional discharge, but the patients regard these situations as thoroughly rationalized.

The advantages of this defensive position are clear. Emotional re-experience is retarded and a determined attempt is made to substitute an intellectual acceptance of the Œdipus complex for emotional conviction as to the reality of the incest-barrier. Nevertheless, expression of emotion is by no means absent. This is most frequently of a negative sort and takes the form of grudge, anger, revenge-phantasies and in some instances moods of depression. This negative feeling reaches its height when the theorizing stage has been given a certain amount of play and the analyst commences to press for the underlying content. The patient then changes his tune. Analytic explanations tend to be regarded as purely fanciful and, almost in the same breath, the analytic process is characterized as injurious. Ideas of mental injury caused by analysis appear and are accompanied by revenge-phantasies of a sadistic nature.

It is generally agreed that one of the main causative factors here is the castration complex, and it may be of interest to record an example in which the expression of castration anxiety was effected by a manipulation of analytical concepts. The patient, a medical man with definite obsessional symptoms, had, prior to analysis, a fairly close acquaintance with modern psycho-analytical literature. Analysis followed roughly the course already described and he was with difficulty restrained from constant intellectual ' dogging ' of his associative material. He loved above all to give occasional theoretical résumés of his state. Amongst the various matters which engaged his theoretical attention, the process of ego-ideal formation took a prominent place. Two aspects of this process interested him particularly, first, the idea of introjecting something, and second, the fact that the nature of the introjected object would depend to some extent on the actual attitudes of the parent. As his memories relating to the father always represented the latter as an inept individual, the patient arrived at the following conclusion. His father, he thought, was responsible for the building up of an ineffective and incompetent ego-ideal in his, the patient's, mind. His father was therefore responsible for the patient's neurotic difficulties. This idea has a patent resemblance to the phan-

tasy commonly entertained by patients, that their case is hopeless because they suffer from disease of hereditary origin, in other words, that their illness represents castration at the hands of the father, hence that they can never be the same again. In actual fact it was striking to observe that on the occasions when he adumbrated this idea, the whole of the accompanying associative material consisted of castration-images. Further corroboration was obtained on a subsequent occasion. This coincided with the appearance of Alexander's article on the processes of cure, wherein the theory is advanced that the super-ego is an anachronism in the psyche, one which it is the purpose of analysis to remove. The patient was much attracted by the new term of 'super-ego,' but was concerned on theoretical grounds over the view that this ego-institution could be removed or indeed that it should be regarded as an anachronism. With both these views he profoundly disagreed.

I have been content here to call attention to a single aspect of his manipulation of a psycho-analytical concept in the interest of unconscious imagery. There were obviously many other trends represented in his preoccupation. The interest in introjecting ideas was clearly of a fundamental oral pattern and at the same time gave expression to homosexual phantasies concerning his father. This is in keeping with his expressions of negative transference, and with the castration-significance of removing the 'super-ego'. Ferenczi has pointed out that castration-manifestations are in themselves a representation of the inverted Œdipus complex.

A similar play with analytical ideas is to be observed during the analysis of some unconscious homosexuals, who react with irritation to analytic interpretations, regarding them as foreign bodies in the mind. The idea of a foreign body being introduced into the mind is not unlike the theory sometimes advanced to explain the phenomena of suggestion, viz. that it is a process of thought-implantation. In some instances patients are inclined to characterize these alleged implantations as acts of persecutory hostility, and one cannot help thinking that on such occasions interpretations are reacted to in the same way as the paranoiac reacts to the idea of 'emanations' (compare Schreber's 'rays of God'). It must be added, however, that quite the opposite idea may also be present in the same patient's mind, viz. a repudiation of so-called passive analysis and a desire for more active and aggressive therapy, 'something short and sharp', which will 'extirpate' the neurosis.

At this point it would be interesting to consider to what extent unconscious wishes may have some influence on theoretical discussions and differences of opinion. This, however, exceeds the scope of the present communication, which is brought forward as an illustration of a highly rationalized resistance, i.e. a resistance expressed by a theoretical interest in analytic processes.

THE SOURCES OF NEUROTIC ANXIETY: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY OF PSYCHO-ANALYTIC THERAPY

BY

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From the point of view of causal psycho-therapy, the first task of psycho-analysis is to bring into consciousness the meaning of neurotic anxiety, both manifest and larval; only when this has been done are we in a position to influence the sources of anxiety, which, as Freud has shown, is derived, in the last event, from instinctual energy. This therapeutic modification merely implies a fresh orientation of the instincts in the sense that the latter are regulated in a way more adapted to the requirements of reality. Nevertheless various sources of neurotic anxiety can be distinguished by reference to their dynamic power. Permanent cure, which is the ultimate aim of all psycho-analysis, can only be brought about by successful modification of the most important dynamic sources of anxiety. Etiologically speaking, the significance of sources of anxiety can be judged by their mutual relations: one would regard as secondary those sources of anxiety which (1) become pathogenic for the first time during the neurotic processes of regression and repression, and of which (2) the dynamic force is mainly borrowed from other sources.

Freud was the first to show that sexual abstinence or inadequate gratification are an immediate source of anxiety.[1] This 'actual anxiety' is related to a damming-up of somatic libido and disappears when this pathogenic factor is eliminated. Moreover, he found that anxiety can arise when the moral ego is not completely successful in suppressing a libidinal excitation: the repressed impulse returns in the form of anxiety. The latter is an ego-anxiety and is a reaction to the claims of instinct. Since every sexual repression brings about a blockage of somatic libido, actual anxiety is the core of all neurotic anxieties. The situation is complicated by the fact that Freud[2]

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[1] 'The justification for detaching from neurasthenia a particular syndrome: the anxiety-neurosis' (1894), *Collected Papers*, Vol. I.

[2] *Introductory Lectures.*

regards the anxiety occurring at birth as the prototype of all later anxieties. We owe it to Rank [3] that more attention is now paid to birth-anxiety, but it is a matter for investigation whether birth-anxiety can be regarded as the primary source of anxiety. In contrast to this view, Adler [4] considers that anxiety is due solely and simply to suppression of aggressive tendencies. Experimental evidence of the accuracy of Freud's views on actual anxiety is to be found in the fact that ligature of the vasa deferentia sets up acute anxiety owing to increase of internal secretions.[5] Nevertheless, there is much clinical evidence in favour of the existence of an ' aggression-anxiety ', and on the whole experience of numerous neurotic conditions goes to show that birth-anxiety is, dynamically speaking, the most important source of anxiety. We must therefore consider the inter-relations of these best-known sources of anxiety, viz. libido-congestion, the trauma of birth and suppressed aggression.

As we know, most neuroses commence with developmental inhibition during the Œdipus phase of genital organization. This may result either in a fixation at the stage of incestuous (genital) object-love or in a regression to earlier stages of development during which latent fixation-points had been established, though they had subsequently been passed through (Freud). In the former case a hysteria develops, in the latter an obsessional neurosis or some allied condition. Now the libido not only remains firmly anchored to the specific fixation-point but strives to attain a permanent position typical of other neurotic formations. Thus the adhesiveness of libido together with the strength of fixations determine typical forms of illness, whilst the additional factor of lability gives rise to mixed forms. Adhesiveness can be related to the repetition-compulsion which obtains emphatic expression through the pleasure-principle.[6] Nevertheless this condition of lability is not arbitrary : it appears to be governed on the basis of certain correlations between the component impulses. They are expressed by a sort of superimposed arrangement of the meanings of the anxiety and of its sources, which arrangement is peculiar to each case. In the

[3] *Das Trauma der Geburt,* Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1924.

[4] ' Über neurotische Disposition ', *Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische Forschung,* 1909 : *Der Nervöse Charakter,* 2 Aufl., 1919.

[5] Federn : Lecture delivered at the Seventh Psycho-analytical Congress, Berlin, 1922.

[6] Reich, ' Zur Triebenergetik ', *Zeitschrift für Sexualwissenschaft,* 1923.

obsessional neurosis, for example, although anxiety is not a characteristic feature, yet one sometimes meets with hysterical and manic-depressive symptoms. Analysis shows that very often the libido has pressed forward from anal-sadistic fixation towards new genital cathexis of objects, stimulated the development of hysterical anxiety and retreated to the obsessional position which it reinforces. It may even go so far as to activate in waves an oral-melancholic position; miscarriage of the forward genital movement is followed by oral mechanisms of introjection. Many hysterical cases react in an analogous way during analysis: an acute exacerbation of genital anxiety occurs followed by a temporary regression to anal sadism: the obsessional elements are reinforced or transitory obsessional symptoms appear. That the obsessional symptom serves to bind genital anxiety can be seen in cases where, after resolution of the obsessional symptoms but before recovery takes place, anxiety-hysteria is developed. This is a new edition of the anxiety-hysteria experienced in childhood; cathexis of the genital stage again at first stimulates anxiety. In contrast to this one finds with hysteria of the oral type (particularly with cases of bronchial asthma) that when, stimulated by removal of repression, any advance is made to the genital stage, miscarriage of this attempt is reacted to by an acutely reinforced desire for the intra-uterine position and by acute birth-anxiety. This is entirely in keeping with the development of the libido in such cases: the child had arrived at genital object-love, experienced frustration and attempted to overcome this by an anxiety-hysteria reaction, subsequently reactivating his oral position and longing for return to the intra-uterine position which represents in phantasy protection from external danger. Generalizing from this, we may say that the retreat of libido from a genital position which is invested with anxiety to an intra-uterine phantasy takes place to some extent in all neuroses. This explains why in a cross-section of most neuroses one observes this intra-uterine longing together with anxiety: a longitudinal section, however, shows that their activation is not the cause but a result of regression and repression.[7] They have of course led secondarily to the formation of special symptoms in which the wish for incest plays a part. The intra-uterine phantasy acquires an incestuous

[7] This is clear, for instance, during analytic treatment: interpretation of the desire to return into the mother's womb is accepted with incomparably greater willingness than that of incestuous desires.

meaning and, especially amongst women, the phantasy arises of having coitus with the father whilst in the mother's womb. Is not then anxiety concerning the mother's womb, upon which Rank has insisted so much, derived for the most part from the horror of incest ? A similar question is suggested by Rank's assumption that the dread of castration is ultimately connected with anxiety concerning the mother's genital—a reminder, that is, of the trauma of birth. How could the child come to develop this anxiety-idea at the actual birth ? If, however, the child later on perceives the maternal genital and through comparison with the male genital invests the former with anxiety, then surely this is castration-anxiety. Even although birth-anxiety is ontogenetically earlier and although anxiety possibly derives its usual content (choking, darkness, narrow space, etc.) in consequence from the process of birth, nevertheless from the dynamic point of view birth is a secondary source of anxiety, becoming operative as a result of pathogenic regression. It could only operate as a primary source of anxiety when post-natal development has come up against crude external obstacles, as, for example, serious difficulties at the oral phase.

Longing for return to the mother's body is therefore a manifestation of flight without defence ; this is expressed as a character-trait by extreme childish passivity. In contrast to this, the obsessional character expresses flight from genital incest-conflict together with aggressive action as a defence. Sadistic activity predominates in the man, aggressive masculinity in the woman. In the early stages of analysis one can observe how each advance towards genital object-love in the transference is held up by the incest-barrier and by castration-anxiety, giving rise to increase of aggressive impulses. This increase may either precede an acute development of anxiety or may occur subsequently, in which case it gives the impression of being true conscience-anxiety. The sequence of action and reaction is roughly as follows : advance towards genital love—dread of castration—defence against this danger by means of active aggression (active castration)—increase of castration-dread and conscience-anxiety—renewed defence, or again powerful repression of masked aggression followed by depression. It depends on the strength of the anal libido, which predisposes to passivity, whether (phallic) aggression is converted into anal masochism. This is quite in keeping with Federn's view [8] that there is a special affinity, on the one hand, between genital

[8] Federn, ' Beiträge zur Analyse des Sadismus und Masochismus ', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 1913–14.

erotism and sadism and, on the other, between anal erotism and masochism. Speaking dynamically, we may say that phallic erotism is a necessary condition for the manifest continuance of sadism, whilst anal erotism demands its conversion into (anal) masochism. Should castration-anxiety be converted into the wish to be castrated, or should dread of punishment turn into need for punishment, or again sadism change to masochism, we find that, in place of an attempt to cling to genital positions or to reactivate them, a tendency becomes manifest to desert genital positions altogether and retreat to the intra-uterine position or to some closely related fixation. Genital anxiety then figures much less prominently in the neurotic picture. Masochistic wishes occasionally result from anxiety; their fulfilment gratifies the need for punishment (Reik, Alexander) and relieves the genital anxiety by an imaginary self-castration. When a masochistic patient gains courage through analysis to countenance a return of sadism, genital anxiety is reawakened. Both conditions are a sign of recovery. We shall show elsewhere that the ultimate course of the destructive instincts and the severity of the super-ego depend on the nature of erotogenic fixation. One might say roughly that any further development of the Freudian theory of structure of personality must be preceded by a detailed clinical organization of ego-psychology by way of the sexual theory. If we regard the relation of the sexual instincts to the destructive instincts as the fundamental problem of ego-psychology, then an investigation of the sources of energy of aggression-anxiety promises to contribute some preliminary fundamental elucidation.

The ultimate meaning behind aggression-anxiety is the subject's apprehension that he will himself be destroyed because of egoistic and anti-social behaviour. Later on when the destructive instinct has been sublimated by turning against the self in the form of moral inhibitions, aggression-anxiety acquires the additional significance of conscience-anxiety (Freud). Teleologically speaking, aggression-anxiety exists as well as libidinal anxiety. The question is merely whether the source of the anxiety lies in the energy of the destructive instinct, in the same way that the source of sexual anxiety is dammed-up libido. This brings us to the following considerations.

When instinct-ridden character-types control their sadistic impulses, anxiety develops. Superficial consideration would then seem to confirm Adler's view that the energy of the suppressed aggression is the source of the anxiety. The anxiety, however, does not dis-

appear when the impulse is carried into action, in this way differing from actual anxiety which disappears after sexual gratification; on the contrary, it is actually intensified. In this sense the social significance of aggression-anxiety might be held as determining the qualitative difference between it and libidinal anxiety. Investigation of the individual genesis of aggression uncovers its specific relation to the vicissitudes of the libido. Types who in later life exhibit sadistic-aggressive impulses have obtained full sexual gratification in early childhood and their impulsive behaviour was prompted originally by purely libidinal trends. Aggression becomes patent for the first time after forcible suppression of sexual gratification at the hands of parents or parent-substitutes. This brutal frustration of incestuous love was the more severely felt in that the latter had been greatly intensified by actual libido-gratification. Premature introjection of brutal love-objects established an ego-ideal which operates sadistically towards both ego and outer world; aggression is not so much restricted by morality and the capacity for love is overgrown by hate and sadism. In other words: frustration of sexual gratification drives into the foreground aggressive impulses which take on an increasingly sexual colouring through fusion with repressed sexual impulses. Only at this point can they justifiably be designated ' sadism '.

This view of the individual origin of sadism, which is decisively confirmed by the analysis of instinct-ridden psychopaths, can also be abundantly verified by study of the ' instinctually inhibited ' neuroses. Every frustration of sexual gratification arouses ambivalence (Graber) and a tendency to acts of sadistic revenge. Whether these are given actual expression, as happens in the instinct-ridden character-types, or whether they result in complete instinctual inhibition, depends on the extent of the identifications, the nature and intensity of the frustrations and the point in time at which the pleasure-ego experienced these frustrations.[9] Reactions during analytical treatment and during the process of recovery show that the intensity of aggressive trends depends on the existing state of libido-congestion. For example, neurotic women are profoundly stimulated during menstrual periods and react with aggression or depression. Psychiatrists regard this depression as a *direct* consequence of the somatic processes of menstruation and endeavour to alleviate it by means of organotherapy. Analysis shows,

[9] Reich, *Der triebhafte Charakter*, Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1925.

however, that the aggression is a psychic reaction to the flow of blood from the genital, whilst the depression is due partly to the narcissistic wound and partly to repression of aggressive wishes (sense of guilt). Should the analysis of such cases bring about full capacity for orgasm, menstrual depression gives place to sexual excitability, which is in all probability conditioned by local factors and by factors of inner secretion. Moreover, normally the libido is increased shortly before, during and after menstruation; this does not result in increased aggression, since the absence of the penis has been accepted, sexual desire has been approved by the super-ego, and, in distinction from the neurotic who represses all expectation, the anticipation of gratification through the man does not arouse hate, but rather increases the readiness for love.

In the phantasies of male obsessional cases with sadistic impulses, the symbols used are chiefly phallic in nature, e.g. knife, revolver, hatchet, etc. Nevertheless the impulses do not disappear when their significance has been unmasked: they disappear only when genital object-love has gained the upper hand and has been gratified or sublimated. Even when such patients are potent in the sense of erection, the orgasm is associated with a sense of guilt relating to destructive trends. The dissipation of the orgasm leads once more to an increase of aggressive tendencies, whilst the subsequent repression gives rise to rationalizations of ascetic ideology, e.g. that coitus is a filthy (anal) and bestial (sadistic) practice. The analysis of married couples who are given to quarrelling or actual illtreatment proves that the main source of difficulty is lack of sexual gratification. The change from happiness to unhappiness in marital relations is preceded by a (at first imperceptible) decrease in genital attraction.

The phlegmatic temperament of eunuchs who have been castrated before puberty shows that when no libidinal contribution is present the aggressive instinct is feeble. Castrated animals such as capons, bullocks, etc., are entirely without aggressiveness. On the other hand, the less frequently bulls and stallions are sexually gratified the more aggressive they become. After coitus their aggression diminishes. If one wishes to keep watchdogs on the alert, they must be tied up without a chance of coitus with stray bitches. The whining and yelping of dogs on the chain has a distinct note of anxiety. Professional athletes whose form of sport gratifies aggressive instincts (boxing, football, etc.) affirm that sexual intercourse diminishes their athletic powers.

This seems to suggest that libido-obstruction is the visible individual source of destructive aggression and that sadism is due to this

relation. It is not yet certain whether any destructive impulse exists without associated sexual trends. Ostensibly non-erotic aggression proves in the long run to be the result of external or internal frustration of sexual gratification. Gratification binds aggression by withdrawing its source of energy. If, as in the case of those castrated in early life, sexual gratification is abolished, no sign of an externally directed aggression appears. Observation of the climacteric and of senile stages of life shows that aggression depends on the state of somatic sources of libido. In the early stages of involution the individual exhibits increased sexual activity ('a wave of activity', H. Deutsch), but later on becomes discontented, quarrelsome and sometimes cruel, until finally in senile involution the biological operation of the destructive instinct is entirely directed inwards. Its dependence on libidinal sources of energy is then confined to a psychic functioning towards external objects.

The biological significance attached by Freud to the destructive instinct suggests that neurotic fear of death is an immediate derivative of the biological tendency to destroy life. As a matter of fact neurotic death-anxiety together with its variants (general anxiety of destruction and anxiety concerning cosmic destruction) are especially pronounced where a sense of guilt, a sign of defused aggressive impulses, prompts to self-destruction. Conscious death-anxiety may represent an endopsychic perception of this tendency. During analysis, however, death-anxiety, no matter how intense it had been, is invariably unveiled as castration-anxiety and a longing for (or anxiety concerning) the intrauterine position. If the body or the mental self comes to be identified with the genital, there appears either a hypochondriacal anxiety about dying or general anxiety of impending catastrophe. That castration-anxiety and anxiety concerning the womb can be included under death-anxiety was shown by a patient to whom death represented a separation of the body from the soul. The body, which signified unconsciously the penis, disappeared in the womb. 'To be alive is . . . to the ego the same as being loved. . . .'[10]

In real danger, too, the ego reacts with mechanisms which are available for the production of death-anxiety. The ego 'sees itself deserted by all the powers of protection and lets itself die. It is,

[10] Freud, *Das Ich und das Es.* H. Deutsch pointed out during a discussion of this point, that the anxiety of dying does not mean anxiety of non-existence but is anxiety concerning *loss* of life which for the unconscious represents nothing but possibilities of pleasure-gain.

moreover, precisely the same situation which arose at the first great anxiety-experience of birth and of infantile longing for one who is absent, namely, separation from the protecting mother'.[11] A true unconscious representation of death-anxiety cannot be found during analysis. According to a private communication from Ferenczi it cannot be present as an archaic constituent of the unconscious, since the death-anxiety experienced on dissolution cannot be inherited. Moreover, the idea of death is a purely negative concept and, according to Freud, cannot exist as such in the unconscious. If, however, we cling to the concept of an irreducible, biologically-based death-anxiety, it is clear that this can only be expressed psychically as castration-anxiety or fear of the mother's womb.

As Freud has shown, a sense of guilt is a special form of anxiety, dread of the father who is loved yet punishes; the latter is introjected and continues to function in the ego as the rigour of conscience. Important clinical observations do not, however, permit us to equate the need for punishment with an unconscious sense of guilt. Not all guilt-feeling impels to self-punishment: fundamentally the latter is an attempt to free oneself from the pangs of conscience. It originates in the pleasure-ego, which under cover of morality renders masochistic submission to the super-ego (i.e. father). In many cases the punishment is directed solely against an introjected object.

To come back to the starting-point of our investigation: what part do the various sources of anxiety play in the process of analytic cure? Although not prejudiced in favour of the new, we have found in theory that the intensity of birth-anxiety and aggression-anxiety depend on the existing state of libido-congestion. This is confirmed by the fact that there is a variation in temporary as well as permanent reactions to liberation from different varieties of anxiety. Successful analytic solution of any neurosis leads to the abandonment both of longing for the mother's womb and of aggression, or else these are subordinated to other impulses or again they are sublimated. Genital sexuality, on the other hand, preserves its sexual aim, abandoning only the incestuous love-object. The question arises why liberation from anxiety automatically produces in one case a stronger forward drive of instinct and in the other a renunciation? We are inclined to presuppose that this result is a therapeutic success without considering why the same therapeutic process, viz. liberation from anxiety, should produce such

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[11] Freud, *loc. cit.*

opposite results. It is by no means obvious why it should. Further experience, however, shows us: (1) that longing for the mother's womb and aggression persist in spite of analytical understanding so long as castration-anxiety is not analysed (refractory cases), or that the partly freed libido after a feeble movement towards the genital position retreats to earlier fixation-points (relapse); (2) cases which remain permanently free from symptoms, in spite of the fact that they have not been completely analysed. In such instances analysis has dealt with genital fixations from the outset and has succeeded in resolving them before the transference-situation could be complicated by deeper fixations. The fact that genital libido was freed from anxiety brought about an automatic abrogation of other wishes.[12] For all practical purposes, relief of libido-congestion by orgasm abolishes the tendency to regress. (3) If genital primacy has never been fully attained in childhood, the 'attraction of the womb' or the tendency to pregenital gratification persists in spite of analysis of all sources of anxiety.[13]

Hence genital object-love is the most powerful counter to the destructive instinct, to pregenital masochism, to the desire to return to the womb and to punishment by the super-ego. Genital gratification relieves libido-congestion, which is the core of every neurotic anxiety and binds the destructive instinct, which now finds partial discharge in the male by phallic sadism and in the female by vaginal masochism. The ascendancy of the 'life-preserving' Eros over the destructive instincts is the objective justification of our therapeutic labours. The individual source of the life-instinct is the somatic sexual apparatus: an analogous individual source of the death-instinct cannot at the present time be indicated. 'Primary masochism' (Freud) is a purely hypothetical source of the death-instinct; it can only be observed clinically as 'secondary masochism' which, being a turning of sadism against the self (Freud), has an erotic source of energy. We may assume the existence of a biological death-instinct

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[12] Permanent cure by means of palliative psycho-therapy, which is sometimes reported, probably depends on overcoming genital inhibition by suggestion. Spontaneous cure of hysteria, e.g. after marriage, can be explained in this way. The real problem is here the means by which the sense of guilt is overcome.

[13] Reich, 'Über Genitalität', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 1924; and 'Über die chronische hypochondrische Neurasthenie', *Ibid.*, 1926.

to explain the destructive instinct, but that is a question for natural philosophy. One may also regard the death of the individual as a victory over the sources of Eros in the individual: the climacteric coincides with the beginning of senile involution; some insects die after the nuptial flight.

The problem why somatic libido-congestion appears in the particular form of anxiety can in the meantime only be answered by speculation, a method to which we have no desire to resort. At this juncture we must forgo the attempt to correlate the clinical basis of psycho-analysis, that is, the theory of repression and of libido-congestion, with its speculative superstructure, the hypothesis of death-instincts. Withal the attempt to clarify therapeutic aims has brought us back to the beginnings of psycho-analytic research, to the theory of libido-congestion and ' actual anxiety '.

A TYPE OF ANAL-EROTIC RESISTANCE

BY

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It seems particularly fitting that a paper contributed to the *Festschrift*, prepared in honour of Professor Freud, should concern itself with the application of one of his fundamental contributions to psycho-analysis. The concept of anal erotism in its relation to the development of the ego has provoked the most violent opposition and incredulity. The original masterly contribution, which is compressed in a brief paper, opened up new vistas in character analysis which stimulated subsequent workers in the field to amplify the initial conception (Jones, Ferenczi, Abraham, Brill, Eisler, Coriat).

The present communication will be mainly concerned with a further investigation of a certain type of anal resistance occasionally encountered in the analysis of stammerers, which had already been briefly referred to in a recent paper.[1] There it was pointed out that the oral libido is often expressed in anal terms, and this, in connection with the narcissism, explains the stubborn resistances encountered in the analysis of stammerers. This special form of resistance is experienced in other analytic work, as in the transference neuroses, but it is in the narcissistic neuroses, particularly stammering which is an extreme type of the disorder, that it appears in its most severe form in the guise of constipation. As stammering is an attempt at oral libidinal satisfaction, a close relationship is perceived between anal and oral erotism, both on psychological and morphological grounds. Ferenczi[2] has also briefly referred to constipation as a transitory symptom-construction revealing itself in the analysis as a regression of the anal character.

When this anal resistance producing constipation occurs in the analysis of stammerers, there is noted a parallel increase in the speech defect, leading at times to almost complete dumbness, resulting in a poverty of free associations as a form of stinginess in the production

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[1] Isador H. Coriat, ' The Oral-Erotic Components of Stammering ', read before the Ninth Congress of the International Psycho-Analytical Association, Bad Homburg, 1925.

[2] S. Ferenczi : ' Transitory Symptom-Constructions during the Analysis ', *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis*, Chapter VII.

of unconscious material. The stammering on these occasions shows an analogy to the constipation; both are stoppages, but involving different ends of the intestinal canal. The curtailment of the oral libido produces a resistance in another segment of the alimentary canal, and constipation develops as a reinforcement of anal pleasure through the postponed act of defæcation.

The constipation transfers or shifts the resistance from the field of oral erotism to that of anal erotism. The anal zone now acquires erotic significance instead of the mouth zone, as a form of unconscious rebellion against further analysis and interpretation of the oral erotism. In the constipation, which is synonymous with anal-erotic resistance, there is a regression to the pregenital stage of development of the libido, in the same manner as the oral erotism of stammering is a regression to a similar stage.

In addition, the constipation is also a resistance against losing the phallus (castration), which is symbolized by the form of the fæcal mass and its retention. This resistance against castration displacement in the form of constipation producing retention of the fæcal mass is unconsciously connected with the physical apparatus of speech, particularly the tongue, which has a well-known phallic significance.[3] This castration anxiety is the fear of losing the tongue because of the forbidden pleasure principle involved (sucking or nursing) and of becoming phonetically impotent, the worst form of punishment which can overtake the narcissistic stammerer. The castration anxiety is therefore resisted by transferring it to a zone of less libidinal importance, the anal, where the constipation acts as an equivalent of the preservation of the phallic tongue. The retention of the fæcal mass becomes therefore a resistance against castration; yet at the same time its final expulsion and detachment from the body, a demand forced on it by physical necessity, is a mild castration substitute for the loss of the tongue. This expulsion meets with prolonged opposition, an opposition designed to retain the phallic equivalent of the fæcal mass, hence the constipation as an over-determined symptom. This physical and psychical ramification of the resistance is for the purpose of preserving that narcissistic omnipotence and auto-erotic gratification which is so characteristic of all stammerers. The analytic situation

[3] J. C. Flügel, ' A Note on the Phallic Significance of the Tongue and of Speech ', International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Vol. VI, 2, 1925.

here confirms the observation of Freud [4] in the statement that ' the original anal defiance enters into the composition of the castration complex ', a fusion in the pregenital organization of sadism and anal erotism.

In order to deflect the interest from the mouth zone to the anal zone, the pleasure is transferred from mouth to rectum in the form of constipation. This is a sign of the unconscious hate directed against analysis of the oral erotism, in an attempt to prevent its disintegration. It is this preponderant anal-sadistic trend which constitutes the components of the resistance in the guise of constipation. This anal resistance proceeds from the same pregenital stage as the oral erotism ; in both there exists an omnipotent over-valuation of the wish to retain the infantile pleasure. The unwinding of the libido in the process of analysis has become massed into a negative transference and has created for itself a new cathectic object in the anal zone in the form of constipation.

It appears from these observations that there exists an amalgamation of the oral and anal zones, in the sense that Ferenczi has conjectured a similar amalgamation, termed amphimixis, between the ana and urethral erotic roots of the innervation disturbances of ejaculation.[5] This is significantly characterized by Ferenczi as ' genital stuttering ' and is compared with stammering upon vowels and consonants. By analogy, the constipation may also be designated a form of " anal stuttering '. The evolution of the genital system from originally separate erotisms (anal, oral, urethral), can be traced to such an amphimictic process and on this hypothesis, there can be formulated a close relationship between the oral erotism of stammerers and the resistance encountered in the anal zone producing constipation. A double erotic pleasure is therefore experienced both oral and anal, in the sense of a fusion or amalgamation. The somatic manifestation of constipation is the result of resistance transferred to another erotogenic zone and consequently is quite different from the familiar hysterical conversion symptom.

Pleasure in the act of evacuation comprises both physical and psychical gratification, based on the achievement of the evacuation. Hence, the anal-erotic resistance which motivates the constipation is a

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[4] S. Freud, ' On the Transformation of Instincts with Special Reference to Anal Erotism ', *Collected Papers*, Vol. II.

[5] S. Ferenczi, *Versuch einer Genitaltheorie*, 1924.

narcissistic pleasure, in the same way that the oral libidinal activity, which produces the stammering, is also a narcissistic pleasure. The anal resistance or impotence is retardatory and so produces the constipation. The peculiar infantile characteristic of the resistance is that of a sadistic-anal defiance. Its origin is to be sought in the stage of pregenital libido development prior to object choice, the same stage of organization in which the oral libido arose, whose persistence into maturity produced stammering because of the desire to retain the infantile pleasure of sucking.

This particular form of resistance appears only when the narcissism has been attacked at its vulnerable point in the ego, that of oral erotism. In these cases, active therapy is particularly suitable. The tendency to mobilize the resistance of the oral erotism in the anal zone proceeds according to the pregenital pleasure-principle. The transference becomes repulsion or resistance, because the unconscious fights with all the means at its disposal to retain this early pleasure-principle of the libido. However, it must be pointed out that all stammerers show well-marked characteristic traits of anal erotism and that these constituent character traits may produce the anal defiance through re-animation in the analysis, leading to constipation as a form of resistance.

THE PSYCHIC EFFECTS OF INTOXICANTS: AN ATTEMPT TO EVOLVE A PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL THEORY OF MORBID CRAVINGS

BY

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Intoxicants are substances varying very greatly in origin and chemical peculiarities (alkaloids, substances of the alcohol-group, etc.), which, when resorted to either occasionally or habitually, have stupefying, stimulating or exhilarating effects on the mental life. Pharmacology has conducted more or less exhaustive researches in connection with the influence of these substances upon the organic functions of body and mind and gives us some information with regard to the specific effects produced by intoxicants according to the manner and the quantity in which they are employed. Nevertheless, these investigations have only a rough (statistical) validity; we are quite unable to predict with any certainty how a given individual will react to an intoxicant. Pharmacology gives this fact due consideration by postulating a 'constitutional factor'. According to Lewin[1] every individual has his own peculiar 'toxic equation'; this, however, is composed of elements of which we know nothing and which elude the investigations of the pharmacologist.

Everyday experience shows us how great this uncertainty is, particularly in regard to the specific effects of intoxicants. A very little alcohol suffices to intoxicate some people, whereas others can drink a large quantity and yet remain sober, though experiencing the physical effects of intoxication. Indeed, the behaviour of one and the same person in this respect may completely change as time goes on, without anyone being able to say why. Similar phenomena are observed when morphia and other narcotics are administered. Accordingly, the theory of the psychiatrists is that this unknown quantity—the individual's disposition or tendency to intoxication—plays a decisive part in the etiology of morbid cravings and allied states.

Let us try to penetrate this obscure region from the psychoanalytical point of view. Pharmacology classifies the manifold effects

[1] Lewin, *Phantastica. Die betaübenden und erregenden Genussmittel.* Berlin, 1924, S. 15.

of intoxicants according to its own standpoints. We aim at a psychological (or, more exactly, a metapsychological) orientation and ask ourselves: What are the peculiar properties of these substances, in virtue of which they are employed by the medical profession and in ordinary life? The answer is simple: they offer human beings in their need two things—help and gratification. This 'help' may take one of two forms: the drugs have (*a*) an analgesic (sedative, hypnotic), and (*b*) a stimulating effect.

Hitherto these two modes of operation have not been investigated analytically. Let us put down the first things which strike us as characteristic of them.

(*a*) In order to discuss the pain-killing effect of the so-called 'analgesics' we have to enter upon the problem of pain in general. Freud's view has provided a firm basis for a psychological conception of this difficult subject.[2] His theory is as follows: The specific mental distress of bodily pain arises when some influence breaks down the peripheral shield against stimuli, thus allowing a flow of continuous excitations from the affected area to the central mental apparatus. When the shield is broken through pain, even when its onslaught is from without, assumes the characteristics of continuous inner stimuli (i.e. of the instincts), against which the measures designed to withstand stimuli are from the outset futile. Within the mental apparatus the pleasure-pain principle by which it is governed, by setting up anticathexes, binds the advancing volume of excitation and discharges it in motor activities. It is the quantitative factor which determines the measure of success attained by these defensive processes in the mastering of pain. Experience teaches us that when the painful excitation passes beyond a certain intensity the mental life succumbs to it helplessly. Moreover, the biological tendency of pain, which is to give warning of a danger threatening,[3] is then altogether defeated.

We can now easily realize that, by diminishing or removing the sensation of pain, drugs supply exactly that which the mental organization lacks—namely, a shield against stimulation from within. This artificial shield functions *centrally*, at the sensory approaches to the mental apparatus, and acts, as we may say, as a second line of defence. The somatic process by which it is conditioned is invariably a diminution in function through paralysis of the excitable nerve-substance—

[2] *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, p. 30.

[3] Goldscheider: *Das Schmerzproblem*. Berlin, 1920, S. 81.

a method which is sometimes also employed by the natural peripheral shield against stimuli.[4]

All medical practitioners seem to agree that morphia is still our most valuable analgesic, though chemists are working hard to produce new and specifically differentiated combinations. Recently, L. Lévy[5] published one of the few psycho-analytical contributions to this subject.[5] He tells us that, in a number of grave organic cases in which morphia had been administered with successful results, he observed a remarkable phenomenon : the patients in their phantasies *projected* their serious state of health on to persons in their environment. This discovery of Lévy's must be regarded as of great importance in the present connection. As we know, Freud has traced the origin of projection to the impulse to treat inner excitations ' as if they were acting not from within but from without, so as to be able to employ against them the defensive measures of the shield against stimuli '.[6] Now if, as I think, the analgesia produced by morphia is an artificial inner defence against stimuli, then Lévy's observation is actually an experimental proof of the close connection between the warding-off of stimuli and the process of projection.

The overcoming of sleeplessness by hypnotics or the inducing of sleep by means of toxins (narcosis) cannot for the present be described more exactly in analytical terms, because we know almost nothing about the specific characteristics of these states. When we consider that sleeplessness is due to the obduracy of inner excitations, which will not yield to the desire for sleep and co-operate in the general withdrawal of cathexis, we must suppose that the establishing of a shield against stimuli from within again plays a part in the hypnotic and sedative effect of the drugs. But in narcosis there must certainly be something more than that, psychologically.

(*b*) The specific effect of ' stimulants ' is the one most familiar to us and of the most general importance, because these substances, in the form of coffee, tea, etc., are part of our daily food. Nevertheless, an attempt to define the processes of stimulation psychologically meets with great difficulties. The usual explanation that stimulants have a quickening effect upon our intellectual functions obviously

[4] What occurs in local anæsthesia is that the peripheral shield is so enormously strengthened that the sensory end-apparatus is benumbed and the function of receiving stimuli is wholly abrogated.

[5] *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 1924, Band X, S. 434.

[6] Freud : *loc. cit.*, p. 33.

takes us little further. Pharmacology teaches us that, strictly speaking, there are no drugs which are pure stimulants, for all such substances work electively upon the different nervous centres, stimulating some and paralysing others. Perhaps the single exception is caffeine, which has an almost exclusively stimulating effect and is not succeeded by a phase of dullness. We must assume that the influence of these substances on the separate centres and functions of the brain is much more far-reaching and more finely graded electively than pharmacology can at present demonstrate. For psychological observation shows us that what constitutes the psychic effect of these substances is the alternation of stimulating and paralysing influences. We can see that the drugs produce feelings of tension and at the same time relieve already existing tensions—the final result being the conversion of painful into pleasurable tensions. Unfortunately, this simple explanation is even less valuable than it might be, because we know so little of these two kinds of sensations of tension.

On the other hand, we must not underrate the importance of the discovery that the promotion of our ego-functions by means of toxins is bound up with a reversal in the feeling-tone of our inner tensions. Behind this lie hidden the economic conditions of our ego-functions in general, into which we may possibly penetrate from this angle. Let us consider the situation in which the ego has recourse to toxins in order to function more freely. We have already said that it needs this help in the distress consequent upon the hard struggle to maintain itself. Freud has given us an impressive account of the ' allegiances ' which the ego owes.[7] The ego must always be alert to adapt itself satisfactorily to the demands of reality and at the same time to be true to its two inner masters : the libido of the id and the demands of conscience. Now self-observation shews us that both the libidinal instinctual tensions and also the tensions proceeding from conscience —the so-called sense of guilt—invariably announce themselves to consciousness (though it may be only as a nameless discomfort), when the ego has succeeded in warding off by repression the ideational contents of these affects or when these contents are from the outset incapable of becoming conscious. In the same way we see that the ucs phantasies by which the impulses of the object-libido are gratified and also those phantasies from which the self-complacent ideal (the super-ego) derives satisfaction make themselves felt in consciousness

[7] *Das Ich und das Es.*

in the form of an inarticulate feeling of pleasure (a mood).[8] Sometimes we succeed in catching hold of such ucs products in analysis, and then we can also see how it is that stimulants bring about a reversal in the mind. They clear the way for hampered intentions, for they appease the hampering (inhibiting) influences—which are mainly the tensions produced by conscience—by giving them ucs gratification and thus get rid of them. Apparently this has the direct effect of reinforcing the function intended ; at the same time the subject is enabled to draw upon instinctual sources, otherwise sealed to him, through an extensive fusion of the contents of the ego with the symbol-cathexes of the id. Or possibly, this fusion gives rise to a partial transition from the ' bound ' discharge of the secondary process to that of the primary process. This effect is principally brought about in the pcs ; the rigid attachments of this system are loosened and its conductivity is increased. We note that what happens in stimulation is really a successful eroticizing of the ego-functions.

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The second effect of intoxicants is the production of states of well-being (euphoria, stupefaction and exhilaration), which vary greatly in intensity and quality. The variety of phenomena observed is enormously increased by the specific characteristics and secondary effects of the different intoxicants, by the manner in which they are employed and by all kinds of disturbances in the capacity of individuals to react to them. From amongst these many possibilities let us select the type of the *optimal* effect, as we see it in complete euphoria induced by morphia or in the untroubled ecstasy resulting from opium. The erotic nature of these states (to which Abraham drew attention long ago) is immediately obvious. But in following up this impression we may go much further and are bound to conclude that there is an essential agreement between the ideal, toxic inebriation and the end-pleasure obtained in natural sexual activities, i.e. orgasm. The distinctive characteristic of genital orgasm, which makes it rank high as a gratification *sui generis*, must be held to lie simply in the fact that the feeling of well-being succeeding on orgasm quickly loses its originally local character and, in a manner which we cannot apprehend more

[8] These facts must also play an important part in the effect of music on our minds.

exactly, becomes diffused through the entire organism with the utmost intensity.[9] In the gratification of the erotic component instincts and in the ordinary pleasure-sensations located in the erotogenic zones this is never the case; their local colour is retained throughout the discharge of excitation, and this discharge, so far as we know at present, is not capable of general diffusion. But precisely this feature of diffusion recurs in a marked form in the picture of intoxication. In our view this justifies us in calling the production of this feeling of well-being the *orgastic* effect of intoxicants. In comparison with the abrupt curve of genital orgasm, the course followed by pharmacotoxic or pharmacogenic orgasm is generally a long drawn-out one. We shall return later to this striking difference between the two phenomena.

The question arises whether this conception of the orgastic effect of intoxicants may be extended from the 'optimal' to all other cases? The capacity of different drugs and of different individuals to achieve this effect certainly varies very greatly, but observation puts it almost beyond doubt that in every instance the process tends to the same final result. In practice, of course, we have to take into account all the varying degrees of intensity and further we must not be misled by those cases in which the orgastic effect is qualitatively impaired or wholly absent. After all, genital orgasm also is frequently enough subject to similar disturbances. Even 'stimulation', which on theoretical grounds we differentiate so sharply from the pure pleasure-states, proves in the light of this knowledge to be an admirably graduated 'minimal effect' of an orgastic process.

In pharmacogenic orgasm the subject becomes acquainted with a new kind of erotic gratification, which enters into rivalry with the natural modes of sexual gratification. It has certain characteristics which give it remarkable advantages and must appear the more attractive in proportion as the normal possibilities of gratification are prejudiced by neurosis or by unfavourable circumstances. The crisis occurs when the ego is enlisted on the side of the desire for intoxication, and thus brings to the experience of pharmacotoxic orgasm all the libido at its disposal. When once intoxication has become a sexual aim, the subject has fallen a victim to the craving; it is but seldom that anyone succeeds in arresting the further course of events. It

[9] The extension of orgastic excitation to the whole vegetative nervous system has already been demonstrated from the physiological point of view. Cf. L. R. Müller: *Das Vegetative Nervensystem*, Berlin, 1920.

makes very little difference whether the temptation is succumbed to of deliberate intention or whether the first unforgettable experience of the pleasure of intoxication is a secondary result of the medical administration of a drug. Only too often we observe an instructive initial stage, in which the drug addict denies to himself his desire for intoxication; he still uses the drug as a 'medicine' to overcome suffering, to increase his efficiency or to heighten his potency, but in reality he has long ago succumbed to its orgastic influence and, departing from the reality-principle, is approaching dangerously near to blind obedience to instinct.

On the other hand we now comprehend how it comes about that imbibing intoxicants does not always lead to intoxication or to any orgastic discharge. In the first place, because the longing, the desire for intoxication, is lacking. And secondly, because that desire may be replaced by a strong inhibition (in the form of a reaction of conscience, usually unconscious), which checks the instinctual transmutations and prevents intoxication, even though the dose be considerably increased.

When a person adopts the practice of pharmacotoxic gratification, momentous consequences ensue to his whole psychic and somatic condition. The phenomena presented to the clinical observer in cases of morbid craving are so multifarious that in this brief survey we must confine ourselves to stressing certain fundamental characteristics. The changes are enacted principally, of course, in the abode of the libido, for erotic gratification by means of drugs is a violent attack on our biological sexual organization, a bold forward movement of our 'alloplastic' civilization. Let us confine ourselves to morphinism and to the most 'fashionable' method of administering the poison by means of the Pravaz syringe. To put the matter in a nutshell, the whole peripheral sexual apparatus is left on one side as in a 'short circuit' and the exciting stimuli are enabled to operate directly on the central organ. I propose to term this phenomenon, which deserves to be distinguished by a special name, 'metaerotism'.[10] With the advance of organic chemistry the manufacture of the most refined

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[10] I prefer to use this term rather than the obvious 'paraerotism', which I think should be reserved for the less questionable scientific designation of the perversions. My justification for proposing so many new terms in this paper must be that I am trying to treat of a wide range of facts which have not hitherto been dealt with in detail by psycho-analysis.

substances for producing (sexual) gratification is assuredly only a matter of time, and it is easy to prophesy that in the future of our race this mode of gratification will play a part as yet incalculable.

Elimination of the genital and of the other erotogenic zones, with their complicated interplay and their cumbrous methods for discharging excitation, first and foremost undermines genital potency and then leads rapidly to a turning away from real love-objects, which are no longer of any interest. Like most intoxicants, morphia is a poison dangerous to potency and as a source of pleasure soon makes itself an absolute monarch. With the abandonment of sexual love a loosening of the relations to reality begins—of course, with the exception of the drug itself, and the whole psychic interest of the morphomaniac becomes gradually concentrated upon procuring the latter.

Metaerotism, however, not only destroys genital potency ; it also robs of their value all other natural ways of attaining pleasure, substituting for them pharmacotoxic orgasm as a means of gratification. We must regard pharmacogenic orgasm as an executive process by which the discharge of the entire psycho-sexual excitation is accomplished, like the function of onanism in children.

Now what is the state in which the libido finds itself psychically after real love-objects and genital activity have been given up ? As always happens when the genital primacy is demolished, the pregenital organizations come to their own. The erotic tendencies of the past are activated by a comprehensive regression, the Œdipus complex flares up and it depends in the first instance on the vicissitudes of infancy and the fixation-points of the libido what manner of impulses and desires make their appearance. Day-dreams and phantasies occur, quite comparable to masturbation-phantasies, the excitation of which is discharged in pharmacotoxic orgasm. In the blissful phantasy-images of opium-intoxication as described by certain writers, it is evident that the subject actually produces wish-fulfilling hallucinations. Thus every hidden source of pleasure which can conduce towards intensification of the ecstasy may contribute to the gratification. Even the genital libido, after being withdrawn from reality, may still be retained for a time in phantasy as an impulse belonging to the Œdipus complex. This is apparent in the symbolic value attached to the syringe, etc.

In many cases the significance of particular erotogenic zones is so marked that they take shelter, like refugees, under the metaerotic régime ; they may then be retained as areas for and modes of applica-

tion of the drug and take their place in the metaerotic organization, together with the excitation of which they are capable or with the symbolic cathexis attaching to them, as a kind of mechanism for preliminary pleasure. Incomparably the most important in this respect is the oral zone, the close connections of which with intoxicants are already known. Undoubtedly drinking was the earliest method by which intoxicants were imbibed and it is probably still the most widespread. We may say in general that there is scarcely any accessible region of the body which has not been used for the introduction of drugs, and the variety in the ways of their application is amazingly great.

If we have the courage to compare artificial metaerotism with the natural libidinal organizations we shall find certain further points which assist orientation in the bewildering abundance of phenomena. We then see clearly that pharmacogenic orgasm may be subject to disturbances and produce pathological reactions (as it were of a second order), just like any normal life process. First and foremost, owing to its great practical significance for the curability of the patient, is pharmacotoxic impotence—the failure to achieve pharmacotoxic orgasm though the intention to obtain gratification is present. It seems premature to-day to give a picture of the *psychic* forces and processes which may produce this state, sometimes even in the initial stages of the craving. In any case the fact should be specially stressed that with most drugs this failure inevitably occurs sooner or later from physiological reasons (' habituation ') and cannot be overcome, however desperate the efforts of the patient. Another group of phenomena displays those products of unsuccessful attempts at defence or powerful reaction of conscience familiar to us from the theory of the neuroses. This defence impairs or wholly nullifies the pharmacogenic orgasm aimed at, but the defensive process is directed against its psychic superstructure, the forbidden tendencies of the Œdipus complex activated by metaerotism. Thus the ' neurotic ' reverse side of blissful intoxication is manifested in the most terrible anxiety-states, torturing excitement, frightful visions, etc. The behaviour of different drugs varies greatly in this respect. With many of them (for instance, with cocaine) the specific effect is complicated from the beginning by these phenomena. All these relations can only be cleared up by full and complete analyses, and the same is true of the vast field of allied phenomena accompanying abstention from the drug, with which we cannot deal here.

Several authors have already remarked on the emergence of the

primitive libidinal organizations in the clinical picture of morbid cravings. Schilder[11] recently laid special emphasis on this point. To this we must add that the destruction of genital primacy may so strengthen certain pregenital erotisms that the result is sometimes (especially in periods of abstention from the drug) a manifest perversion. In particular, an important part is played here by homosexuality, the relations of which to alcoholism were described by Abraham long ago, and to the cocaine-habit recently by Hartmann.[12]

In grave cases of drug-mania the disruptive effect of metaerotism on the mental life goes much further still. We get the impression that, through the neglect of their somatic sources, the specific mental impulses of the component instincts gradually become exhausted also, and even that all the differentiated mental modes of erotic manifestation, with their richly diversified contents, progressively perish. A relentless process of mental devastation overtakes and destroys everything that has been created through psychogenesis in the individual—a mental state comparable only to certain features in the final stages of schizophrenia. We shall be entirely in accordance with facts if we construct theoretically a final phase in which the libido has lost all its genetically differentiated characteristics and forms of organization, and survives in mental life only as an *amorphous* erotic tension. The patient's mental life is then represented by a very simple formula: *desire for intoxication, intoxication, after-effects*, and so forth. This hypothesis seems to me to throw a searching light on certain grave forms of morbid craving, for it is indisputable that, unless failure through 'habituation' previously takes place, this is the direction in which they tend. The whole mental personality, together with the drug, then represents an autoerotic pleasure-apparatus. The ego is completely subjugated and devastated by the libido of the id—one might almost say that it is converted back into the id; the outside world is ignored and the conscience disintegrated. We get a glimpse of the enormous importance the drug assumes as the sole piece of reality in which the subject has any interest, and we can realize how it is that from the very beginning of his illness the drug-addict throws overboard every legal and moral consideration in his attempts to procure it.

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[11] Schilder: *Entwurf zu einer Psychiatrie auf psycho-analytischer Grundlage*, 1925.

[12] Hartmann: 'Kokainismus und Homosexualitat'. *Zeitschrift für die gesammte Psychiatrie und Neurologie*, 1925.

The picture I have outlined must now be supplemented by certain features which relate to one factor that I have so far left on one side. The continuous process of regression and deterioration which overtakes the libido in metaerotism must, according to Freud's conception, which is confirmed by all the experience acquired in studying the psychoneuroses, be accompanied by a far-reaching defusion of the instincts and liberation of the destructive component. It is easy to see that the facts fully bear out this theoretical expectation. The overthrow which I have described of the higher mental organizations and differentiations can only be the work of destructive forces liberated by defusion, and we still do not know what part this psychic factor plays in the somatic deterioration of the drug-victim, which runs parallel with his mental ruin. The destructive force, once let loose, finds a second stronghold within the super-ego in the faculty of conscience whose aggressive tendencies (according to Freud's view) are directed upon the ego in the form of a ' conscience-instinct '.[13] In the case of many drug-addicts (we do not as yet know of which type) we are actually forced to assume that the unconscious tension of conscience is actually intensified rapidly, and that this involves, amongst other things, a strong need for punishment. The result is a vicious circle, the patient being plunged deeper and deeper into his craving, and a *psychological* basis being supplied for the inevitable increase of the dose.

Although often, especially in the case of certain drugs, the aggressive tendency may also be directed outwards, undoubtedly it is far more significant when it is ' turned round ' upon the subject's own person. Here is a remarkable analogy : the drug-addict perishes as a result of the psychic disintegration due to his metaerotism, just as some lower animals perish as a result of their natural sexual activity.

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Let us now turn to what is perhaps the most important question arising out of our discussion. After the drug has been first taken

[13] It seems advisable to designate as the ' conscience-instinct ' the dynamic expression of the institution of conscience. According to Freud's discovery this instinct represents the phylogenetically most recent differentiation in human instinctual life and is mainly determined by its topographical strategical position. The phrase enables us to utilize in the psychology of the ego terminology already familiar from the theory of instinct, and as regards its content it is perfectly accurate and is also helpful.

purely for medical purposes, what is it in a man's mind which oversteps the boundary between 'help' and 'pleasure', or what is it which first of all leads him to resort to drugs with the intention o procuring gratification? [14] In other words, what kind of person conceives the desire for intoxication and follows it along the path which leads to drug-mania?

The commonest factor in the etiology of morbid cravings is, of course, actual frustration of gratification with all its manifold accompanying phenomena, familiar to us from the etiology of the neurosis. We find nothing which might not occur as an 'actual conflict' in the neuroses too, with at most this additional fact that any of the neurosis may also enter into the causation of morbid cravings. It often happens that frustration is followed first of all by a neurosis, and only later by such a craving, but this complicates matters only by one degree. The disposing factors which decide the choice of 'flight into morbid craving' must therefore lie further back, and all our endeavours to bring this field of phenomena under the terms of Freud's theory of the libido lead us to the conclusion that these factors are to be sought in the libidinal development of the person concerned. Thus our attention was directed to oral erotism, whose etiological importance in dipsomania (already cited by Freud in his *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie*) has been confirmed by all subsequent analytical experience. The surprising discovery was made that the psychic manifestations of oral erotism are always present in a marked form even in those cases

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[14] The following table may make it easier to grasp the relations which I have been describing:

THE PSYCHIC EFFECTS OF INTOXICANTS

A. *Help rendered.* (*a*) Protective shield against stimulus from within. (Analgetic, sedative, hypnotic and narcotic effects.) (*b*) Promotion of ego-functions. (Stimulating effects.)	Internal relief for the ego in the service of reality.
B. *Pleasure derived.* Pharmacotoxic orgasm. (Intoxicating effects.)	Subjugation of the ego by the id. Destruction of the relations of the ego to reality.

of drug-mania in which the drug is not taken by mouth at all. One received the impression that some mysterious bonds exist between the oral zone and intoxication, and that the significance of these bonds is retained even when other erotogenic zones have replaced the oral in administering the drug, or when it is wholly independent of erotogenic zones. This fact is perhaps most clearly seen in cases of the latter type, where the Pravaz syringe is employed. It is as though intoxication remained an oral phenomenon, although precisely the most highly finished technique for producing it has emancipated itself from the oral zone. This conclusion is certainly not very satisfying, and the more so when we reflect how little it advances our knowledge. Abraham's classic researches have shown us how manifold are the operations and manifestations of oral erotism in our mental life, and we simply do not understand what there can be which disposes the subject to the production of states of intoxication, from which the mouth as an erotogenic zone is eliminated.

I admit that for many years this problem baffled me, until certain chance observations supplied me with the solution. Curiously enough, these were not in the first instance made in relation to drug-addicts at all. One day it struck me that the exciting process in oral erotism could not be restricted to the region of the mouth as the somatic source. When pleasant-tasting food has been eaten in abundance and with enjoyment, there follows a phase to which, physiologically, nothing but the beginning of digestion and absorption can correspond. In this phase the mental picture is dominated by the agreeable feeling of a full stomach (repletion) and by a general diffused feeling of well-being which extends far beyond that of repletion, the whole organism here again taking its share.[15] Some people possess the capacity for experiencing this phenomenon intensely; in others the faculty has been more or less lost. There is no doubt that, in adults, this process is the survival of a psycho-physiological primary function which can only be termed an *alimentary orgasm*. I will show elsewhere by means of clinical material how great may be the significance of this orgastic mode of gratification in normal persons, and in certain of the neuroses. Such observations are easily made, when once attention

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[15] The phase of digestion announces itself, as we know, by a series of physiological indications in the *whole* organism (raising of the temperature, change in the composition of the blood, etc.).

has been drawn to the phenomenon. Let us pass on to consider the theoretical importance of this discovery.

It is only too plain that the oral organization of the sucking infant culminates in alimentary orgasm. Since the somatic processes on which this orgastic pleasure is based take place within the body, and are thus unperceived by the infant, his interest must be displaced on to the tangible oral zone, the excitation of which, as a fore-pleasure mechanism, sets in motion the process of gratification. We may assume that what the sucking infant really aims at is the repetition of orgastic gratification, and that he contents himself with such enjoyment as is restricted to the oral zone only as a surrogate satisfaction. Owing to the dependence of alimentary orgasm on the function of nutrition it is possible to repeat it at all only within the limits permitted by the physical condition of the digestive tract at the moment. Thus the enhanced erotic value of the oral zone would have to be traced to alimentary orgasm. In any case, however, there is deeply imprinted in the ucs the expectant surmise that stimulation of the oral zone may reproduce that hidden and mysterious pleasure. This may even have led some ancestor of ours with unusual oral endowment to the first discovery of a plant yielding an intoxicating substance.

Alimentary orgasm makes its appearance in mental life as a finished psycho-physiological mechanism, and in its further developments exercises a far-reaching influence on psycho-sexual evolution. With the cathexes which it contributes it enters into a whole series of infantile ideas and wish-images familiar to us. Thus, to mention only the most essential, it proves to be what really underlies the familiar sequence : *oral impregnation—abdominal pregnancy—anal birth.* These connections may be proved with certainty in analysis, and must be reckoned amongst the most important factual bases of our theory. It is only when we argue back to the sucking infant that we enter the realm of speculation, cogent though our argument seems to be. But why alimentary orgasm is the nucleus round which are grouped the 'genital' ideas which enter into these infantile sexual theories so important in the symptomatology of the neuroses—this is a question which must be answered later. Here I would simply add the remark that the sexual excitation of such wish-phantasies (which belong to the Œdipus complex), given a certain disposition in the subject, is discharged *not* by means of onanism but through alimentary orgasm. Subsequently, when a defence is set up against the, now forbidden, incestuous tendencies, the repressive process extends to the executive

function of alimentary orgasm and in *this* way brings about the familiar psychic disturbances of the function of nutrition (distaste for food, gastric and intestinal neuroses, etc.).

It is in alimentary orgasm with its psychic superstructure as outlined here that we shall find the specific fixation-point disposing the subject to morbid craving. Pharmacotoxic orgasm is seen to be a new edition of alimentary orgasm, in common with which it shares its diffused and retarded course and much besides, but which otherwise it far surpasses in pleasurable characteristics.[16] Here we have at one blow the solution of a number of problems which present themselves in our study of morbid cravings. The pregenital erotisms, so prominent in the clinical pictures, are the psychic garb of the alimentary orgasm of the infantile period. This gives us an intelligible psychological motivation for the prevalence of homosexuality, without being obliged to assume with Schilder[17] a mutual affinity between particular drugs and particular erotisms. We understand first of all from the psychological side why most morbid cravings are accompanied by great emaciation and by the neglect of the function of nutrition, and why, according to Lewin,[18] in the coca-chewer, for instance, 'for long periods of time, the under-nourished body feels no sensations of hunger'. The pharmacotoxic orgasm in its magnitude has swallowed up the rudiments of the alimentary orgasm which act as a pleasure-premium and ensure nutrition and digestion.

To the unconscious 'tension of conscience' (sense of guilt), on the other hand, no specific rôle in the etiology of morbid cravings can be ascribed. Its importance in grave cases is similar to that which we must assign to it in grave cases of neuroses. Merely proving that it is present (important as this may be practically) makes us none the wiser as to why a given individual should have either succumbed to a neurosis, or fallen a victim to drug-mania, or become a criminal or a specially energetic philanthropist.

Before we leave this subject let us draw a brief comparison between the different modes of orgastic gratification which we have discovered. Here it is tempting to mention the phylogenetic standpoint. It seems

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[16] A long series of foods and delicacies can be worked out, forming a regular gradation from ordinary foods up to pure intoxicants, so that we have also to take into consideration cases in which the two orgastic functions are blended.

[17] Loc cit

[18] Loc cit., S. 70.

hardly credible that the orgastic mode of gratification was first introduced as a novelty when the higher forms of animal life emerged and the organs of copulation were formed. If, then, we discard this hypothesis, purely evolutionary reasons force us to adopt the view that alimentary orgasm represents the original form of orgastic gratification, and that, accordingly, the highest pleasure-function of primitive living beings is bound up with their most important self-preservative function.[19] Thus in the period when he is an infant at the breast the individual recapitulates a version of that phase of development, which then (and this is certainly only a repetition of a phase in the evolution of the race—cf. beasts of prey) persists for a time in formidable rivalry with the gradually maturing genitality.[20] This would explain also the fact that in ontogenesis the complex of ' genital ' phantasies (and often also the discharge of the accompanying sexual excitation) is at the outset connected with alimentary orgasm. This latter must obviously be based on the physiological-chemical processes of digestion and absorption. Following the theory suggested by Freud in relation to a sexual chemistry,[21] we assume that in these processes some change (and perhaps also the production) of sexual substances takes place. This would imply that alimentary orgasm is an (endo-)toxic phenomenon, closely bound up with the nutritive processes. According to Ferenczi's view,[22] the development of ' genitality ' in the phylogenetic process of progressive differentiation is to be conceived of as the setting up and discriminating of an erotic centre, whose function it is to relieve the processes of self-preservation from their secondary, erotic service. If we accept this view, we may

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[19] Biological considerations compel us to ascribe alimentary orgasm even to the lowest protozoa, which take in nourishment with their whole, undifferentiated, unicellular body. The conception of orgasm as an ' erotic primary function ' and of the cell as an ' orgastic unity ' opens up an interesting biological perspective and should throw light from a new angle upon the processes of cell-division and copulation, and make them more accessible to experimental research.

[20] The transition from alimentary orgasm to genital erotism appears to be made by way of the oral zone. For the relations existing between oral and genital erotism, cf. the following writings : *Psychoanalyse der weiblichen Sexualfunctionen*, by Helene Deutsch ; *Psychologie des Säuglings*, by Bernfeld ; ' Zur Genese der Genitalität ', by Rank.

[21] *Drei Abhandlungen Zur Sexualtheorie.*

[22] *Versuch einer Genitaltheorie*, 1924.

add to our argument that the genital has obviously wrested its orgastic operation from the process of nutrition. In spite of its subservience to the function of reproduction, genitality has without doubt a greater mobility in the management of sexual substances than was the case in the act of nutrition. For the present we do not understand how the toxic sexual substances have been so dealt with by genital erotism as to undergo *explosive* transformation in the new, *genital* orgasm. But when man discovered pharmacotoxic orgasm he played a trick on biology. He too has copied the function of nutrition, has detached its accompanying sexual-toxic phenomena from their cumbrous alimentary prerequisites and raised them to the status of an independent mode of orgastic gratification. Possibly we shall at some future time succeed in imitating a genital orgasm by pharmacogenic means.

One factor common to all three forms of orgasm is that they induce sleep by equalizing the erotic tensions. In alimentary orgasm the destructive tendency, when liberated (mainly in the form of *chemical* aggression), is directed against the food which the subject has taken ; in genital and pharmacogenic orgasm the destructive force attacks the subject's own bodily existence, though far less noticeably in the first than in the second.

In conclusion, I would say a few words on the subject of melancholia. Knowing, as we do, the significance of the function of oral incorporation in this disease, we should expect that the idea of alimentary orgasm would throw fresh light also on its pathology. We will confine ourselves here to a few brief suggestions. The similarity of mania and melancholia to intoxication and its depressing after-effects respectively is well known. I think that we can now show the biological prototypes of both pairs of phenomena ; they are (*a*) alimentary orgasm and (*b*) long-continued hunger which has already produced a paralysing effect. When a starving man, in order to meet his need for fresh energy, destroys his own body, his aggression is ultimately directed against objects formerly belonging to the outside world, which have been incorporated by him and built into his frame. Though we are far from overestimating the importance of analogies of this sort, yet we cannot but be surprised to see how faithfully these processes are reproduced on purely psychological ground in melancholia. And further, we must not forget that rapid emaciation is one of the most striking clinical accompaniments of melancholia. Moreover, the constant lament of the melancholic patient that his body is decomposing and that his stomach or intestines have perished and so

forth, betrays its deep biological meaning—a grave impairment of the orgastic alimentary function. Finally, it must be admitted in this connection that both with our ancestors in the brute creation, and to a great extent with infants at the present time, alimentary orgasm was and is preceded by a tormenting state of hunger, just as mania is preceded by melancholia.

THE CONCEPTION OF THE EGO

BY

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Recent contributions to the psychology of the ego have introduced into this concept topographical complexities which tend to obscure its fundamental predicates.

Our need now would seem to be to relate this complicated structure to the fundamental dynamics of mental functioning, or in other words to instinctual activity.

It might seem that this has already been done in Freud's original antithesis of ego and sex instincts which regards the ego as the psychological expression of tendencies subserving the biological end of self-preservation. But the relation of the ego to instinct nowadays requires further elucidation than is furnished by this simple equation.

An enquiry into this relation might usefully begin with the examination of a hypothetical primal ego.

We may safely allot to this primal ego two basic functions which persist throughout its subsequent elaboration.

One of these deals with internal happenings and imposes a check on the immediacies of instinctual impulses (*Triebe*), in the interests of better adaptation to external reality; the other deals with external happenings by utilizing perceptions and memory-traces to arrive at appropriate motor adjustments.

These complementary activities, control of motility, and adaptation to reality with the help of memory-traces and perceptions remain the fundamental attributes of the ego, and survive in Freud's later conception of the real ego, as distinct from the super-ego.

At this hypothetical early stage in the phylogenesis of the ego, its rôle in subserving self-preservation is obvious and uncomplicated. Any modification of pre-existing more stereotyped instinctual responses, which permitted a wider range of possible adaptations under environmental stresses, would have a high survival value. It is a fairly safe assumption that the emergence of the primal ego and with it the development of intelligence was the outcome of some environmental change which rendered previous stereotyped instinctual responses relatively insufficient and which, through the operation of natural selection, favoured the survival of individuals endowed with greater plasticity,

although spontaneous variation may also have played a part in the development of this new type of adaptation.

Our enquiry into the relation of the ego to instinct is here threatened with shipwreck on an antithesis between instinct and intelligence which would represent the ego as developing a totally new type of response and so introducing an unbridgeable gap into the developmental series.

To circumvent this difficulty we must reconsider the concept of instinct itself. We must abandon for the moment the descriptive grouping of the instincts into sex instincts and ego instincts, or their teleological grouping into race-preservation and self-preservation tendencies, and regard all instinctual activities from a functional standpoint.

From this point of view we may distinguish instinctual impulses compelling the organism to take appropriate steps to secure discharge of the tensions initiating and sustaining them from instinctual modes of response to external stimuli. The eating impulse set in motion by the internal changes manifested as hunger would be an example of the first; the instinctual response of flight from an external stimulus would be an example of the second. Of course this functional distinction may not be too rigidly maintained, since, for instance, the sight of food or of an attractive sexual object may appear to be the prime instigator of instinctual activity; but it has considerable practical value, and neglect of it is responsible for much of the confusion which constantly befogs discussions on the subject of instinct.

Thus, lacking the insight which Freud's researches have given us into the nature and dynamic importance of these 'internal stimuli' which he designates *Triebe*, more superficial investigations have led to a quite disproportionate importance being attached to environmental determinants of instinctual activities, a point of view which has been developed to remarkably extreme lengths by some contemporary American psychologists.

My present thesis is that what we call the ego is fundamentally modelled on what we might call the 'reactive,' rather than the 'impulsive,' aspects of instincts; or in other words, that its activities are based phylogenetically on the function of responses to external stimuli. This contention would seem to be supported by the following facts:

1. That what we now call the real ego is built up from perceptions and memory-traces of perceptions.

2. That in dealing with internal sources of 'pain' (*Unlust*) the ego

betrays its origin by tending to treat them as if they were external, e.g. by the mechanism of projection.

3. That the most powerful weapon of defence against internal stimuli rendered painful by cultural development, namely, repression, is fundamentally modelled on the reaction of flight.

Our first conclusion, therefore, is that the ego is born of a restraint of instinctual impulses necessitated by their failure to achieve prompt gratification under new conditions requiring a wider range of motor adaptations guided by perceptions and memory-traces.

If, however, we associate the formation of the ego with a development of the reactive type of instinctual activity, or a developmental complication of responses to external stimuli, we are left with the difficult problem of the relation of the 'reactive' ego-instincts to instinctual impulses, such as that of hunger, which although 'impulsive', also subserve self-preservation. It might be maintained with every show of justification that such impulses and even such libidinal impulses which escape the internal inhibiting function of the ego should be regarded as part of the ego, since they merge freely with its other activities, i.e. are 'ego-syntonic' (*ichgerecht*), but I suggest that the essential nature of the ego is better appreciated if we bear the foregoing functional distinction in mind.

The regulative activities of the ego share with earlier mechanisms of securing instinctual discharge the function of lowering psychic tension to an optimum level, a tendency which has led Freud to the paradoxical conclusion that the secret of the ego-instincts apparently making for self-preservation is their deathward tendency.

The essential difference between the earlier and the later modes of reducing psychic tension is expressed in the distinction between the pleasure-principle and the reality-principle, the latter being a delayed and complicated version of the former, evolved as the result of the condition which led to ego-development.

The successful functioning of this later type of response involved an apparent renunciation of the pleasure-principle, which had retained its supremacy so long as instinctual gratifications were quasi-reflex in character.

And though we may only speculate as to the historical conditions which occasioned this renunciation we may be sure that the actual taskmaster was dire external necessity.

In ontogenetic development the stage of quasi-automatic instinctual gratification is represented by the almost immediate fulfilment of

infantile needs, and here too we see that the distinction between the ego and the outer world is rendered possible only by a differentiation of the type of reaction necessary to deal with external and internal stimuli respectively.

The essential function of the ego is to mediate between the internal demands of instinct-impulses and the external world of reality.

Other factors in the development of the complementary ego-functions of inhibition and adaptation have to be considered.

Its inhibiting function involves a process of energy-transformation first described by Breuer, whereby free energy becomes tonic or bound energy. It is possible that further research along the lines which led Head to formulate his conceptions of ' vigilance ' may help to elucidate this transformation from the physiological standpoint.

But the most striking development of the ego-function of adaptation followed the development of language and with it the supreme manifestation of ego-functions in human consciousness.

If my view is correct that the ego is modelled mainly on the ' reactive ', rather than on the ' impulsive ' type of instinct, then we shall have further confirmation of the view that consciousness has merely a limiting and shunting function and has no initiatory rôle in the mental life.

So far we have considered the ego as a development in the psychic apparatus of an inhibiting function subserving better adaptation, and have suggested that it is essentially the imprint of external necessity in what is now called the id, but we have yet to examine more fully the instinctual tendencies which maintain it in being.

It is easy to see how the constraint of external necessity can maintain the operation of a function restraining the older modes of relief of tension in so far as self-preservation needs are concerned, for the penalty here is failure to survive ; but the gradually increasing capacity of the ego to hold all sorts of instinct-impulses in check including powerful libidinal ones requires further scrutiny.

First of all we may briefly consider certain factors which facilitate the maintenance of its painfully acquired supremacy over the pleasure-principle.

It would seem that the mechanism of hallucinatory gratification like its later modification into phantasy production, although essentially regressive in character, affords on occasion an easement of the continuous strain of reality-adaptation.

Again we have to take into account the profound easement of

instinct-tensions afforded by displacement in its various forms. A third reinforcement was lent by the libidinal support derived from the masochistic component of sexuality.

Before considering the next and most important instinctual reinforcement of the inhibiting and adapting functions of the ego, we have to take account of a gradually increasing differentiation of these two functions, one directed more and more to the external world of stimuli, and the other directed more and more to the internal world of impulse, culminating in the differentiation of the real ego and the super-ego.

We have seen that the premium placed on the earliest renunciation of the pleasure-principle in respect of ego-impulses was no less than survival itself, and no doubt that was originally true to a large extent of libidinal impulses as well—e.g. in the hypothetical stage of the primal horde; but group-life would have continued to pass through an unending cycle of enforced submission to external constraint of libidinal gratifications and murderous removal of such constraints had not some adjustment of instinctual forces powerfully reinforced the inhibiting function of the ego in respect of libidinal impulses.

It is characteristic of the sometimes faulty economy of nature that this reinforcement was affected by dividing libidinal forces against themselves as if the essentially regulative functions of the ego maintained their supremacy through the application of the maxim, 'Divide and rule.'

When thwarted libido withdrawn from incestuous love-objects installs in the self the composite image of these objects, so that henceforth a differentiated part of the self is invested with libido formerly attached to supreme love-objects (an image which exercises the prerogatives of observation, criticism, approval, and punishment formerly exploited by its real precursors) then the libido is effectively divided against itself, for the narcissistic recompense for renounced object gratifications so obtained can only be maintained by inhibition, and this inhibition is maintained with the help of affective sanctions as strong or even stronger than these disciplining self-preservative activities. Just as a threat to survival mobilizes the painful affect of fear, so an infringement of the ego-ideal loosens the secondary narcissism bound in the cathexis of the introjected parental image and occasions the painful tensions of guilt, etc.

Much might be said here of the relations of consciousness, as the quintessence of the developed ego, with self-consciousness following the specialized development of the super-ego, but I do not propose to

say more of the super-ego here than that it has taken over to a large extent the care of the inhibiting functions of the primal ego, e.g. in instigating the ego to repression, remaining at the same time in close contact with the impulse-life and that its activities are no longer purely 'reactive', and in this sense self-preservative, but are now strongly reinforced by a positive direction of the libido itself in which the maintenance of the inhibitory function of the ego becomes a paramount libidinal aim in the narcissistic cathexis of the super-ego.

It is interesting to note that this differentiation and specialization of the primary ego-activities of inhibition and adaptation has its analogue in the rôles played in social life by religion and science respectively, the first being the social counterpart of the super-ego, while the second mirrors the function of the real ego.

THE SENSE OF GUILT AND THE NEED FOR PUNISHMENT

BY

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In his work entitled *The Economic Problem in Masochism* (1)[1] Freud was led by practical considerations to substitute the conception of an unconscious need for punishment for that of an unconscious sense of guilt. In this paper we shall attempt to find out whether these two feelings may not be theoretically differentiated and whether, with regard to genesis and content, they do not represent two different things.

According to Freud's theory the Œdipus complex is the source of man's sense of guilt and of his morality (3). Basing his assumption on Robertson Smith's hypothesis (6) with regard to the totem-feast Freud supposes that in the primal horde the father was murdered, dismembered and devoured by the sons. Having perpetrated this act, they were seized with a longing for the father whom they had thus lost. This longing was converted into dread of the community, which is another term for the sense of guilt. As time went on and the longing for the father recurred (being the expression of unsatisfied libido fixated to the father), it became the principal source of the various religions in which the power of the father was re-established by the mechanism of projection. The father was exalted, while the son was abased and the primal transgression was redressed. The father's image was revived and, in a sublimated form, the passive homosexual libido directed towards him attained its goal again.

In the development of the individual a mere thought or impulse suffices to bring about similar consequences. The father is absorbed into the ego (introjected), from which he is then differentiated as the ego-ideal or super-ego. The attitude of the ego to the super-ego is then analogous to the former attitude of the son to the father. In the main the super-ego imposes inhibitions upon the ego. The super-ego is formed by way of identification, a process which genetically has developed from the oral phase of libidinal organization (2 and 4).

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[1] The references are to the bibliography at the end of the paper.

Following the lines of thought suggested by Freud, Roheim has shown that the mourning-rites of savages are a reaction to the primal transgression. The mourning-observances consist of certain rites of purification, which are preceded by depositing fæces on the dead man's grave, which, however, have to be removed before these rites are performed. Roheim puts forward the general hypothesis that after the primal deed mankind fell back to the anal-oral phase of libidinal organization (7 and 8).

In schizophrenics I have been able directly to observe the connection between the sense of guilt and oral-anal impulses (9). In melancholia, a disease of the conscience *par excellence*, the clinical picture is dominated by anal and oral tendencies. We are indebted to Abraham for the demonstration that melancholia is also a form of mourning-ritual, in which the loss of the object is re-experienced by oral incorporation and anal retention (11), while self-punishment leads to pangs of conscience, self-reproaches, and suicidal tendencies. In schizophrenia the physical (hypochondriacal) delusion of being injured corresponds to the latter tendencies. In this disease it may also be observed that, after the loss of the object through incorporation (identification), anxiety arises, part of which is mastered in the sense of guilt by intestinal changes, while another part finds an outlet in the need for punishment, which is a manifestation of the destructive instincts.

Hence, in the psychoses the sense of guilt and the need for punishment are not entirely identical: the aim and the content are different in each. The same is true of the neuroses. Not infrequently we observe that the sense of guilt does not always seek to be appeased by punishment, by the suffering of pain, humiliation, degradation, etc. It often manifests itself instead in an impulse to give away something of the subject's self, e.g. by making presents or disbursing money, by attempts to win the favour of others, and so forth. Here, too, belong certain dreams, for instance, of the birth of a child, of eating, and many dreams of fæces. Other patients again have a feeling that, in spite of all their endeavours, they are not able to give that which in their innermost hearts they wish to bestow.

I have seen not only that in many cases of hysteria vomiting and defecation serve as a discharge for the sense of guilt, but that the same thing occurs in the obsessional neurosis, where the symptoms of conversion-hysteria, which are invariably present, always manifest themselves in the region of the alimentary canal.

I am at present treating a patient suffering from brooding-mania, who maintains that the seat of all his illness is his stomach. Apart from his doubting-mania and the obsessive brooding, which make him incapable of work, he suffers every Saturday from moods of depression, in which he weeps, experiences every conceivable kind of self-reproach, eats almost nothing and has no action of the bowels. He is a devout Jew, training to be a rabbi, and comes of a pious stock. His illness first manifested itself on the Day of Atonement, exactly a week after his thirteenth birthday (confirmation), and took the form of doubts about God and feelings of remorse. Later on, Saturday was substituted for the Day of Atonement. Amongst devout Jews the Sabbath begins on Friday evening with solemn prayers. My patient was specially impressed by a certain hymn in which God is adored as the Bridegroom of the Sabbath, which He espouses on Friday evening. The boy, who was of a devout turn of mind, already knew of the Jewish religious ordinance that it was God's will that on Friday nights husbands should perform coitus, and in his mind this was equivalent to the nuptials of God with his mother. He imagined that the spirit of God was breathed into his mother's body through her mouth. But the idea that, in his mother's body, the spirit of God was bound to come into contact with fæces was as intolerable to him as the thought that his father might have intercourse with his mother on that evening. A ceremonial meal followed the prayers, whereupon the patient passed into a state of euphoria, resembling mania. He was gay and boisterous and, contrary to his usual custom, he had a very strong impulse to talk. He purposely avoided exchanging a word with his father on that evening and was pleased if he noticed that his father was vexed by his behaviour. Moreover, he was seized with a most voracious appetite, which was otherwise not habitual with him. He even took tit-bits to bed with him and nibbled them till he went to sleep but soon woke up with a dread of dying. On Saturday the mood of depression which I have already described set in ; it ended in the evening with vomiting and defecation, and with an emission during the night.

The ' Saturday-melancholia ' of this obsessional patient always began with a ' mania ' on Friday evening. Identifying himself with his mother and with the Sabbath, he created phantasies of an oral-sexual kind, in which he not only desired his father but also identified himself with him. The result of *this* identification was the dread of death, following upon vehement self-reproaches which, incidentally,

were completely appropriate to the father, in the characteristic melancholic manner. The refusal of food, as the analysis showed, represented a defence against cannibalistic impulses; the constipation corresponded to a phantasy of pregnancy. The 'melancholia' always came to an end on Saturday evening with vomiting and subsequent defecation. He relieved himself of what he had devoured on the Friday evening in his hypomanic excitement, which had been such a terrible burden on his conscience. On Saturday night the sexual excitation which had set in on Friday evening was terminated by an emission. The postponement of the genital gratification can only be explained by a need in the patient first to punish himself in the 'melancholia', and then to rid himself of the guilt by vomiting and defecation (expulsion of the swallowed [2] object).

This greatly abbreviated extract from the case-history of my patient shows that identification is bound up with the function of the eating apparatus. The damming of genital libido and postponement of gratification give rise to symptoms of anxiety, to changes in the whole of the alimentary tract and to the sense of guilt.

From the following example we shall see that such changes may actually become a menace to bodily health.

The case is one of a pervert, who suffers from the morbid impulse to take the genital of a man into his mouth, to suck it and swallow the sperma. Since puberty he had indeed never given play to his homosexual tendencies, but he had to summon all his energies in order to control this impulse. At times he was forced to masturbate. With practice he succeeded in getting his penis into his own mouth, sucking at it and swallowing the semen. Afterwards he was seized with a violent sense of guilt, which sometimes reached the point of very extreme depression. He took care never to form intimacies with men who had a specially strong sexual effect upon him. On one occasion one of his acquaintances made advances of a homosexual nature to him. He became greatly excited and to his horror ejaculation took place. From that time on he avoided this acquaintance. Some weeks later it happened that they were obliged to share a room for a night. He determined, however, to control himself, all night long carried on a terrible struggle with his impulse and remained victorious over it. But this conquest, he said, cost him dear, for he began to suffer from a grave

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[2] *Verschluckt* = lit. 'swallowed', but also has the connotation of 'mangled'.

form of diarrhœa, which resisted all therapeutic measures. His illness assumed a dangerous form, in five days he lost seven kilograms in weight, was so weak that he could neither eat nor move and had the feeling that he was slowly dying. Certain material in his analysis threw light upon this illness. He felt the impulse to suck the penis of a man who was strong and big and for whom he could feel hatred and contempt. Such a man represented his father.

The patient always had a disagreeable feeling in his mouth and thought that an unpleasant smell emanated from him, due to the putrefaction in his stomach of the sperma he had swallowed. Every time he practised masturbation he had to defecate afterwards and, if this were not performed successfully, he fell into deep depression. Analysis brought into consciousness his fear that swallowing the semen would cause him to be impregnated and to have children. As a child he had invented the following theory about birth : the child, he thought, is entwined with the woman's intestines through the navel, which further analysis showed to be symbolic of the penis. At birth the child so strains at the intestine that it is torn out with the infant and causes an injury to the navel (penis).

As in the previous case, the patient once more represents here in his own person, man and wife, father and mother. After the birth of a younger brother (when the patient was three years and two months old) he identified himself with his mother and endeavoured to incorporate the father. But it appears that he encountered resistances on the part of his ego-ideal, the substitute for that father whom he would devour. This caused the impulse to turn round upon his own person. When, however, the damming of libido was too great and he had in phantasy perpetrated the deed, he felt guilty. He had to atone for this guilt by bearing a child, i.e. by yielding up a part of his innermost self. The birth of a living being signified, however, his own death. Here, therefore, we have again the attempt to devour the father—an attempt which produces feelings of guilt and somatic, anal-oral efforts at expulsion and also brings about punishment through the tearing out of the intestine (castration).

How closely interwoven are the mechanism of identification, sense of guilt, anal-oral ideas and phantasies, and the Œdipus complex is shown by a dream of this patient's. *I am on a road near a crescent-shaped hollow, opposite a meadow which I only feel to be there but at the moment do not see. In the hollow, which is in the side of a rock, there is a bed which belongs to my elder brother. I have the feeling that my father*

is asleep in a bed in the field and that this would be a good opportunity to kill him. Still dazed with sleep he is enticed to the hollow. Then I see two iron gratings, one descending from above and the other rising from below, but they do not meet. The grating is made of vertical iron stakes connected by horizontal ones. The opening between the stakes serves as a means of getting my father into the hole. My brother seizes my father from behind round the waist and tries to drag him through the opening. Gradually he wakes up and begins to call for help. We both now realise that our assault has failed, and I am seized with terror and wake with the thought that we are lost. When I go to sleep again I see the meadow under water. I see a white shirt, which is flung to and fro in the water by an arm and rinsed in order to cleanse it. The shirt lies spread right out, but between the front and the back of it float light-brown, soft fæces, the fæces of children, which cannot be washed out of the shirt. I am afraid that it will be impossible to get the shirt clean and I cannot bear to look on any longer.

The patient thought that the hollow with the pointed stakes probably stood for a mouth. The elder brother represented the dreamer himself, for he was tall and strong, whereas the dreamer was small and weak. He always wished that his elder brother would display more spirit in opposing his father ; and would have liked to have him as an ally in his conflict with their father. The wish to kill the latter corresponded to a constantly recurring phantasy of the father's dying or being actually dead. Dragging the father through the grating probably expressed the desire to swallow a powerful man, for, first, the patient had believed that swallowing semen would make him strong and, secondly, he was always having phantasies of an enormous penis which he took into his mouth. He thought that ordinary masturbation and sexual intercourse weakened (castrated) a man, whilst the swallowing of semen strengthened him. It occurred to him that in the dream he had had a feeling that he ought to pity his father who was being attacked, and he remembered that after phantasying the death of his father he was always smitten with remorse and tried to comfort himself by thinking of something nice about him. ' But in the dream ', he said, before my explanation, ' my father was not killed ; I simply brought away a sense of guilt, instead of the intention of killing him.' The hole reminded him of times when he waited for hours in vain in front of the cage in which the bears lived in the Zoological Gardens, in order to watch them performing coitus. Further, he recalled a phantasy that the large penis of the father penetrated the mother and sprayed and gave nourishment to the child in the uterus.

In later years, when he learned with terror and disgust how children were procreated, he thought that both the woman and the child within her must suffer a fearful injury. In the light of these associations it seemed to him that his wish was that, whilst in the womb, he should swallow the father, suck in all his energy and thus destroy him, but that he could not manage this because he was deterred by remorse.

In spite of the involved character of this dream the main idea running through it is plainly visible. It shows the ambivalent attitude to the father and presents the same picture as Freud reconstructed in reference to the situation in the primal horde after the primal crime. Remorse, the anxiety of longing and the sense of guilt deterred the dreamer from repeating the deed.

In the second part of the dream the idea of guilt recurs, but in another form and accompanied by much less anxiety. The shirt reminded him of his younger brother, who was very late in learning cleanliness, a matter which his mother often bitterly deplored. The patient himself had defecated in his clothes on one occasion only and this, as he still insisted, was not his fault, for his teacher would not allow him to leave the class. He reached home crying and his mother comforted and cleansed him, but he was beside himself with shame and disgust, especially because he had behaved like his little brother whom he had wanted never to have. This brother, when a new-born infant, had a very dark, brown skin, and the first words with which my patient greeted him were: 'I don't want this mucky brother'. The idea of not being able to wash the shirt clean reminded the dreamer of a passage in *Hamlet*, where the king prays to God and asks whether there is not rain enough in the heavens to wash his hands white as snow. To this were associated recollections that the patient himself once took the part of a woman in a play but later refused to act in it because he felt humiliated in such a rôle. There followed recollections of his grandmother whom he had seen in a nightdress stained with dried blood, and in connection with this he remembered castration-phantasies with which were interwoven phantasies of anal birth.

In the second dream, too, the subject of guilt recurs, the guilt finding expression in a fæcal phantasy. The dreamer is dirty and evil; blood and fæces here have the same symbolic meaning. In this dream the anxiety is diminished to a mere apprehensiveness, because he identifies himself with the brother whom he hates, who is at once dirty and bad, and by so doing becomes the much-loved child of his mother, who cleanses and tends him. By being at the same time punished,

castrated, made into a woman and given an anal child he expiates his guilt towards his father. The deed aimed at in the first part of the dream is here atoned for by expulsion and reanimation, and is thus as it were cancelled.

Hence, we see that the sense of guilt must be separated from the need for punishment. The origin of the former is, as Abraham concludes (11), connected with the function of the oral zone. Some years ago I tried to show that this feeling of guilt is an organic sensation, connected at its source with certain oral-anal impulses, but reappearing only when the Œdipus complex has already developed (10). We see it most clearly in the delusion of physical persecution which occurs in schizophrenia. To-day I am able to say with more precision that it is originally an intestinal sensation, which occurs in certain tracts of the alimentary canal or in the whole canal, simultaneously with the process of identification. In the genital (phallic) stage the feelings of intestinal tension, which arise during the process of identification, are fused in the Œdipus constellation with genital sensations and accompany infantile masturbation. In psychic disease the sense of guilt, subsequently so finely graded and so complicated, may regress to its original organic roots. It is based on the inhibited impulse to expel from the mind an object which has been incorporated. Since neurosis originates in consequence either of acute or of chronic damming of the libido, we find that in regression the intestinal tendencies to expulsion are once more sexualized. Behind the neurotic sense of guilt, therefore, lies the attempt through incorporation to effect a fresh libidinal cathexis of the object which has been wholly or partly lost. In other words, the patient attempts to bring it to life again in the outside world, in order to be able to love it in reality as before. Again, projection often means that an attempt is being made by the ego to rid itself of guilt and punishment (projection = casting out = expelling).[3]

[3] The following detail out of the analysis of the obsessional patient already referred to supports the view put forward. One morning he received from his firm a sealed registered letter containing money, which alarmed him seriously. He was afraid that he had not been working so well lately and that the firm had sent him the salary due to him and broken off all further dealings with him. Before he opened the letter he had a violent need to defecate and immediately the evacuation was over he remembered that the sealed letter did not represent the end of his connection with the firm at all, but would contain a cheque for his recent disbursements, which proved to be correct. The same sort of thing was

Now we might admit that the sense of guilt is in fact invariably accompanied by physical symptoms and yet object that these are not always located in the alimentary canal, as for instance, in nervous asthma, in psychogenic affections of the heart, in paralysis of the extremities, etc. As far as I can see, this objection is easily answered, for even in these cases the sense of guilt finds expression predominantly in the region of the alimentary canal and the other organs are merely substitutes for this. Even in asthma oral phantasies play the leading part. I once treated a man with a cardiac neurosis, who had phantasies of the heart as the genital and located it in the stomach. In a patient with psychogenic headaches the symptoms were displaced from the stomach to the head. In another case an organ right at the periphery was identified with the intestine.

The case was one of painful cramp in the fingers, coming on in paroxysms, as in Raynaud's disease, the fingers becoming white as though they were ' dead '. The patient once had a dream which gave the clue to her neurosis. She dreamt that *she was reading from a piece torn off a newspaper, which had golden rings hanging on it, and what she read was something about death*. The newspaper stood for toilet paper, while the ring was a wedding-ring, but the circumstances associated with it were peculiar. When she was quite little, she kept on tormenting her father, a retired colour-sergeant of the old Austrian army, with the request for a ring. On one occasion he lost patience and shouted at her to put her finger into her anus and then she would have a ring. The child took him literally at his word, attempted it and hurt herself. Then she reflected that she had only made her finger dirty and not got a ring in this way. Finally, it occurred to her to wash her finger, thinking that the brown mark left would then look like a ring. At puberty, when she began to reproach herself for masturbation, she suffered from digestive disturbances and increasingly frequent attacks in which her fingers ' died '. These were always accompanied by the vision of a ' white hand '. In analysis this white hand proved to be the dead hand of her mother, stretched out from the grave

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repeated regularly during his fits of depression, when he doubted the existence of God. After a very large evacuation, ' hardly was it out (the fæces) ' when proofs of the existence of God came to his mind in extraordinary abundance, whereupon his depression vanished. It is true that it annoyed him that this inspiration should come to him just while he was in the w.c. after an evacuation ; however, for a short time he was relieved of his doubts.

towards her daughter (actually the mother was living). Further analysis shewed that the dying fingers represented fæces, which the patient identified with the male genital and lost, in the sense of castration ; at the same time this was a punishment for masturbation and for death-wishes against her mother.

Now it happened frequently that the patient was interrupted in defecating by a spasmodic closing of the anus which, as it were, cut off the fæces. Hence it would seem that not only were the contents of the intestine displaced on to the fingers as a whole, but also that the innervation of the intestinal muscles was displaced on to artery-wall muscles in the fingers. This meant that the processes taking place at the lower end of the intestine were replaced by processes in peripheral parts of the body with the object of destroying the particular organ concerned. Here, as in another case which I had the opportunity of observing, the destruction took place in relation to the unstriped muscles. According to Freud, sadism, representing the instincts of destruction or death, is connected with the function of the muscular system (5). Probably we ought to understand by this both the voluntary, striped muscles and the involuntary, unstriped muscles. (The striped muscles of the oral apparatus, for instance, find direct continuation in the unstriped muscles of the intestinal canal.)

As the case of this patient shows, the unstriped muscles within the body pass on their excitation, if they are under the influence of sadism, to the muscles at the periphery. The processes at work here seem to represent a kind of autotomy, of which the prototype is intestinal expulsion. Expulsion and destruction coincide[4], and since in the unconscious punishment means destruction, annihilation, and so forth, in this symptom, as in many others, the sense of guilt coincides with the need for punishment.

Now how do the destructive tendencies of punishment come to ally themselves with the libidinal tendencies of the sense of guilt ?

It is striking that the introjected persons, that is, those with whom the ego has identified itself, become avengers and inflict retribution. An example will make this clear.

A girl came for treatment, not because of a manifest neurosis but because she was completely dominated by her mother and could not summon up any energy to free herself from her. After a separation from her mother had been successfully effected, the daughter suffered

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[4] Abraham, loc. cit.

from feelings of guilt, digestive disturbances, abdominal pains and constipation. Neither her conscious sense of guilt and oppression nor her physical symptoms were accessible at this period to analysis, till one day one of her girl friends happened to say to her that this was the anniversary of her own father's death. Recollections immediately arose in the patient's mind of the death of *her* father and were accompanied by passionate weeping. She herself was struck by this outbreak of affect, for she had never really experienced grief at her father's death, which had taken place some years before. She cried herself to sleep and dreamt that *she was sitting at table at a meal when she was seized with a need to pass urine. She took hold of a chamber, which to her surprise was covered with dust as though it had not been used for a long time. She passed urine and the dust and urine formed a pulpy mass.* She woke with an urgent desire to urinate. She could not go to sleep again, because she could not dismiss from her mind thoughts of her father's funeral. After two hours of torment it occurred to her that it might help her to sleep if she ate something. This idea came to her through the following train of thought: she could not go to sleep because the thoughts of her father caused congestion in her head, but, if she ate something, the blood would be drawn away from her head to her stomach by the process of digestion. She ate with avidity a stale, dry piece of bread and fell asleep.

I omit the detailed analysis of the dream, for it speaks for itself.

The next evening an acquaintance said to her in jest at supper that he would make a will and give it to her to keep. In the night she dreamt that she was having sexual intercourse with him and that he hurt her, and she awoke in pain. In the next few days she experienced strong sexual excitement, was obsessed with thoughts about her father and was ravenously hungry. Phantasies of fellatio made their appearance and the analysis suddenly penetrated to her earliest childhood.

After separating from her mother the patient experienced a longing for her which found expression in a conscious sense of guilt. This roused to activity a deeper, unconscious sense of guilt, which had reference to her father. For the first time she mourned for him, for long before his death she had repressed her love for him by a process of identification. His death did not mean any loss to her, because for her he had virtually died long before. Thereupon the infantile, cannibalistic tendencies awoke, culminating in the desire to bring the father back to life and have children by him. The next night the

incestuous impulse had reached the genital level but was felt as bodily pain. The father, who had been absorbed into the ego, with whom the patient had identified herself and who had been ' devoured ', was projected and became a person who inflicted pain and threatened her with annihilation. Retribution takes place thus : the incorporated, introjected, in a certain sense ' murdered ' person becomes, if projection is impossible, a chastizing and avenging fate.

Now, how can we understand the fact that the person who was once loved and longed for becomes the avenger ?

Freud is of opinion that human life is made up of two sorts of instincts ; the sexual or life-instinct and the destructive or death-instinct (5). In the course of development the two kinds of instincts are to some extent fused, the death-instinct being held in check by the life-instinct. In pathological processes defusion of the two kinds of instincts takes place and the death-instinct, being liberated, finds expression in a need for punishment which may culminate in self-destruction. (Hitherto this has been most clearly grasped in relation to the obsessional neurosis and to melancholia.) Nevertheless, not only in morbid processes but also in normal development the death-instinct gains a footing in the ego very early : namely, at the time when the ego-ideal or super-ego begins to be formed. For, as Freud has concluded from the facts before him, the formation of the super-ego is accompanied by desexualization of the libido, which involves a liberation of the death-instincts. The super-ego develops out of the process of identification, the libidinal objects of the id being incorporated in the ego. This process is the psychic deposit of the cannibalistic phase of organization. When identification takes place, the instinct of aggression which was directed against the object turns round upon the subject's own person and the libido becomes desexualized. The object now appears in the ego as a stern power, inflicting punishment or even destruction, and first of all inhibits the sexual instincts in the Œdipus constellation, in order more or less completely to resolve the Œdipus complex and to exercise a negative control on instinctual life (2). In neurosis the inhibitions of the sexual (life) instincts have their origin in this power (the super-ego). Hence, regarded from the angle of the ego, it represents a destruction of life.

Since in identification the real object is partly or wholly lost, when formation of the super-ego takes place, the sexual libido is liberated. Part of this is converted into dread of the community, the sense of guilt, while another part unites with the instincts of destruction and

constitutes the need for punishment.) In this we have the expression of retribution which represents the parent's power of prohibition, whose origin is in the outside world. That in men this power stands for the father is so obvious that I need not labour the point. But the fact that in many women the deepest unconscious sense of guilt likewise has reference to the father may be partly explained by the circumstance that in them, as in men, oral identification leads to formation of the super-ego.

Although when damming of the libido takes place the instincts of destruction are regressively sexualized, so that suffering becomes a pleasurable experience, yet the need for punishment does mainly subserve destructive tendencies accumulated in the ego, while the sense of guilt conceals object-libidinal tendencies.

It looks rather as though the sense of guilt arose first and the need for punishment were simply added later as a reaction. This is actually maintained by some people, although patients are very often more able to admit the need for punishment to consciousness only after disclosure of the anxious longing at the back of the sense of guilt. I believe that this has nothing to do with the different levels of the unconscious. Both the sense of guilt and the need for punishment arise when identification and formation of the super-ego take place; from the very beginning they are intertwined, and it is only later that to some extent they branch off in different directions; often they make use of the same means of expression but not uncommonly they take independent forms.

To go back to the point from which our enquiry started, we can prove that the sense of guilt and the need for punishment are not one and the same thing. Although historically they represent a repetition of the primal deed, as reconstructed by Freud in connection with the primal horde, and in the development of the individual have a common genesis, not differentiated in time, and sometimes cannot be sharply distinguished in their manifestations, yet behind the sense of guilt there is unsatisfied object-libido, while behind the need for punishment there lurks the instinct of destruction, sexualized and directed against the ego. In the sense of guilt we have the attempt to cancel the deed; in the need for punishment the deed is renewed in relation to the subject's own ego. It is true that in the different types of neurosis the relation of the two tendencies to one another differs, but it is of practical importance to differentiate them and to recognize them in every patient.

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SOME VARIATIONS IN EGO-FEELING

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Until the advent of psycho-analysis all psychology was psychology of the ego. A raising or lowering of ego-feeling was included, although called by other names, among the common emotions. Since psychiatrists have turned their attention to the phenomena of depersonalization, there have been numerous investigations of disturbances of ego-feeling. In his work on self-consciousness, consciousness of the personality and the somatic organization, Schilder in particular has described this condition in some detail, but has been concerned mainly with its manifestations in grave pathological conditions. The present communication deals with certain states bordering on normality, and is based on self-observation and on observations concerning themselves communicated to me by patients.

All definitions of the ego come to grief owing to the fact that they represent the ego as a distinct entity, something opposed to external reality. ' Ego-feeling ' can be described as the feeling of bodily and mental relations in respect to time and content, the relation being regarded as an uninterrupted or a restored unity.

Concerning the time-relation, we know from Freud that for the Ucs time does not exist. In so far as we can recall dream-experiences by self-observation, the ' dream-ego ' very rarely has any feeling of its unity in time, although this is not invariably absent. Nevertheless events occurring in dreams are felt to follow some chronological order. This does not contradict Freud's view, since in dreams the system Cs is to some extent awake. When in waking life the feeling of unity in the ego in regard to time is absent, there arises the well-recognized condition of depersonalization (also of *déjà vu*). Whereas normally the present is regarded as existing somewhere between the future and the past, in such states the present is constantly experienced as beginning *de novo*. This depends on ego-feeling and not on the faculty for perceiving the passage of time, since time-orientation still persists.

As regards content, we can distinguish in the ego a mental from a bodily ego-feeling. The phrase *cogito ergo sum* is a rational formulation of mental ego-feeling. Since Freud has differentiated the super-ego and defined its unconscious components more clearly, many psycho-

analysts have tended to regard this distinction as a mere formulation or construction, linking together several already recognized institutions in the ego exercising a censoring function. Self-observation goes to show that in every case of mental conflict there are distinct ego-feelings associated respectively with the ego and with the super-ego. These can be distinguished from one another by self-observation. An accurate description of these ego-feelings has not so far been published. In some cases the ego-feeling associated with the super-ego is purely mental and without any body-content. This is in keeping with the fact that normally the super-ego has no approach to motility. It does not seem to apply to melancholia, which accounts for the close association of suicide with this disease, in contrast to other forms of depression of equal intensity. Moreover, we can tell from self-observation that the super-ego has no direct access to volition but is able to inhibit it and can influence the voluntary direction of attention. All this may not, however, be the same in other people, and doubtless it would be possible to discover differences in this form of ego-feeling. As far as obsessive impulses, thoughts or ideas derive from the super-ego, like all compulsions they are accompanied by a feeling which varies according to the intensity of the unconscious cathexis, viz., the feeling that they are almost on the verge of motor discharge, although without actually attaining it. Their accentuated motor character, and with thoughts intentional character, brings about an increase of inhibitions and feelings having an opposite tendency, and stimulates a constant anxiety lest the ideas should really be carried into action.

On the other hand the ego-feeling belonging to the ego, as distinct from the super-ego, has access to motility and to the bodily sensations of the ego. In view of the fact that, in the neuroses, mental processes can be projected (using the word in an extended sense) into the body (i.e. ' converted '), whilst in the psychoses they can be projected (in the usual sense) outside the body into the external world, we can describe the mental ego as an ' inner ego ', thereby adopting a topographical point of view which has, of course, no immediate connection with the topography of levels of consciousness.

The bodily ego-feeling is a compound feeling, including all motor and sensory memories concerning one's own person. It is not, however, identical with these memories, but represents rather a unified feeling of libido-cathexes of the motor and sensory apparatus. The bodily ego-feeling is not identical with the somatic organization, with the unity of correctly ordered perceptions of one's own body. The one

can disappear without involving the other. The bodily feeling could be regarded by the ego as a part of the mental ego-feeling, and any distinction drawn between the two as useful only for simplicity of presentation. This view is contradicted, however, by observations of states in which the two are quite distinct. This occurs in the case of the ' dream-ego ' and also in loss of consciousness, falling asleep and waking-up. Scherner, the most acute observer of dream-manifestations before Freud, had already described these states, using a terminology which nowadays sounds unfamiliar.

The simplest process is that where a person in a somnolent condition suddenly falls into a dreamless sleep without hypnagogic symptoms. Here the intensity of all ego-feeling is almost at once reduced to zero. This must be emphasised, since Freud's description of sleep as a narcissistic state might give rise to the misunderstanding that the ego is specially invested with narcissistic libido during sleep. All that he implies is that the libido in the Ucs is turned to more narcissistic account, but not exclusively. The fact that displacements, withdrawal of libido and fresh cathexes in the Ucs also concern object-presentations shows that these are occasionally completely altered after a short dreamless sleep. We could be more certain of this if it were possible to demonstrate the dreamlessness of a state of sleep.

However that may be, it is usually possible to observe in a withdrawal of cathexes with sudden falling asleep, that bodily ego-feeling disappears sooner than mental ego-feeling or super-ego-feeling. The body-ego (for the sake of brevity I shall sometimes use the term ' ego ' instead of ' ego-feeling ') can disappear entirely while falling asleep and can be freshly invested and awakened by the ' mental ' ego which has remained awake. In this way we can succeed in postponing sleep voluntarily. It is probable that with most people who fall asleep suddenly, the super-ego loses cathexis before the ego. Even when the super-ego has disappeared the ego, as the result of some memory or an external stimulus, can, with a perceptible feeling of voluntary effort, re-cathect the body-ego. Only then do bodily innervations appear ; movement precedes the return of the body-ego only in the case of waking-up in terror.

Just as with normal rapid falling asleep, there exists a normal process of waking which occurs apparently spontaneously and unaccompanied by awakening dreams through external and somatic stimuli, including those of inner rhythm. The body-ego and the mental ego awaken almost simultaneously. At the same time one can often

observe a certain precedence of mental ego-feeling unaccompanied by any feeling of strangeness. We rediscover ourselves at the beginning of a new day. The super-ego awakens as a rule only after the ego.

On the other hand, even when we wake up from a dream, it is possible to distinguish very clearly between the body-ego and the mental ego; a particular example of this will be adduced later. Awakening dreams arise partly from bodily or from external stimuli and partly from the super-ego. When we dream that we have finished some disagreeable task or that we have looked at the time only to find that it is too late to do anything effective, the ego will all the same successfully protect itself from the super-ego by waking up in time. On the other hand, when a person whose identity relates to super-ego control appears in a dream at the moment of waking or when the dreamer is reminded in a dream of the duties awaiting him, the super-ego has been in time and has first regained cathexis.

In an attack of fainting where the loss of consciousness occurs gradually the distinction between body-ego and mental ego is clearer than in falling asleep. Here the body-ego is felt to slip away from one and slide downwards in the strangest manner; sometimes the distal extremities go before the proximal parts. For a short space of time the mental ego alone is felt in a definite way, an experience which never occurs under any other conditions. It may be that it accompanies states of ecstasy and is responsible for the self-evident dualistic conviction of the separate existence of body and soul. The ascension-myth is a projected representation of such experiences.

A completely opposite condition is found in states of extreme mental fatigue where bodily ego-feeling alone is present.

In the case of gradual falling asleep both ego-feelings are present Hypnagogic manifestations lead gradually to the dream-state. Here the mental and the body-ego undergo varying modifications which remind us of waking states of a similar kind. During a state of somnolence the pleasure-principle overcomes the reality-principle in the mental ego. Many people invariably fall asleep in the midst of wish-phantasies. These become more active because the regression to centrifugal cathexis of sensory function gives rise to the well-known hypnagogic visions; more attention is directed to vegetative processes; motility and volition recede. Hence falling asleep is disturbed by any thought which involves the reality-principle, by external sensory stimuli which tend towards centripetal cathexis of sensory function and in the last resort by processes of the vegetative organs of so slight

an intensity that they pass unobserved during waking life. These modifications correspond to another mental ego-feeling, the ego-feeling of the child. The fact that many individuals, as they grow older, find it more difficult to fall asleep is largely due to increasing difficulty in relinquishing the reality-principle. Phantasies which formerly enabled them to fall asleep have lost their pleasurable character ; these people are no longer childish nor can they express childish wishes.

Regression to the childish stage of bodily ego-feeling is less familiar to us. We may assume that the child's original ego-feeling extended only to sensations arising from the less vegetative erotogenic zones, whereas bodily ego-feeling similar to that of the adult is gradually developed later. This adult ego-feeling corresponds to Schilder's somatic organization. Normally all ego-feeling extends to the whole body. In gradual falling asleep, however, the body-ego regresses to the stage when the various parts of the body first came to be included in the ego.

This regression proceeds in very different ways. The body-ego often completely loses all dimensional sense : it becomes warped and distorted in every direction. The most bizarre representations of modern portraiture can all be observed on oneself when falling asleep. The symmetrical parts of the body often appear longer than the vertical : spatial dimensions become entirely out of proportion. If two or three parts of the body are correctly apperceived the rest becomes a more or less vague mass, magnified or reduced on one side of these parts or lying round them. The planes of the body are displaced in every direction. Occasionally the modification is simply in the nature of curtailing ; the bodily ego-feeling goes no farther than the trunk or down to the knees ; but middle parts of the body can also lose bodily ego-feeling. Frequently the body loses outline in some direction, and one feels instead a movement of these parts in this direction, which is not transmitted to the body as a whole. Here we have an actual loss of ego-boundaries.

The body-ego feeling relating to the face and head remains unaffected by these modifications longest of all. The parts of the body acting as supports in the recumbent position are also more stable ; nevertheless these too can be involved in the disappearance of bodily feeling. It was no coincidence when a patient, who when falling asleep felt that his skull had become enlarged in one direction, experienced on the following day a feeling of depersonalization precisely in regard to his voice : i.e. an auditory sense of strangeness.

The modifications of bodily ego-feeling we have described are not

associated with any feeling of strangeness ; they do not attract our attention unless we direct attention to them : if we do observe them, we feel certain that we need only direct more attention to the bodily shape or sometimes need only make the slightest movement in order to dispel the illusion. This exercise of will to be sure prevents us falling asleep, but normally it restores the entire body-ego. We are unable to say whether similar distortions of the body-ego exist in childhood during the process of its formation.

When the body-ego habitually becomes unstable in this way in people who fall asleep with difficulty, the remarkable fact can be observed that erotically significant zones or parts are more resistant than others and more resistant than with other individuals. A person with a marked degree of oral libido does not lose the bodily feeling of the mouth : a patient who in his youth had strong interest in exhibiting his buttocks and several masochists with whom the back was of erotic significance retained the cathexis of these erotically important parts of the body. Its strong libidinal cathexis accounts in an analogous way for the fact that in everyone the subjective body-feeling of the face is least modified.

We are unable to say whether, in the case of delayed falling asleep, hypnagogic visions and hypnagogic modifications of ego-feeling are always continued into a dream when sleep finally comes, because the memory of the falling asleep dream does not last until the following morning. In normal persons we seldom hear of dreams in which distortion of the bodily ego-feeling occurs. Such dreams have their special significance.

On the other hand, even when the dream-ego has a definite bodily contour, it is much more often incomplete than like the whole body-ego. If we refrain from influencing the subject and ask him to draw the dream-scenes, the complete figure of the dreamer is seldom sketched ; frequently it is only vaguely indicated, perhaps only by the head or bust. Often the dreamer only indicates where he stood ; sometimes he doesn't even know that. Skilled draughtsmen are very willing to complete the figure of themselves in the interests of secondary elaboration, and we have to explain to them the origin of this impulse. At all events we see that the dream-ego has very often an incomplete bodily feeling. In other cases, however, this is quite complete, often indeed accentuated. In such dreams the feeling of well-being is often very marked.

The bodily feeling in dreams with characteristic sensations, painful

as well as pleasant, is always increased, but often incomplete. It is both accentuated and complete in flying and swimming dreams, which are accompanied with a marked feeling of well-being. There are, however, dreams with a similar content without any feeling of well-being and with a vaguely outlined body-ego. Should the latter be entirely absent, the dream cannot be given the customary interpretation. Bodily ego-feeling is always marked in anxiety and inhibition dreams but is often concentrated in special parts of the body. Since these dreams are quite typical and are repeated in the same person without any alteration, it is easy to note any variation in the accompanying ego-feeling.

In proof of the fact that the extent of the bodily ego-feeling in dreams is determined by the erotic constitution, we may mention a typical dream of a masochistic person who had a special liking for exhibiting his legs. He had that characteristic form of flying dream which consists of floating downstairs. In this case only the lower extremities were represented in the body-ego.

In contrast to such dreams in which bodily ego-feeling is more marked than in waking life, the majority of remembered dreams have a complete lack of any body-feeling. The ' dream-ego ' is in such instances the mental ego only. The libido withdrawn from the body on falling asleep, or rather the libido which then retreats into the id, has not been redirected to the body-ego. The regression leading up to the dream meets with object-presentations and activates them to the point of reality, and often beyond that point ; yet in spite of the most vivid dreaming, the dreamer feels nothing of his own body. Preservation of his identity and the feeling of it depends on mental ego-feeling. The dream-character of dreaming in these instances is precisely in this absence of bodily ego-feeling. The fact that patients describe their states of depersonalization as ' dreamlike ' relates to this defect in bodily ego-feeling.

The vividness of isolated dream-elements depends on concentration of libido-cathexis by condensation (Freud). Dreams which are remembered as completely and specially vivid can be divided into two groups. In one of these it is observed that the element of personal participation is accentuated, the affect is marked, the body-ego is clear and often vivid sensations of a typical sort are present. On the other hand the accessories and setting are often merely suggested, colourless and transient or hardly tangible. In the second group, on the other hand, the representation of these latter elements is unusually

vivid. Clear and detailed pictures of town or country appear as large as in a panorama, brightly lit up, and the actors too are sharply defined. In this group the bodily ego-feeling is often entirely absent or is limited to the head or lower limbs. It would appear that the libidinal cathexis is insufficient for both object-presentations and the body, consequently that either mental or bodily ego-feeling must be deficient in dreams. If both were fully invested the dreamer would wake.

A patient, who did not suffer from depersonalization in waking life, has reported to me a remarkable example of the distinction between the mental and the bodily ego. He had an unusually complete and vivid sexual dream with very vivid object-presentation and ego-feeling of a pleasureable sexual nature. The dream was enacted in his bedroom but not in his bed. He was suddenly woken up and found himself in bed in a state of complete depersonalization ; he felt that his body was lying beside him and that it did not belong to him. His mental ego had wakened up first. Bodily ego-feeling had not awakened along with the mental ego because the libido available for narcissistic use is essential for the awakening of bodily ego-feeling and in the foregoing dream all the libido had invested the very vivid presentation of the object.

This unusual occurrence clearly shows that cathexis of the ego stands in a compensatory relation to cathexis of a sexual object.

It is easy to understand that in dreams where bodily ego-feeling is present the dreamer is represented by himself, and that only fragmentary objects or allusions to them by other figures can come into the dream. In dreams with complete absence of bodily ego-feeling some figure in the dream always represents the dreamer's ego, which shows that to the mental ego the body-ego always constitutes one element of the dream, even if it is not experienced in person.

We have given above so many examples of the variation and limitations of ego-feeling in normal persons that we cannot be surprised to find similar conditions in them in waking life also. In all conditions of extreme fatigue, especially where the person is prevented from falling asleep only by external forces and interests, bodily ego-feeling loses some of its intensity and extent. It is often concentrated solely in the fatigued parts of the body. In all depressions following fatigue the bodily ego becomes incomplete.

This applies also to every endogenous or exogenous depression and to melancholic depression : in the intervals of anxiety-neuroses disturbed bodily ego-feeling is present. It is often limited to the head

and face. It only requires, however, an effort of will to bring back the entire bodily feeling. Some activity will bring this about, or a conversation with some second person or even meeting someone, especially if he does not belong to the accustomed milieu. Real depersonalization, on the other hand, commences just when the subject is alone or feels lonely on meeting with strangers or in social situations which are not flattering to his vanity. The slight disturbances of ego-feeling we have described differ from states of depersonalization, first, in that in depersonalization the reduced body-ego cannot be invested with more libido, and secondly, in that, when the attempt is automatically made to do this, perception of an object arouses in the patient a feeling of strangeness. The variations we have described are hardly ever noticed spontaneously: depression varying in degree and often quite slight is present, but no strangeness is felt, and the complete body-ego can always be recovered. In certain prodromal states of schizophrenia, however, limitation of the body-ego is experienced spontaneously, the patient complains that in spite of vigorous efforts of will it cannot be extended, but he has nevertheless no feeling of strangeness.

Persons, who when falling asleep find that special parts of the body, particularly those invested by component sexual instincts, resist limitation of the body-ego, show similar peculiarities in waking life by analogous variations in their ego-feeling. When extreme cases of perversion are required to observe their body-ego, even when not actively engaged in sexual practices, one finds that the erotogenic zones are permanently accentuated in the bodily ego-feeling. There is a striking contrast in the ego-feeling of sadists and of masochists. In the former the organ of cohabitation is included in the body-ego; in the latter it is excluded. In extreme cases of sado-masochism, ego-feeling swings in alternate directions. The mental ego-feeling of sadists also includes genito-sexual feeling, whereas with masochists the latter is only felt in a bodily way and as outside the ego.

All these manifestations can be explained by reference to the development of ego-feeling. Mental ego-feeling, corresponding to inner perceptions, is the first to be experienced by the child. Ego-feeling related to the body and to perceptions conveyed through the body comes only gradually; thereafter the feeling of cathexis of object-presentations is distinguished from that of cathexis of the body itself, and at the same time the perceptual content of the external world is differentiated from that of the body. The appearance of any new part

of what is later ego-feeling in its entirety represents one fixation-point in development, the most important of which is the distinction between body-ego and mental ego. When violent separation from the body occurs, as in temporary loss of consciousness, the ego-feeling regresses to this fixation-point. Partial regressions are also seen in the waking state as the result of libido-frustration, which also gives rise to states of depression. In complete depersonalization, ego-feeling regresses permanently to this fixation-point.

In most instances ego-feeling regresses to stages of development at which the various organs of bodily perception are gradually incorporated into the ego and as the body-ego becomes consolidated ego-feeling becomes more and more complete. My view of the cause of depersonalization is accordingly as follows : when external objects are perceived by means of organs, all or part of which have not yet been included in the body-ego, such objects are regarded as strange. This is not because the object is recognized with more difficulty, but because the part of the ego-boundary at which the object impinges on the ego has not been invested with narcissistic libido. All cases of depersonalization complain that they can neither ' get at ' the object nor can the object ' get at ' them.

This also accounts for the fact, first observed by Nunberg and confirmed by me in every case, viz., that symptoms of depersonalization are present in every transference-neurosis. When deprivation of the object occurs suddenly, object-libido is withdrawn from the object and narcissistic libido is withdrawn—at any rate temporarily—from the part of the ego-boundary concerned with its perception.

As a rule in the transference-neuroses this narcissistic libido cathexis is soon renewed. In the obsessional neurosis the ego-boundaries can, if we are sufficiently familiar with the fixation-points, probably be found in the mental ego-feeling. In conversion-hysteria they are to be found between the body-ego and the mental ego.

The distinction between mental and bodily ego-feeling, together with the fact that either one or the other retains libidinal cathexis in dreams, also that bodily ego-feeling is most marked in dreams with typical sensations, enables us to understand the mechanism of conversion. Here a libido-cathected process in the Ucs regresses to a fixation-point between the mental and the body-ego and is projected from this into the body-ego. But where projection of bodily processes into the external world occurs (a regular occurrence in dreams and a permanent symptom in the waking life of psychotics), regression breaks down the

boundary between the feeling of the body-ego and that of the perception of objects.

It might be said that many apparently healthy people work off their conversion-neuroses during sleep by means of typical bodily dream-sensations. In a similar way an anxiety-neurosis can be discharged in anxiety-dreams.

We can understand many cases of depersonalization by paying attention to the variations of the body-ego. It is probable that all of the numerous stages of depersonalization can be traced to some fixation-point or other in the development of ego-feeling.

The variations of ego-feeling we have detailed above constitute a territory in which the dynamic conception of the mind is confirmed almost entirely by means of self-observation of the outflow and withdrawal of *libidinal* cathexes. It is striking how clearly the identity of the narcissistic cathexis of the ego and of sexual energy appears. Variations in ego-feeling are endopsychic symptoms which can be investigated by means of psycho-analysis and are amenable to psycho-analytic treatment.

PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AND ORGANIC DISORDER: MYOPIA AS A PARADIGM[1]

BY

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NEW YORK

Keyserling in his *Travel Diary of a Philosopher*[2] states, 'For man is not only man, he is simultaneously, in various parts of his being, animal, plant, rock and sea; only he rarely becomes conscious of the fact and only knows how to feel as a human being'.

No matter how many times down through the centuries this general concept of mnemic binding of external contacts though internal integration has been expressed, now in one form, now in another, the essential unity of outside and inside relationships remains an outstanding bit of reality.

As one traverses the world we live in with this genial philosopher in this self-same *Diary*, one is uncertain whether most to be struck by the richness of the objective manifestations detailed, or to marvel at the ingenuity of penetration of the internal subjective concentrations suggested.

Glimpsing through the innumerable fascinating vistas opened by Keyserling one is impressed again and again with the general plan of *bipolarity* underlying all the external and internal manifestations which have come under his observation, and, as an aside, just as he counsels a year's stay in Benares for those who would wish to get into the inside of the religious experience, and a year's compulsory residence in China for our self-sufficient men of ethics and morals, so, in this same spirit of counsel, I can conceive of no better suggestion to the psycho-analytic student to travel once at least around the world and study deeply the bipolar types of expression of the human organism.[3]

As, from the objective point of view, the macrocosmic canvas will

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[1] Shortened outline of Communication given at the Ninth International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Bad Homburg, September, 1925.

[2] Vol. ii, p. 144, English edition.

[3] An interesting contribution to this thought is Alexander's 'Der biologische Sinn psychischer Vorgänge'. *Imago*, Bd. IX, 1923, in which the Buddhistic inner experiential or intuitive methods are discussed psycho-analytically.

never be big enough upon which a colossal industry will be able to paint the doings of humanity, so also from the subjective point of view—the microcosm—no microscopic eye will ever be able completely to refract into its integers the masterly accumulations within the individual of Nature's experiences with that self-same Cosmos. Fortunately the psycho-analytic method does justice to this bipolarity, and East and West may ultimately be shown to be at one if their ambivalent factors may be reconciled.

Drawing closer to the subject of my paper, first from the objective point of view—and limiting this view to the small, yet vast group of phenomena in medicine termed the myopias—permit me to say that I would essay a purely tentative, I might more rightly say, a purely speculative approach. Speculative in two senses—one as in accord with the general logical thesis that all studies along the lines contemplated can hardly be termed more than a series of speculations at best, and second, a personal acknowledgment of a somewhat cursory effort in the specific direction of the inquiry suggested.

Still further I purpose focussing attention upon one group of the myopias, the which, however, ophthalmological science recognizes as showing a fairly constant phenomenology.

The congenital myopias are rare. These will not concern us—nor those apparently acquired in the early years of infancy, also, numerically speaking, insignificant. The group to which attention is here drawn is that which bulks large in ophthalmological experience and which temporarily considered cluster about the puberty period—viewing this period with the wider ranges of extension which analytic research has shown it to possess. These myopias then which are more or less rapidly determined from 10 to 18 years of age, but with apical supremacy in the incidence curve from 14 to 16 years of age, and shading off as indicated. Phenomenologically, these myopias are noted more particularly in boys and girls as they are in their high school or early college period. The myopia is usually attributed to some special application in reading or, in girls, doing fine needlework, or something of that general nature. It advances slowly within 1–2–3 years to degrees of 2–4–6 and more diopters. Glasses are prescibed, changed a few times, and the series of changes apparently cease; the myopic norm is established and remains so more or less throughout life.

From the descriptive somatic side ophthalmological science chiefly accents the lengthening of the optical axis by elongation of the eyeball.

It has measured this in innumerable instances and most frequently focusses its attention upon the external muscles of the eyeball which pull the sclera and thus deform the instrument. Certain studies deal with scleral changes as permitting this deformation. Only within recent years has the vegetative nervous mechanism present in involuntary muscle been interrogated as playing a rôle in this new adaptation.

Another factor, which, so far as may be definitely stated, may be involved, but as yet lacks the measurement exactness of that just recorded, is concerned with the internal muscles of adaptation acting upon the crystalline lens. Here sthenic or asthenic muscular reactions —using these older bipolar terms of tonal import—are undoubtedly involved, although as stated, ophthalmological science—the which I cannot claim to have exhaustively searched—still lacks precise formulation.

Reduced to simple terms, which may however conceal more than reveal, we are dealing with an effort syndrome which elongates the eyeball and which tends to increase the convexity of the lens.

The histological changes which parallel these larger findings cannot be entered into here, although they must ultimately be correlated in a causal relational pathology.

Viewed from an obvious psychical platform two questions may be asked. Since far vision is lost and near vision in a sense enhanced, what large environmental contact is the individual seeking to eliminate from visual perception in order to concentrate upon a smaller world of optical reality ? Or viewed from an inner platform or panel, speaking in terms of relational frames, what purpose or wish fulfilment, in its most general sense, is being pursued ?

This is the kernel of our inquiry. The answer, here postulated and towards which some confirmatory evidence is offered—a castration symbol.

It is in but a minor sense that the conception is here regarded as new, or novel, since I take it that it has been so often stated by others, and not infrequently emphasized by Freud whom we all take pleasure in honouring as having offered more explicit intellectual tools to prove that which intuitively has been glimpsed for centuries.

Thus St. Paul's pronouncement has been chosen as the centra theme of this intuitively arrived at formula : ' If thy right eye offend thee—pluck it out '. The mystics' meaning of ' offense '—as well as the ' means ' by which the relative destruction has taken place—may be opened up by the psycho-analytic discipline and the ' symbolic ' truth

reduced to rational terminology in terms of a dynamic pathology, and ultimate therapeutic relief of a different type than the wearing of glasses, which after all must afford but a partial compromise with the inner conflict.

Innumerable considerations, possibly of absolute value in a strict logic, are here pushed aside, conditioned by individual insufficiencies, or temporal considerations, but chiefly because of the purely preliminary nature of this presentation. I can present but a moiety of the numberless torsos of observation which have passed before my eyes. I cannot claim to have as yet satisfied my own canons of sincerity of exhaustive research. The majority of the observations have been extremely fleeting and belong to a crude natural history—a few have been more fortunately offered for more detailed study, and as yet but tiny fragments of psycho-analytic research—but even so with the crudity said to so persistently stamp the cultural processes of the far West I have the temerity to offer them.

One of my keenest and ablest students, a youth of 18, when I was a young teacher of pharmacognosy of 30, was a pronounced myopic of the type under consideration. The explanation offered was the banal one of over-application to interest in intellectual pursuits with the added factor that he would read into the night with candle light in order to avoid his father's prohibitions of his reading after a legitimate retiring limit. I have known him 30 years at conscious levels, but my first faint questionings of the myopic problem began with the observation of this general type of cultivated, eager, studious, intellectual kind of person which seems to bulk large in the ophthalmological literature of myopia. Dimly I have caught glimpses of his inner problems, through his young married life, early widowhood, with tragic loss of his life partner—possibly a not unrelated bit of social pathology—his later scholastic and academic career, his friendships, and a diabetic later development—which point in the general frame of some narcissistic fixation factors—the whole—logically considered—if presented as a bit of science would afford a Gargantuan opportunity for caricature of psycho-analysis. Yet here I am willing to be an impressionistic novelist of the most speculative stamp.

Early in my psycho-analytic period a most pronounced example zigzagged through my consultation room. A young woman of about thirty who, beginning as the type formulated, had by virtue of exaggeration of inner conflicts, pushed her myopia up year by year until it has reached the preposterous grade of 20–25 diopters. She was a

malignant, as contrasted with the benign type just hastily sketched. Eccentric, wild, exaggerated, self-willed, musically talented, discontented, the few hours' contact brought into sharp outline an almost catatonic personality which threatened to disrupt at any moment, but the which, I take it—in all humility—was prevented by the masochistic self-destruction—through the eye relationships with reality. Here the homosexual repressed factors were obvious even to the psycho-analytic tyro I then certainly was. Here again impressionism is all that I can legitimately offer.

Another sample, more exhaustively studied, may finally be considered. It, like so many of the problems in the borderland of somatic and psychopathology, was not studied from the standpoint of our title. Very few patients come to be studied for these types of organic disease or deformity, and hence, like many another study conducted upon skin, bone, blood, heart, lung, kidney, eye, or ear pathology, the patients have come for relief for some difficulty to them more pregnant with meaning, and only as incidental to my therapeutic work have I been intrigued to make occasional forays into the somatic pathological situations which are universally present and which some day may be regarded as Hawthorne has so succinctly stated in his *Scarlet Letter* ' A physical disease which we consider as something separate and apart, may be after all but a symptom of a disorder in the spiritual part of our nature'.

This patient, a young business man of relatively healthy and sound ascendants, was 31 years of age when first seen. He had a married sister of 35, an unmarried sister of 33, and a younger married brother of 29. He looked after the property interests of a prosperous professional father, integrating them into a larger business activity. He read early, had an exclusive private school and college training, was a rower and developed into a tall, strong, attractive American type of bachelor. In spite of all this good physique and active participation in sports, etc., he remained quiet, somewhat retiring, even timid, and came for consultation and possible treatment because of his inability to push himself, reluctance to be a ' go getter ', timidity and fear of women and an annoying tendency to blush, particularly with women, but also in the presence of men.[4] He had never been in love, was apprehensive of marriage,

[4] Benedek, Th.: ' Aus der Analyse eines Fälles von Erythrophobie ', *Int. Zeit. f. Psa.*, Bd. II, 1925, 88.

and although no conscious purist or puritan, his actual erotic relations with the *demi mondaine* were conditioned upon a special bit of conduct.

He had to drink. When well liquored his entire personality underwent a very definite change. From being retiring and quiet and more or less terse and apodictic—saying yes, and no, and being a listener rather than a talker—he became highly sociable, was witty, and even a most entertaining comic artist. He became the life of a party and would extemporise poetry, became a great raconteur, and wooed women, of a complaisant type, with great interest and success. He practically never sought them by himself but always went along with the crowd and had a great time. With ' good ' women he was always on guard—and unless well alcoholized even under the most auspicious surroundings was impotent.

So far as our theme is concerned, his general analysis cannot be entered into—his myopia began when he was in his prep. school—about 12-14. Masturbatory activities had a spurt about 10—were feared and suppressed and then later accepted with some struggling repulsion. Cohabitation began at 21 and under circumstances mentioned—this latter situation had remained as outlined up to a certain period in the analysis.

The myopia advanced slowly, and by his second or third year in college, 18-20 years of age, was fairly stable. He had about 4 to 5 diopters. He could distinguish people in the immediate environment without his glasses but was not certain as to their features.

Our analysis began about the middle of February. From the first the dream material was ample although associations have not become ' free '. The first dream may be recorded. It was of interest in view of the behaviour alteration under the regressive influence of alcohol. *I am at a stag dinner. All is quite convivial. A man arose to speak. No one paid any attention to him. He finally got up on top of the table and walked up and down on it. Rather queer I thought his soiling the tablecloth that way.*

Its partial analysis naturally brought out much of the material alluded to as to his activity when having a good time in male company. It evidences, I take it, certain aspects of repressed homoerotic components which are not without importance in his general analysis.

The second dream two days later led directly into the Œdipus situation. *I am somewhere with my father. We meet a woman, she is married and she said that her husband had died. She was making a*

wreath of flowers for his grave. I wanted to talk with her but my father monopolized her attention. He finally sent me off to close a couple of doors of a closet. (Vaguely familiar, like those in the house where I was born.)

This general Œdipus conception was quite readily accepted, intellectually, but it remained repressed emotionally. It seemed quite logical to the patient, and his general family neurotic romance situation was quite conscious in its chief features as Rank has outlined them.

The discussion of the dream lead directly to a week or two of resistance and negative transference defensive dreams which were very passively handled. These do not need recital here, as we are now more concerned with the entrance into the dream symbolism of his eye situation—even though it is recognized that such a separation of the material is purely arbitrary. These resistance features slowly were building up a ' father-brother ' identification pattern. In a dream of March 6th, I appeared in the dream—*sitting on a chair next to him in a club locker room. You were my age.* He did not want to join the club to which I belonged—some discussion about it ! A ' sight ' feature here appeared for the first time, *something was written on a large bulletin board—Article on Physical Culture Type of thing. Care of woman before childbirth. In white chalk—something about a sac, which bursts with a loud report—other unknown details.*

Infantile peeping and even adolescent peeping memories were very definitely covered and under repression—partial analysis here showed. Amnesia was profound then and still remains.

March 16th: Dream of last night mostly gone. *' I broke my glasses. I was looking in some basement dining-room, several girls were there (inside sitting-room). In some way I got inside and was talking with a girl. I think I asked her to dance. I dropped my glasses. At first the lens only cracked, but as I started to straighten them out, they broke (right glass only) in three pieces—I could not see so well then.*

This dream started a few inquiries regarding his myopia. One eye was worse than the other—which one he could not recall (right in reality).

No peeping material came out of the associations and no memories were evokable. Interpreted as resistance material. Also to myself the first intimation of the castration complex shown early in the father prohibitions—conscious fear of father and slight anxiety in his child and adult contacts with him—very fond of him but quite distant. Rarely likes to enter into any discussion—which is often quite necessary

in view of close business association—' always uses the mother as an intermediary '.

The relation between his right broken lens and his castration with the girl (dancing) perhaps hardly needs emphasizing in this assembly. Associations permit certain inferences binding the alcoholic perceptive cloudiness with the optic perceptive cloudiness and the incest prohibition barrier—sister, just older—is beginning to emerge as the mother —displaced libido carrier.

If I can't see, I do not know (mother—sister) hence I may possess (mother—sister) and get past the barrier—impotency = alcoholic reduction = eye reduction. Impotency is overcome with (inferior—superior) (servant girl—sister) (*demi mondaine* cohabitation) when full of booze.

March 8th: Hetero-homosexual identification. Girl becomes man. Height—seeing proposition.

March 10th: *I am in a department store and wanted to go downstairs in the elevator. As I moved towards it I saw on the counters a lot of babies displayed instead of the ordinary goods. I entered the elevator, it was very wide. Other people also in it. A man called out his floor; on that floor there were a lot of Mercedes cars stored, as in a garage, most of the people got off. I also got off but decided to go on down with the elevator, which now seemed separated from the floor by a gap, undecided and anxious and finally jumped on the elevator. Another man was in the uncomfortable position of straddling the gap. I finally gave him a hand and pulled him on.*

Associations: The thought of the babies annoyed him—each one had a nurse—then the nursery activities were very repugnant, especially wet clothes, bed clothes, games of hiding under the bed clothes.

Anxiety was most marked about making the gap. Not so hard after all when he made it. Also was able to help the other man quite readily. This is a very characteristic feature of his business reluctance. He holds back and holds back, but once started, sometimes by a little shove from some outside source, and it becomes very easy after all. All but the interest in a woman.

He only saw the back of the elevator man. The people who mostly disappeared at this Mercedes floor were men. Only one woman. Quite indistinct.

The autos were Mercedes cars, large expensive fast cars, foreign cars, exhibitionistic—bruiser type—real estate mortgages—title Insurance—certain type of business man—know it all—Father—the

whole auto situation was certainly his father. He had feared him all his life—anxiety quite of that type—every once in a while he had experienced quite an ambivalent feeling to the father underneath. He was a mischievous boy—he would break things and he feared his father's homecoming when a settling-up was necessary. In summer studying, putting off and putting off—he would lie about his having studied. 'Father after us all the time, prodding us'. 'Nagging a bit'—'Still does it and rouses great opposition in me'. 'I get my back up'. 'Father always goes ahead and does the thing he asks us to do—we are so slow or he so impatient'. 'Hence we lose interest, he has gone ahead and done it'. 'If we did it, it would be the wrong way anyway'. Rarely tender—passive or distant, rarely demonstrative. 'When at boarding school would write me a letter, would send stamped addressed envelope—as if demanding a reply.'

Here one sees outlined much of the hesitancy factors which enter into the patient's business and social difficulties. His reluctance to push himself forward under the father anxiety supervision. His dissociation of anxiety (jumping the gap) and wanting help to get out of straddling the gap, and as I take it the homoerotic fixation—deep underneath father attachment and its ambivalent : i.e. his narcissistic mother identification—(one woman got off on the father floor) ; also dream of two days later. *Had been playing squash ; was coming down elevator with two men. Some sort of entertainment then going on. Two men disappeared leaving me alone. I was averse—no drink-diffident. Then a woman got hold of me and took me to a bench, talking to me. She then became a man. I was cornered. The place or recess where we were so low that I could not straighten up. Anxiety and annoyance.*

No new material bearing on the eye situation turned up and I avoided its activation as I felt I was treading on rather serious ground as it was. The analysis of the blushing was not without some serious matters for consideration and I was struck with certain resemblances in the dream material with those of a patient seen for a very short time some years previously (1915), whose social inhibitions, general diffused blushing and unconscious homoerotic situations were quite closely related to the factors uncovered in patient and had led me to warn his parents of a serious suicidal situation—which some months later eventuated while he was under the care of an internist.

Thus in a dream of April 8th : *I went to keep an appointment with you at your office which had been changed to the ground floor of a building we manage in East 54th Street. I was accompanied by the business*

manager, who showed me with great pride a mirror and table he had bought for the hall. This man followed me in your office and sat down. After you had been talking for a short time I decided to get rid of him and excused myself on the ground of having to show himself something in the basement. On returning I noticed you had to pass through a bath-room in order to reach your office and you were wearing a pink dressing gown. After we had gotten started you told me that you had found out that you would not be able to help me without fatal results to myself. I replied that if you would not go on with the process I would be dead anyway within a year from alcohol and pleaded with you to take a chance.

This dream was analyzed only as to some of its more superficial aspects. It with others had given me the impression that Nature possibly might be a better therapist than I and that I might here have an illustration of a principle which it strikes me is quite sound, namely that symbolic castration—which appears in the form of an organic deformation or malformation or organic chronic disease process—may be a compromise formation which enables the individual to remain in the herd at the expense of a part of his body (*das Es*).

In saying that I am not unmindful of the very frequent experience which has been frequently commented upon of the capacity during analysis, when a libido-transfer situation becomes loosened, of the regression to an early instinctive phase on the ontogeny of the individual How with each new advance in the depths of the psychical systems the regression becomes deeper. With many another I have started with 'hysterical' conversion symptoms and apparently arrived at 'schizophrenic' levels.[5] Even more pronounced have been the recurrent thoughts in working through the regression scale or organic cases, that one peers into the chasm of a severe catatonic splitting possibility.

Bodily disease may constitute the sacrifice for mental, i.e. herd, conformity—which when failing may permit a severe withdrawal from the herd either by suicide or any of its less radical substitutes.

Thus in the broadest of speculative limning in my first case noted—the myopia possibly made a herd adjustment (marriage relation) possible. The wife died from a malignant disease of the breast before 33. As hinted, this may be understood some day in terms of unconscious dynamics. The narcissistic fixation of the myopic

[5] See Alexander, F., loc. cit. '*Metapsychologische Darstellung*, p. 172. Compare Alexander, F., 'Der biologische Sinn psychischer Vorgänge', *Imago*, Bd. IX, 1923.

husband may have denied the woman the baby—hence her organic disease displacement, possibly complicated by her idealistic sexual morality and her own marriage to herself in the terms of her husband's female component.

This break is then followed by extra stress thrown upon the homo-erotic component—he never remarries—remaining true to the image of the dead wife—ergo—the mother fixation—and then a secondary bit of organic pathology comes in—since the social adjustment, tact, diplomacy, finesse, bedside manner, etc., etc., are superlative—and a diabetic situation represents an additive lex talionis factor—speaking in terms of a definite psychopathology and a questionable absolute ethics.[6]

My information in my second case is fragmentary but here the perverse urge increasingly demanding some form of recognition thrusts more and more energy over to the myopic situation which being insufficient is being balanced by a growing paranoid psychotic behaviouristic expression.

In some such manner of thinking are we justified in seeing the myopia-alcohol situation of the patient whose dreams have just been partly presented. Theoretical considerations would justify a long discussion of their many features, but with these I am not now concerned. I only think it true that the pubertal handling of the narcissistic phase of the Œdipus situation, which stated all too briefly means a specific type of homosexual craving—by an organic castration displacement, which as it were 'encysts' libido, constitutes a psycho-therapeutic consideration of much moment. In the terms of our quotation from Hawthorne, we cannot deal with the 'symptom', i.e. the organic disease as such alone. Would it not correspond even by the more skilful weapons of the analytic technique, to the cruder stages of hysteria therapy for instance, which deemed it had done something when the symptom was dissipated? And are not such conversion situations being displaced continuously by innumerable forms of pseudo-therapy? Symptom analysis is no longer a tenable single goal in the psycho-analysis of the neuroses, or psychoses.[7]

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[6] v. Monakow: *The Emotions, Morality and the Brain*, Nervous and Mental Disisease Monograph Series, 39. Holt: *The Freudian Wish and Its Relation to Ethics*, 1913.

[7] Rank and Ferenczi: *Development of Psycho-analysis*, Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series, 42, 1924.

These considerations are advanced relative to the serious underlying libido concealments behind organic disease, which by locking up libido—a fixed cathexis—as it were—acts conservatively, for the masses, incapable of greater creative utilization of the libidinal sources of inspiration.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF STUDY AND EXAMINATIONS

BY

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Since Freud has given us insight into the operations of the unconscious, we have learnt to appreciate the significance that the tendencies and institutions of civilisation have in the id, and we can see how the structure of all mental activities is built up in symbolic ideas and sublimations out of sexual instincts. Wherever such sublimations miscarry our mental activities must inevitably again succumb to sexualization; they then become associated with the sense of guilt which is thus restimulated and end in failure. I propose to illustrate this process from the analysis of a woman student who was inhibited in her studies; the conclusions resulting from this analysis will throw light on the psychology of examinations.

Freud showed us long ago in the case of certain individuals that examinations are associated with early infantile experiences and may become the instrument of punishment tendencies. In the *Traumdeutung* he says:

'These are ineradicable recollections of the punishments we suffered for naughtiness as children. As such they reassert themselves within us at the two crucial points of our studies, at the *dies iræ, dies illa* of the examinations. The examination dread of neurotics, too, is reinforced by this infantile fear. Once we have ceased to be students it is no longer the parents or tutors who serve to punish us; life's chain of causations eventually takes over our education, and now we dream of the Matric. or of our M.B. (and who, even among the best of us, has not trembled at the thought of them?) whenever we may expect a punishment to fall because we have not done something right, not carried it out thoroughly, or whenever we feel the load of a responsibility.'

This patient, a woman student twenty-three years old, was not troubled at all by fear of examinations; on the contrary she had been remarkably calm, almost indifferent, when she took her first M.B. Soon after, however, a severe inhibition against the work for a further examination broke out and this led her to come for treatment. From the beginning she showed the ego-change characteristic of an obsessional neurosis, and a process of displacement on a large scale revealed itself by which she attempted to avoid the sense of guilt which soon asserted

itself. A far-reaching repression of affect had taken place. The repressed sexual instinct which had been forced into the background could only obtain an outlet by displacement, and this was always accompanied by oppressive feelings of guilt and inferiority. As sometimes happens, the patient brought up in the first hour what might be regarded as the motto on which she had based her life, and it became to begin with the basic theme of her analysis: 'Where do children come from?' and this, from the ambivalence of her nature, was followed by the reflection: 'It is all lies'. An experience serving as a screen-memory for this was that her mother had laughed at her, when she was six years old, because she still believed the tale told by her mother that the Easter hare lays the eggs. 'If that is not true, mother must have lied; then it cannot be true either that the stork brings children!' The foundation of her doubting was laid.

The transference-situation brought about by the analysis was opposed by violent resistances and led to a displacement of her libido on to irrelevant and indifferent matters. Her fear of sensuality, her brooding on the subject of 'sexuality' suggested that there were strong libidinal tendencies and that these were always translated into a compulsion; in the course of three and a half months of analytical treatment the obsessional thinking came to be more and more associated with the transference, and now and again the feelings connected with the latter would break through. At the same time the obsessional thinking, manifesting itself as a resistance, took more and more possession of the material of her studies, which thus appeared as a substitute for her libidinal life. Instead of sublimating, she sexualized her studies and the whole of her thinking; a sense of guilt thus became attached to her work which was associated with sexual desires, resulting in a sense of inferiority and further repressions. The subject-matter of her studies was no longer a symbol but the sexual object itself and thus came under repression. She always forgot or repressed, for instance, the word 'hallux,' until the idea came to her 'like someone speaking' that hallux, the big toe, resembles a penis. The lamina cribrosa was for her the greater labia, the crista galli the lesser labia, the foramen cœcum the vagina. Thus her studies became a continuation of her infantile sexual curiosity, and like this were accompanied by prohibitions and doubts. She personified nature, as it were; trees, flowers, worms, caterpillars were all for her, as in the days of childhood, sentient beings to which her emotions might become attached. These matters were also intimately connected with her

studies, which embraced natural history as well as anatomy. But all her experiments were determined by the question ' Why is it like that ' ? and by the doubt, ' But is it like that ' ? Her studies were dominated by this obsessive doubting with its roots in the infantile.

In accordance with their origin, these questions extended to sexual matters. ' Why am I a girl and not a boy ? ' A strong sense of inferiority on account of her femininity proved to be the original form on which her insufficiency in intellectual fields was based. As a compensation she devoted herself to her studies. The search for knowledge and the search for the penis became identical in her unconscious.

The day after the sitting in which the part played by the analyst in her unconscious and the significance of the transference had been comprehended and accepted by her, her inhibition against work disappeared. But this threatened overflow of liberated libido was combated again in the old manner. A dense crop of obsessional thoughts returned, and was followed by a far-reaching detachment of her libido from the external world, severe depression, intense opposition to the analysis, in fact a feigning of death towards the outside world. This flight from the transference drove the libido back to early infantile stages. In this condition, resembling that of primal narcissism, her associations centred round wishes for a return into the mother's womb. According to her mother, she had been born two or three weeks too late. ' I am glad that I fought against birth ', this more particularly because both her sisters had been born too soon. And then she described how everything was closing in round her ; she felt as if she were running up against a brick wall. But she did not want to think about it. She would cling to a single thought which she would harry to death till she was utterly exhausted. Then she would be able to escape into sleep, ' because I know no other way ' ; and she felt she would have to shut herself up still more, otherwise she could not go on living. One can see clearly to what stage her libido was regressing.

That was the psychological situation at the time when the day came for her to undergo her examination. She failed. The analysis had not yet succeeded in binding her sexual desires to the transference ; they were still bound up with her studies and demanded punishment in this field. Thus the original significance of the examination became a reality which she could not permit herself to be equal to. Her libido remained at the stage of extreme rejection of objects (womb situation). She did not want to be born—and she failed in her

examination. Her flight from the transference was realized in the failure in the examination. She expressed the situation herself in the following words: 'If I was fond of anyone and was forced to tell him so, that would be worse to me than failing three times in an examination.' Her remark concerning her failure itself ran as follows: 'What seems strange to me about it is that I do not really care; I am almost glad.'

She was quite sure that her trouble in the examination was not lack of knowledge, but the bad impression she made on the professors. 'Unfortunately, I am never nervous in my exams., and perhaps they (the professors) thought they ought to humble me.' She had an idea that she had wanted to fail.

After this the patient's immediate preoccupation with her examination was done with. Only the later course of the analysis brought insight into the factors responsible for her failure. Her struggle against the transference-love became more and more apparent. She discovered that in the field of her studies there must be something compulsive in her interest, in her desire to grasp the true nature of everything. As her infantile memories unfolded themselves and the accumulated affects coupled with them were liberated, her obsessive thinking disappeared from time to time, and the transference-situation changed accordingly. A double domination by both father and mother corresponded to the strong ambivalence of her feeling. Her affection tended towards the father; prohibitions emanated from the mother. Her inimical attitude towards the mother was discharged in violent outbursts of feeling. More and more distinctly, and in more and more different directions, the latter became the person exercising prohibitions. At one time she would show herself subject to the maternal prohibitions and then display increased obsessional thinking and sense of guilt; at others an opposite attitude towards the father-analyst occurred, with a liberation from the symptoms. These changes in the direction of her transference enabled her to gain insight into her original unconscious desires and into the displacement of her libido on to thinking and study. Dreams ventured to appear in which the analyst assumed the rôle of father. Her defence against this situation manifested itself no longer as a compulsion but as direct attempts to modify the analytical situation. She became hostile to it. Once more the wish awoke to be a man and this opened the flood-gates to feelings of insufficiency and guilt. The following dream throws light on this situation. Another strong resistance had

preceded it, showing itself in an indisposition which the patient made a pretext for two days' interruption of the analysis; but during this time she had studied specimens in the zoological institute although without learning anything (once more a case of displacement of sexual desires from the transference to her studies).

This was the dream. *'All to-day I have felt disinclined to say a word. I had a dream which depresses me terribly. I was in the street and felt ill and a woman was with me who seemed to be Miss X., the daughter of our hall-porter at the University. And I think someone else was in the background; perhaps that is the person who afterwards was my sister, because I could hardly recognise her. The woman asked me where I felt a pain; that meant that I ought to be sick but could not. I said, "In my throat"; she said, "That is not true". Then I said, "Lower down". Then she looked at me so queerly and I knew quite well that she meant that something was the matter with my spinal cord, and I thought that I should become paralysed. At last it turned out that something was the matter higher up in my stomach, in my œsophagus. She said the liver would have to be removed. This had the shape of a stomach, but was simply called liver, and for that X. was necessary. He is the hall-porter, and I could see quite well how he cut my liver out through the skin. Then he went away again. Afterwards I wondered for a long while which organ could take the place of the liver and at last I thought that the pancreas or the spleen might do it. But I kept having the feeling that one could not take the liver out after all and that something must be wrong about it. I wanted to ask X. but woke up before he came.'*

These were her associations: 'I said once that a knife represented the penis entering my body. Of course it is impossible to remove the liver. The feeling that the dream is something wrong—to-day I have the feeling that anyone could do anything they liked with me, I would not defend myself. I am just simply a bad person, but I do not know why. It seems to me that it was not right that my parents were so nice to me yesterday. (She cried.) Now I see specimens in the embryological course, cell-division in the frog, large blastopore, small blastopore. That occurs to me because I have not the least courage to be honest with myself. The feeling that I ought to be punished and that I cannot defend myself. . . .'

It seemed to her that she had experienced something in her childhood, on account of which she must never be really fond of anyone. 'X. has something to do with my father.' The feeling came up that she had been at a disadvantage compared with her sisters, that she

must have been very fond of her father at quite an early time. She could not respect her mother because she told lies to her children.

The dream showed what her studies represented. The scene of the dream was connected with her work (the dissecting-room, anatomy) as well as the persons in it (the hall-porter and his daughter). In content and feeling it expressed (incestuous) desires, displaced in reality on to her studies, and the punishment resulting therefrom (castration). The scene of the dream bore the same relation to its content as her work (which arose from a displacement) bore to its original meaning. We see that her studies represented incestuous indulgence and were devised to show her how her castration could be remedied (' which organ could take the place of the excised liver ? ').

The dream in itself points to an improvement of the libido-situation. By elucidating much of the dream-content with reference to resistance and transference, it became possible to assign the right place to her efforts, wishes, prohibitions, and feelings of guilt and insufficiency. Immediately afterwards the patient could work well for a time and the obsessive thinking disappeared.

As her capacity for sublimation increased and she became free to work, the prohibition based on her infantile sexual inquiries disappeared. This was thereupon dealt with bit by bit and came to consciousness apart from her studies in the form of manifold theories concerning procreation and birth.

While the patient oscillated between her new attitude and the previous obsessional one, the analysis led on to a development of the Œdipus-situation in transference and a return of memories, always accompanied by a rejection of sexual feelings which began to show themselves more distinctly. Always as the libido turned in the one or the other direction, her ability to work alternated between inhibition and progress. The question of the examination which was drawing nearer became a pressing one. She dreamt of the professor of whom sne was most afraid. He came very clearly into the series of father-imagos. Her studies revealed themselves clearly as a flight from the Œdipus-attitude and still subject to the same prohibitions as that attitude.

By the frustration of her love for her father she was driven back to her mother, only to be disappointed again. More and more the latter became the personification of a punishing conscience forbidding libidinal impulses at all stages. Passing back from the genital impulses towards the father, through anal, urethral, oral (sucking) and muscle

(motility) erotism, she met everywhere with prohibitions imposed by the mother. Even her epistemological bent, from infantile sexual investigations to her present studies and the analysis, were subject to this prohibition. She was not allowed to do anything; she was not allowed to know anything. And if she did know anything, she must pretend to be stupid so as to escape direct punishment—and punish herself indirectly after all (in the examination). The experience in which the primal maternal prohibition lay was revealed by a long dream, about which I will only mention that the association of the patient was that she was a boy and wanted something sexual from the mother. She then thought she was growing younger and quite small, and the soup she was eating changed to milk. In a violent storm of feeling she accused her mother of not having suckled her. At the same time the dream revealed her affection for the examining professor, the analyst, the father, because this was of a tender and permitted nature.

The feelings of guilt emanated from the maternal authority and then were transformed into anxiety relating to her, particularly into anxiety relating to the birth-situation. In this way the patient came at last to understand why she still could not put the question ' where do children come from ? ' and what was the nature of the inhibitions in examinations, where she was herself being asked questions (about it). She was not allowed to know and she did not want to know. With this denial of knowledge she seemed to undo the procreation of her brothers and sisters and her own birth. It is clear that by personifying nature she regained her mother and that her study and examinations were dominated by this tendency. Thus, before the first examination, we saw the wish to cancel her birth and return to the womb. At the time it represented a flight from the external world and enabled her to withdraw all libidinal relations. Later the same wish was used to deal with her dread of the birth-situation and the anxiety that had become liberated with regard to the examination. Just before the second examination the following dream gave further clues to the unconscious significance of examinations and of her previous failure.

' I was so disgusted at my dream; however could I think of such things! I only know one bit. Clara was there and so was I. I don't know where we were, but I know I had something in my hand. It was something queer, something hard to describe. At the bottom it was oval and I thought it was a placenta, and the outside was brown and the inside quite white; towards the top there was something like a neck, shoulders

and head, a woman's head, and it was only about as big as that (30 *cms.*), *like a small fœtus ; but the head was well-developed like that of a woman and was coloured pink. I don't know why I had to eat it. It seemed horrible. I said to Clara, " I cannot go on." It was like a carrot that one has to eat. I ate half of it and felt so sick that I woke up.'*

' The shape that was the placenta was just like a drawing in my book on zoology and afterwards I thought it was a zoological specimen made of wood and representing the uterus of a calf ; no, the duplex of a pig ; no, because that, too, is a hoofed animal. And that is brown outside, no, rather red-brown, and quite white inside as in the dream, and one can open it and there is an embryo inside. The specimen that I was shown in the examination was that of a guinea-pig, where one saw placenta, uterus and fœtus. Yesterday I said something about the examination. In the dream fœtus I noticed the hair ; that, too, was red-brown and was combed back as my mother wears it. Then it occurred to me that my mother had had just the same face. I wondered why I had to eat it. Why does one have to eat anything ? From hunger or from love or from hatred. So I did it from hatred of my sister. If I ate a part of my mother's sexual organ, there would be no more children. Then I thought that if I could have managed it, I should have arranged never to come into the world.—It was simply horrible. To-day I saw a hornet being eaten by maggots. I felt awful ; I nearly collapsed, and I kept seeing how I had to eat that thing in the dream. I keep thinking and thinking how ghastly it was. At last it was like wood-shavings, no, it was not so thick and narrower. I can't find the words to describe it, but it had no taste.'

' And Clara kept looking at me and didn't say a word, but I just said as if I were speaking to him, " Now I simply can't manage any more " . . . . Clara is you and you look at me so calmly as if to say, " Eat ". In the dream I said I could eat no more of it. In reality I should say that I do not want to go up for the examination ; and just as Clara said nothing, you say nothing, but I shall just have to go (to the examination) ; I do not want to do my work for nothing.

' I saw in a catalogue, Otto Rank, *The Trauma of Birth.* Then I began to think of birth from a new point of view. It does not seem to me at all impossible that a dread of being born and dread of an examination should resemble each other.' (The patient knew nothing of the content of the book, only the title.) ' If I were asked whether I would rather live or not come into the world, I should want both ; I should wish not to have come into the world when I look at myself now, but

I should like to live all the same, because I think that it will all change some day.'

The patient grasped this dream, as it were, in all its layers. It was closely related to the dream described above and continued on the oral stage what was there expressed by the anal-sadistic one. Material dealing with her studies again entered into its content, this time in direct reference to the examination. The main elements of it are: not to eat, not to incorporate the mother, not to become a woman, not to be born, not to go in for the examination; but at the instigation of the analyst she eats, she decides to go in for the examination, she is prepared to risk birth, she would like to 'live'. In the dream the sense of guilt is turned into disgust and in reality it was for the first time transformed into *anxiety* about the examination.

While she got on well in her work for the examination, a transference-love set in which clearly referred to the mother-imago. ('I look for nothing but my mother in you!') Thereupon there followed a great resistance against this mother-transference, which was expressed as follows with strong affect. 'There is really nothing that I am allowed to do; something in me keeps saying, "you must not". I am not allowed to study, and that is why I fail.' The wide displacement and extent of this resistance thus became clear to her and the prohibition was understood by her in all its extended meaning: 'you are not to be a girl or to love your father or to love the analyst, or be a boy or be fond of your mother, or have your mother's breast, or be born'!

Later on the analyst and the professor who occurred in another dream once more took over the father's rôle; in this dream sexual wishes towards these two occurred, and were again rejected by the ego. 'I can't do anything but keep on suppressing my sexuality. I don't want anything any more, not to go in for the examination, not to have a man.' This remark shows once more how the prohibition against loving became a prohibition against the examination. On the genital stage the examination became for her a test of her capacity to love.

This time the prohibition first became transformed into conversion-symptoms. What was expressed pictorially in the dream narrated above became 'materialized': she felt ill; she wanted to be sick, and when she swallowed her throat felt quite tight 'like the vagina which contracts so that the penis cannot go into it'. With regard to being sick, she said, 'that is something like a birth; it is connected with the examination; just as I refuse to pass the examination, so I refuse to eat anything'.

Then she felt better ; she felt more confident about her examination and three days later she passed it, after she had worked over her four subjects in the last five days, as she felt, successfully for the first time. She got the highest marks from the professor who had clearly represented her father in some of her dreams, and the lowest marks in zoology, although she had prepared herself best for this. But this subject was still tainted with the feelings of guilt which had clearly appeared in the dream of the zoological specimens.

Thus, by overcoming her birth (psychically), by incorporation of (identification with) the mother, and by facing the incestuous transference, the patient succeeded in passing her examination and thus committing incest symbolically. But as a reaction to the transference formed on an incestuous basis, a regression of libido to pregenital stages followed. As if the examination had concluded a phase of the analysis, a severe depression manifested itself, of which the beginning had been indicated by the oral incorporation of the love-object as shown in the dream mentioned above. I cannot here describe the course this took.

Our description of the case can be concluded here, and we may attempt to show the psychological significance of examinations from the fragment of the analysis already given. To do this it has been necessary to look for all the elements of which the ' examination complex ' was constituted in the patient's unconscious ; by working backwards step by step it has been possible to discover all the layers of symbols, until we reach the primal one.

As Freud has shown, all desire for knowledge originates with the infantile sexual enquiries. Our patient brought the proof of this meaning of her studies in the first sitting. Her investigations, however, were abortive and prohibited. The examination which she failed to pass on that Easter day at six years of age formed the nucleus for her doubt of her teachers (mother) and of herself. The second ' success ' of her investigations was the discovery of the difference between a man and a woman. This resulted further in the great disappointment of finding that she had no penis. In her efforts to make up for this inadequacy and to become like her teacher (father) she was again unsuccessful ; thus there was plenty of food for her sense of insufficiency. Her failures in her investigations became a punishment for the incestuous wish underlying them. This Œdipus-conflict could not be resolved ; it had to be subject to prohibitions, which she tried to circumvent, yet without any possibility of thereby escaping from her sense of guilt. Thus her later studies stood in the service of her sexual

curiosity and sexual wishes, not in the sense of gratifying them, but as a continuation of the whole original desire for incestuous gratification and so for obtaining possession of the penis. The examination had to fail, since it was a test of her capacity to love on the one hand and capacity to be a man on the other (which can both be combined into a test of potency). In her efforts to fulfil her incestuous desires by means of displacement she personified and sexualized the whole of nature, in accordance with infantile and archaic tendencies (animism). But she had to study this 'nature,' to answer questions about it in her examination and the taboo of her sexual curiosity prevented her from succeeding.

We are here led to look for further analogies between the unconscious tendencies of the patient and archaic institutions. In *Totem and Tabu* Freud has surmised that our modern institutions have developed according to the mechanism of the obsessional neurosis and that therefore symbolical analogies of them might be found among primitive races. Thus ceremonies concerned with modern education are reflected in the initiatory rites of primitive peoples,[1] as those festivals in which adolescents receive their certificate of matriculation.[2] We have seen how in the unconscious of the patient the examination became a test of potency and failure in it a castration, so that it served the same purposes as the puberty-rites of primitive peoples.[3]

What serves among primitive peoples as a test of bodily sexual maturity corresponds to our examinations for mental maturity. As compared with the puberty-rites of primitive peoples, where the ordeal is manifested in an autoplastic, non-mental manner, the matriculation examination has been 'sublimated', both in its ceremonial and content, into a modern, purely mental, alloplastic form. In cases of failure in examinations and even in the affects of qualms of conscience, feelings of insufficiency and guilt occurring before examinations, we

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[1] Cf. Bernfeld, *Sisyphos*.

[2] [Translator's Note: German, *Reifezeugnis*, lit. certificate of maturity.]

[3] The patient's dreams showed a further striking parallelism with primitive customs. For instance, among certain Australian tribes there is the belief that youths are robbed of their intestines during the initiation-rites and receive new and better ones. In a dream the patient had her liver cut out and wondered which organ might replace it; in a later dream she actually obtained 'better' intestines, namely, the uterus, her mother's genital parts (= rebirth). Cf. Reik, 'Pubertätsriten,' *Probleme der Religionspsychologie*, p. 59 ff.

may see a recurrence of these primitive sexual symbols (desublimation), weighted with all those feelings of guilt and attempts at self-punishment which have been acquired in the history of the race and the individual.[4] Only by referring the individual sense of guilt back to its original sphere and by liberating work, thought and frame of mind in the examination-situation from its 'sexual burden' (sublimation) can a rational attitude towards an examination be made possible. When our patient failed in her examination, this desexualization of the situation had not yet been accomplished, and our description of the course that the analysis took has shown how sexual desires and feelings of guilt can be bound to the transference and retraced to their original aims, so that the work in the examination is freed from them.

Resistance against the transference, however, drove the libido back to its early infantile cathexes, which were then once more reflected in her attitude towards the examination; in the extremity of flight she was ultimately driven back to an inhibition of thought bordering on monideism, and her unconscious expressed this condition in dreams of the womb-situation. She fought against thinking and fought against the examination just as she had fought against being born. The examination was to separate her from her mother, as the puberty-rite finally detaches the young savage from his mother. Parallel to the wish not to be born went her desire not to give birth herself; she dreaded even giving birth to her thoughts. Thus her examination had an unconscious prototype in the act of birth, and may therefore be subdivided into taking in (learning) and giving out (being examined). In the manifestations of opposition to both aspects the original significance was revealed. Learning became for her unconscious the incorporation of the penis, by means of coition on the genital plane, and by swallowing (sucking) on the oral-sadistic plane. On both planes we have the idea of conception (child by the father) and preg-

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[4] Thus, for instance, a young man avoided his matriculation examination by having all his teeth extracted just before, so that he experienced a puberty-rite of the kind customary among Kaffirs, where the youth has a tooth knocked out.

In one school an epidemic of appendicitis broke out just before an examination and affected about fifty pupils. The surgeon, not realizing the psychogenic character of this epidemic, carried out with his knife a symbolic castration in accordance with the puberty-rites of a primitive people.

nancy (' pregnant with thought '). Her answers in the examination represented a birth, an expulsion of what had been imbibed, whereas the anal significance of eating and defæcation had not as yet come into the patient's consciousness. But here, as has already been said, the Œdipus-stage must be brought into relation with the situation. Only this enables us to understand the prohibitions and feelings of guilt, as connected with the wishes for love, for a penis, to receive a child by her father, to get rid of her mother. Therefore the unsuccessful renunciation had to express itself in failure in the examination, representing a castration, a not loving, not being able to give birth (being castrated). In quite a general way the examiner was drawn into this Œdipus-situation. In the transference-situation (punishing father, loving father) the destiny of the examinee was fulfilled.

From this point of view it is possible to explain anxiety about examinations. It arises from the Œdipus-situation, as fear of a castration symbolically experienced by the subject, just as it is by primitive peoples in the transparent ritual of initiation rites. But, further, we have been brought near to the origin and first prototype of all fear, namely, fear of birth ; since the examination is a mental image of birth, the anxiety arising when the defensive barrier of symbols is broken down is a renewal of the birth or castration experience (as we have seen in our present analysis, particularly in the dreams), and as I have also found several times in cases of suffering from dread of examinations which I have treated cathartically.

THE ' DOCTOR-GAME ', ILLNESS AND THE PROFESSION OF MEDICINE

BY

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We often see a child playing at being a doctor and we remember games of this sort in our own childhood. Indeed, this game is frequently one of the few memory-traces which survive the infantile amnesia. Freud has stated that this game is ' the repository of the child's ideas about marriage ', and this gives it, together with ' playing at father and mother ', ' a peculiar importance in the symptomatology of later neuroses '.[1] The forbidden coitus- and pregnancy-phantasies of very early childhood appear in a new guise in the features of the game of ' doctor and patient ' and in the morally unobjectionable wish to cure or be cured. The sadistic conception of the sexual act is clearly betrayed in the instruments of the little physician : penis-equivalents in the form of make-believe stethoscopes, thermometers, enema-syringes and surgical knives. The illness itself often signifies in more or less disguised form pregnancy in the mother. The ' doctor-game ' is frequently combined with the game of ' father and mother ', the rôle of sufferer being allotted to a doll which represents children in general. The doll's behaviour is usually a kind of ' negative therapeutic reaction ' to the treatment it undergoes ; it begins by losing its limbs and finally perishes. It is sacrificed to the castration-complex of its guardians, whom it enables to give play to aggressive tendencies really aimed at their brothers and sisters, the rivals for their parents' love.

Hence, in the ' doctor-game ', which is a symbolic form of activity, *all* the tendencies which enter into the Œdipus conflict find expression. It is a repetition of the primal scene, the child who impersonates the physician identifying himself with the father and the child who acts the patient with the mother.

At first sight it seems curious that children should repeat over and over again (and derive pleasure from the repetition) so painful an experience as that of medical treatment. We know that Freud has taken this circumstance as one of the starting-points of his theory of

[1] Freud, ' On the Sexual Theories of Children ', *Collected Papers*, Vol. II.

the compulsion to repetition.[2] According to him, one of the things which pleases the child in the game is that he is able to pass from the disagreeable rôle of infantile passivity to the active rôle of the adult, the physician. The question remains what interest the other child who takes part in the game has in repeating the painful experience of the patient ; but the answer to this is obvious if we extend the concept of ' activity ' to cover what I have just described. The ' doctor-game ' gives to *all* the children engaged in it the possibility of actively staging and enjoying the whole primal scene, which was originally unpleasant just because the child was obliged to play the part of the inactive third party who had no share in the proceedings.

Of play in general Freud says that in it ' the compulsion to repetition is closely blended with direct instinctual gratification '.[3] After what I have already said the pleasurable and very considerable element of instinctual gratification in the ' doctor-game ' is quite clear. Here play answers the same purpose as that of dreams and neurotic symptom-formation : the fulfilment, by means of symbolic distortion, of desires which are incapable of entering consciousness. In dreams and neurosis, however, they are incestuous wishes *returning* from under a state of repression, whereas the ' doctor-game,' which occurs at a time when the Œdipus experience is still an *actual* conflict, is designed to help the subject in his endeavour to master the original experience. As we know, the Œdipus complex is finally resolved into the different possible identifications through the influence of the castration-complex [4] ; but during the whole transitional period the child finds himself constantly obliged to ward off the ever-recurring, traumatic effect of the primal scenes or to conceal from himself the fact that the parents still *continue* to be unattainable sexual objects. It is by ' repression ' that the child finds an escape from the intolerable truth about the sex-relations between the parents, or evades comprehension of it, and the success of this repression depends upon the possibility of withdrawing from the painful idea a quantitatively and qualitatively adequate amount of libido.[5] The libido which then flows back from the object to the ego and is there regulated by the dynamometer of infantile anxiety forces its way out again to the object-world in the

[2] Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure-Principle.*

[3] Loc. cit.

[4] Freud, ' The Passing of the Œdipus Complex ', *Collected Papers,* Vol. II.

[5] Freud, ' Repression ', *Collected Papers,* Vol. IV.

motor activity of play.[6] In the *form* given to the symbolic content of the play we see the pleasure-principle at work, whilst the *tendency* to play, the ' play instinct ', represents the compulsion to repetition, the necessity to give active expression to a thing in order to be able to repress it.

In my opinion, the more or less successful achievement of *complete* repression is as closely bound up with the process of introjection as is identification itself. The more complete the incorporation of the object which causes disappointment, the more thoroughly is it repressed and removed from external perception, and the more complete is the identification. But the greater in that case becomes the volume of ego-libido pressing for discharge. We may say that the less a child still retains of knowledge or understanding of its parents' marital relations, the more clearly and the more whole-heartedly will it play the game of father and mother, i.e., stage and enact the conception. It might be said (though for reasons of space we cannot discuss the question further here) that introjection is the regressive form available for full understanding, while expression in action is the regressive form available for acquiring understanding. Let us recall here Freud's example of the little boy who mourned the death of a beloved cat by crawling on all fours and miaowing.[7] At this stage it is impossible for the child, because he lacks verbal images, to use the activity of thought as a means of surmounting a forgoing of pleasure, that is to say, a loss. He is able to reproduce it in words only by introjecting the object and withdrawing the libido attaching to it. An accumulation of ego-libido thus takes place and leads to the game of ' being the cat '. We know, too, that at the earliest period of his life the child's mental apparatus works only according to the primary process and that he gradually acquires his serious capacities through a piecemeal introjection of those personalities in his environment whom he loves. Upon this depends not only his powers of communication with them but also his increasing independence of them whereby he first takes his separate place as subject in the object-world represented by the Œdipus conflict. In this ' the first period of puberty ' his libido receives a reinforcement from genital sources which the primary process is no longer capable of mastering.

[6] This view is in agreement with the experience of Frau Melanie Klein, who has emphasized the fact that children ' endeavour to abreact in play the impressions of the primal scene '.

[7] Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.*

The mental processes of ' binding ' are set in motion and build up the ego. Thereupon the object-ideas of the parents, introjected *afresh*, come back from their state of repression, that is from the id into the ego, and (following the analogy of the dream-censorship) are tolerated by the ego in so far as they conform to an ego-ideal of reality, i.e. in so far as they are disguised by means of this ideal.

We can understand that at a time when the process of building-up the infantile ego is still going on, the ' doctor ' is a peculiarly suitable ego-ideal, besides representing very many of the interests of the id. From the child's point of view a doctor is permitted actively to employ all the mechanisms of pleasure which are forbidden to the child himself. The physician pays no heed to clothing and does not feel shame. He is allowed to hear and see everything and to busy himself unpunished with urine and fæces. He knows all the mysteries of the difference between the sexes and how children come, and he exercises a kind of omnipotence over the body of the patient, as the father does over the mother. The child will give preference in his play to this or that feature of ' being a doctor ', according to the special urgency of his own erotogenic zones and instinct-components. Or he may indulge his aggressive, sadistic tendencies in a special way in the rôle of operator (' the love of the knife '), in order by giving active expression to castration-*pleasure* to spare himself castration-*anxiety*. It seems that the ' doctor-game ' is peculiarly calculated to reveal very clearly the psychobiological function of play, namely, the exercise of those mental mechanisms which are necessary for the successful solution of the Œdipus conflict. Moreover, in that the super-ego attracts to itself to some extent the superfluous ego-libido in the form of object-libido made subjective, and, by way of the real ego-ideal, accomplishes something in the outside world, the active behaviour of play does modify that world in part and prevents introversion of the conflict, i.e. neurosis.

Thus we see that the activity of play is a preliminary to the practising of a profession, only in the latter case the model of the resolved Œdipus complex is followed, whilst play reflects the actual process of resolution.

It may be interesting in this connection to consider the ' doctor-game ' at a point where we can see it as it were *in statu nascendi*, namely, as it may be observed in psycho-analytic treatment. The expression through action and behaviour which takes place during treatment and which is at the bottom of the ' transference-game ' is often hardly a

new edition, at any rate it is but a kind of first edition. The patient is confronted with the result of the re-emergence of repressed material. The excess of ego-libido, which is ' bound ' in the symptom, and which originally attached to incestuous objects in the form of object-libido, flows towards the analyst. Thus a basis is formed for an understanding of the psycho-analytical situation, i.e. the patient's recognition of the emotion of love for the physician and the anticipation of its frustration. And just as formerly the Œdipus conflict was thrust out of consciousness by this means, so now, when it is being brought back into consciousness, it follows the same route.

The first signs of anxiety shown by the patient indicate the failure of the attempt at transference and the setting in motion of the repetition-mechanism as a result of the process of introjection—that is to say, the patient is taking refuge in active behaviour in order to defend himself from conscious understanding. Instead of the passive rôle of the analysand he endeavours to assume the active rôle of analyst and to begin by analysing the analyst himself, trying to discover all the secrets of his personal and family life. Disappointed in this attempt, the patient tries to equalize the unbearable tension between ego and super-ego to avoid any sense of guilt or anxiety of conscience by making his parental super-ego conform more and more completely to the ego-ideal which he attains through the analyst. And he tries to imitate the latter by drawing more and more people directly and indirectly into the sphere of psycho-analytical observation and treatment. He wants to play at being the ' doctor ' in order to escape the rôle of patient. He wants to save others by means of psycho-analysis in order to save himself from being analysed. One begins to see how it is that anxiety of conscience, the last of the protections against stimulus, drives some analysands themselves to become (' wild ') analysts, to express in action the part of the physician, to ' play the doctor ' in order to escape the realization of what their own analysis reveals.

We can imagine how the child who was formerly in the position of the patient is impelled to take the rôle of the physician in the ' doctor game.'

Perhaps a practical example taken from a case analysed may make this still clearer and may help us to understand how the same person who plays at being a physician may be inclined, or even obliged, to reassume the rôle of patient.

A woman who suffered from heart disease (clinical diagnosis: essential extrasystole) had a great and apparently hopeless longing for

a child. She prevented conception (from which she was also protected by vaginismus) owing to her dread lest her heart trouble might cause her to die in giving birth. After a certain phase of the treatment, in which she showed herself without any understanding ('emotional stupidity') of such explanations as had to do with the *psychic* genesis of her symptom, she constantly begged me instead to examine her physically, addressing me in a roguish, infantile manner as 'Uncle doctor'. Disappointed in her therapeutic scoptophilia and exhibitionism, she tried to divert my interest from herself to her mother, who also suffered from heart disease and who, the patient informed me, was much more ill than herself, having suffered since the birth of a sister some years younger than the patient. She desired me, therefore, to treat her mother and at any rate to examine her. When I had repeatedly refused, she produced in a dream the hallucinatory fulfilment of the wish embodied in her 'doctor-game'. The dream was as follows: she gave up to her mother one of her own treatment-hours with me. Her mother was lying on the sofa with the upper part of her body exposed for examination. The dreamer watched anxiously, 'fearing' that the diagnosis would be unfavourable. The analyst placed his stethoscope on the mother's breast and it turned out that this instrument, intended for penetrating examination, had a point like a sharp dagger, which penetrated the mother deeply in the neighbourhood of the heart. The dreamer awoke in terror.

The dream betrays clearly the patient's unconscious intention. The analyst was to play at 'doctor' with her in order that she, in the rôle of the patient, might enjoy expressing in her behaviour her passive surrender to him in the part of father-imago; that is, might carry this attitude into action without intellectual insight into it. When, however, the physician refused her, as the father had formerly done in the game of 'father and mother', she identified herself with him and tried to play the doctor with her mother through the agency of the analyst. By actively dramatizing the primal scene in the interest of her scoptophilia, she resigned herself to playing the part of the spectator, on condition that the analyst by his treatment should commit the crime of matricide in her stead and thus absolve her.

The mother as the hated object in the Œdipus conflict is completely introjected—repressed; she is wholly merged in the ego. The father, as the loved object, is only incompletely repressed, i.e. he becomes part of the subject in the super-ego. In passive feminine

masochism the ego submits to the super-ego [8] as the mother does to the father. We see that this patient acquired the same illness as her mother because her super-ego, being completely devoted to the interests of the id, had not applied the superfluous ego-libido to the modification of the outside world (in play or in the practice of a profession) but had returned it to the ego, ' which is essentially a body-ego '), to be transformed in the inner world, as motility within. In analysis she endeavoured to give it active expression outwardly, to play the doctor, in order not to have to be ill ; that is to say, she tried as far as possible to replace the super-ego belonging to her id by the reality-ideal of the physician, who represented real conscience and was to deliver her from introversion of the conflict. She desired to regain health by practising healing. The active physical expression achieved in her illness was designed as an escape from anxiety and an equalizing of the tension between ego and id. It was transformed into a mental activity through her attempt to escape from anxiety of conscience and the tension between ego and super-ego. By converting the sense of guilt [9] into sympathy [10] she tried to rise from suffering *in company with* another [11] to *pity* [12] for her, from the function of patient to that of physician.

This somewhat cursory glance at the distribution of parts, both in the ' doctor-game ' of children and in the adults' game of transference to the doctor during psycho-analytic treatment, shows us that we are justified in concluding that the same instinctual impulse may make a given individual into a physician or a patient. This shows that the psychogenesis of the profession of medicine in an individual is a repetition of its phylogenesis now familiar to us through the researches of Róheim.

Róheim demonstrated that the medicine-man of primitive races represents a cultural advance, by way of transformation of instinct, upon the practitioner of black magic. ' In the magician we find sadistic instincts unsublimated, while in the medicine-man the same instincts appear inhibited through identification with the victim, i.e. in a sublimated form.' [13] Like our patient in her phantasy the man who

[8] Freud, ' The Economic Problem in Masochism ', *Collected Papers*, Vol. II.

[9] *Schuldgefühl.*

[10] *Mitgefühl.*

[11] *Mit-leiden.*

[12] *Mit-leid.*

[13] Róheim, ' Nach dem Tode des Urvaters ', *Imago*, Bd. IX, p. 83 ff.

practised black magic had perpetrated the primal crime—the incorporation and introjection of the parent-substitute. In order to be absolved the magician had to free himself from this substitute, now transformed into an excremental symbol, and to do this he had to project his crime, incorporating the symbol in others, in order subsequently to rid them of it again. The introjected parent-substitute became the substance which caused disease and which must be ejected in order that the patient might recover. The possibility of reincorporating it in another as a substance which may promote recovery arises only when an advance has been made from the oral-anal-sadistic level to the genital libidinal impulse. It is only then that the excremental symbol becomes the symbol of sperma, penis and child. Our patient came to grief in the Œdipus conflict over the synthesis (confluence) of her pregenital and genital libidinal tendencies, and endeavoured to make up for this by the ' doctor-game ' in the psycho-analytical treatment, by releasing from repression the morbid substance introjected into the ego (the mother-substitute) and absorbing it into the super-ego. Hence she became not only father but mother, and even the mother of her mother, to whom she could restore health—life—the life which she had received from her. The patient endeavoured to free herself from the compulsion of the feminine-masochistic attitude in the ego by establishing a kind of bisexuality in the super-ego. This shows us that there is a deeper and more unconscious meaning underlying the superstitious mistrust felt by the laity for treatment by physicians who are themselves ill and of whom one hears it said that ' they cannot even cure themselves.' There is to some extent always the suspicion that, in order to relieve their masochistic ego from suffering, such persons will change the current of the sadistic impulses of their super-ego from inner to outer motility and direct them towards their patients.

But there is also a danger that in the attempt to prevent this happening the physician may himself regress to the rôle of patient. This is the more likely to happen if, as I have already said, his choice of profession was not originally based on the final identification following the resolution of the Œdipus conflict, but if his professional activity can still be regarded as a mode of acting, a ' doctor-game ', designed to defray the cost of repression. Such a physician rediscovers in the patient the incestuous object which has taken on the rôle of patient by the very processes of identification which have made him himself a physician.

In a course of lectures which I gave at the Berlin Analytical Institute, and to which I gave the title *The Art of Medicine and Psycho-Analysis*, I suggested an explanation of the by no means uncommon circumstance that specialists fall a victim to the particular disease which they treat. At that time I had not seen the results of Róheim's ethnological researches and I based my view on analyses conducted by myself and on what Freud teaches us in *Totem und Tabu*. I called physicians of this type '*partial*' physicians, and suggested that, from the psycho-analytical point of view, their practice of their profession was similar to a perversion. For their own unconscious, incestuous libidinal impulses, bound to a particular erotogenic zone, cause them to hyper-cathect the particular organ of the patient (or some specialized branch of medicine) with so great an amount of libido that all the rest of the human being eludes the consciousness or at least the understanding of these physicians owing to the relative displacement of libido on to a single organ. It is really a kind of organ-fetichism, which acts as an anti-cathexis and defrays the cost of repression. That is to say, the specialist does not effect a transference to the patient but identifies himself with him. Instead of restoring the diseased organ to health he endeavours to lay hold of it by introjection, to 'repress' it (an attitude precisely like that of our patient towards her mother's heart-trouble), and the consequent damming-up of his ego—or organ—libido makes him ill himself. Once more he introverts the relations with his patients and once more regresses from understanding to introjection, from verbal expression to action—from suffering in sympathy with [14] the patient (pity) to suffering in company with him.[15]

Thus I have seen specialists in gastric diseases succumb to gastric disease, psychiatrists to psychoses, and psycho-analysts (owing to a 'counter-identification' taking the place of counter-transference) to neuroses and depression. I have heard, too, that a certain lung specialist developed asthma after having been frequently called out at night to an old man who suffered from that disease, at a time when the physician himself was going through a neurotic conflict. This observation applies not only to the physician, but also in particular to the scientist engaged in specialized research. His epistemophilic impulse, nurtured by his incestuous scoptophilia, falls under a taboo and compels him, in accordance with the law of talion, once more to introject

[14] *Mit-Leid.*

[15] *Mit-Leiden.*

and to give active expression to processes relating to a given ' erotogenic zone ' when he is inhibited from understanding or from seeking to understand them. This means that the organ which disease attacks in himself is that in connection with which he wished to pursue his investigations, or in other words ' to sin '.

Various defensive measures often make their appearance as reactions. These are designed to defend the subject in the choice of his profession from his destructive impulses. Let me quote just two examples to show how the physician may on the one hand safeguard his patients against himself and on the other protect himself against himself. For instance, I know a very busy physician who, in order to treat his patients successfully, feels himself obliged to hate them consciously. But to prevent this affective attitude from interfering with his practice he isolates it in time from his day's work. In the morning, before his consultation hours, his custom is to walk rapidly up and down his empty consulting room and vehemently to execrate the patients who are awaiting his help and call them every kind of filthy name. On the other hand, there are many physicians who in their professional attitude regress unconsciously to the ' excremental symbol ' regarded as the introjected morbid substance, i.e. the parent-substitute. To these men the excremental symbol is replaced by money (= fæces) upon which they displace the whole incestuous significance of their patients. This has the effect of a taboo upon the patient's money, so that the physician may not handle it or receive (introject) it if he desires himself to remain well or free from a sense of guilt. He avoids an inhibition in his work at the cost of an inhibition in making money.

Thus in the most modern relations between doctor and patient—the bartering of health for money—we see that the most remote archaisms intrude themselves in their prehistoric interdependence. For every physician repeats in himself not only the psychic ontogenesis of his calling but also its psychic phylogenesis. The proof of this statement is to be found by observing the ' doctor-game ' of children, in which we have already recognized the outlines of the profession in later life.

So I was not at all surprised when I once had the opportunity of observing a game of this sort in its primitive form. It might be called the ' primal doctor-game,' because it was quite undisguisedly based on the significance of the patient as at once enemy and father. I will now describe the game.

A twelve-year-old patient, who suffered from compulsive onanism

with sadistic phantasies, told me that he used to play this game with other boys of his own age when he was six years old. For our discussion it does not matter whether the game was really played in every detail as he told it or whether he had supplemented it with later phantasies.

The boys played at surgical operations. The parts were allotted as follows: one boy, who had somehow made himself unpopular, was the patient, while the others were surgeons and assistants; two of them had special rôles: one acted the nurse who 'gave the anæsthetic', and the other was the 'spirit' of the patient.

The operation was always acted as follows: the surgeons and the boy who was later to act the 'spirit' fell upon the patient and beat him with sticks, trying if possible to hit his penis. They then pretended to eat him up, and each physician tried to snatch from his colleagues the largest possible part of him, preferably 'part of his bottom'. The remains were burnt in an imaginary bonfire and all that was left of the patient (the body of the boy who had been operated upon) was buried in the ground, a proceeding which was indicated by covering him with a tablecloth. The physicians, drunk with the blood of their victim, then danced a wild dance, treading on him as he lay on the ground; the 'spirit', meanwhile, had hidden in a corner and had to dart in and out among the dancers and pinch one or other without being seen. The 'colleagues', always supposing that one of their number had played this trick, finally started a general fight, till at last they all made it up and finished by sucking sweets together.

In this primal 'doctor-game' in a modern nursery, in which a primal compulsion to repetition was working itself out, we see in every detail processes appearing in the form of play which Freud, reasoning from the agreement of the compulsive phenomena exhibited by neurotics, with the ceremonial of savages, supposes to have taken place in the primal horde.[16] I cannot at this point touch on many interesting features of the game as we have it here—for instance, the light it throws on the conception of professional etiquette and on projected feelings of guilt. I would only select certain points which are germane to our subject.

When I suggested to this boy that surgeons really do not kill their patients but make them well, he replied that at the time when he played the game he did not 'as yet' know that. He thought at that

[16] Freud, *Totem und Tabu*. Cf. also Róheim, 'Nach dem Tode des Urvaters'.

time that surgeons were people who hated everyone else and therefore wanted to kill them. He had twice had some experience of them in their professional capacity. On the first occasion his mother had an operation for the removal of an internal growth and this episode terrified him greatly. On the other occasion the same surgeon removed a growth from the boy's nose. In his terror the child defended himself so violently that the surgeon ' by mistake ' knocked out one of his teeth. It is perfectly clear that the child identified the surgeon with his own extremely stern and tyrannical father, from whom he tried to escape because of castration-anxiety. In the nose-operation actual form was given to his identification with his mother, who also had been operated on by the father-surgeon (i.e. had submitted to coitus with him). At the same time there was realized the danger of passive feminine surrender to the father—namely, castration—being made into a woman. Through the symbolic interpretation of the surgeon's assault the son felt himself castrated by, and thus prevented from identifying himself with, the father. In the ' surgeon-game ' he recovered the active father-rôle. In the game, as in dreams, the wish-fulfilment was represented in reverse form, for actually it was only through the operation (castration) that he became the surgeon. It is by piecemeal cannibalistic incorporation in general and by the castration of the patient in particular (surgeon-imago) that the passive subject (the patient) first acquires the powers which in the infantile phantasy are employed by the active subject in his victorious struggle during the primal scene. By introjection of the father he becomes the father, just as the father himself first becomes a man by making the mother a woman, i.e. by ravishing (introjecting) her penis. This also is incorporated, in the form of an excremental symbol, as the parent-substitute (' bottom '), the nates naturally standing simultaneously for the breasts. The latter are then permitted to remain as a perpetual source of gratification in the outer world [17] (compare the sucking of sweets as a token of reconciliation) and make it possible for the subject to resign himself to the rôle of child. The fact that this patient in his ' doctor-game ' often acted the gentle nurse, who alleviates pain by anæsthetics, betrays his regressive instinctual tendency towards the function of the primal mother, who by suckling her infant sends it to sleep and frees it from pain.

[17] Cf. Karl Abraham, ' Zwei Stufen der oralen Entwicklungsphase der Libido ', *Entwicklungsgeschichte der Libido auf Grund der Psychoanalyse seelischer Störungen*, 1924.

Thus in this most primitive of all 'doctor-games' we see the child's ego, in the struggle between the different identifications, already striving to build up his super-ego out of them. It endeavours to free itself from the rôle of *feminine* passivity and to revert to that of *infantile* passivity, in which it has no longer passively to submit to its super-ego (as the mother submits to the father) but can take pleasure in the demands of the super-ego by looking upon it as its child, its own production. I have come to see that the medical practitioner must in a very special way have accomplished in his super-ego a synthesis of the conception of a 'primal mother,' differentiated into father and mother. Otherwise he will transfer to his patient, who is the projection of his ego, the unbearable tension between his super-ego and his ego (i.e. his sense of guilt disguised as sympathy).

The views of a psycho-analyst on the profession of medicine would, however, be incomplete if we did not in conclusion recall that the physician, in the social economy of distribution of labour, represents in his person a biological, psychophysical function discovered by Freud in the 'pleasure-principle' and designated by him 'the guardian of life'. The destructive tendency of the compulsion to repetition—the death-instinct—which presses for the equalization of all tensions, and especially for the abolition of all objective sources of tension, is modified by the claim of the narcissistic libido. This represents the desire for life through love—a desire which is primordial and which subsequently is regressively repeated again and again by way of introjective incorporation (introjective repression). When the level of the ego-libido (the self-preservative instinct) [18] is raised, *anxiety* becomes mobilized as a psychic defence while physical pain, the equivalent of anxiety, forms a physical defence against stimulus. The instinct of destruction menaces the subject in both simultaneously. For every morbid process is, when the demand of the ego-libido is strengthened, a heightened vital process, which of itself evolves the tendency to accelerate relief from tension. The 'circuitous route to death',[19] which is what life represents, is travelled more rapidly by means of disease, and every diseased organ is thereby threatened with the deleterious consequences of the abrupt subsidence of libido—i.e. with orgasm. Mental anxiety and physical pain are in general the alarm-signals which summon the physician to the sufferer's assistance. In the light which psycho-

[18] Freud, 'On Narcissism: an Introduction', *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV.

[19] Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*.

analysis has thrown on the problem of disease we see fresh avenues opening out for our curative methods. It is not necessary for me here to dwell on the liberation of mankind from anxiety and from the symptoms which are its equivalents. But liberation from organic pain, such, for instance, as announces the presence of a morbid inflammation of the susceptibility to bacterial infection, requires of the physician of the body not primarily operative interference but courage to adopt a new technique, comparable to that achieved by analysts through the methods formulated by Freud. In every case the physician must take into account the libidinal constitution of his patients. He must inform himself of the causes of the peculiar erotogenic demand of the organ which is attacked by disease (i.e. which is pressing to live at a more rapid pace), and he must try to assist the adjustment of the economy of the narcissistic libido. The physician who, out of pity (that is in order to avoid his own sense of guilt), feels it to be his duty *only* to annihilate or alleviate pain by means of narcotics is in danger of destroying the 'guardian of life' and so becoming himself the agent of the instinct of death.

A CONTRIBUTION TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF SADO-MASOCHISM

BY

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VIENNA

Two of the problems connected with sado-masochism still require deeper exploration and formulation: the nature and the rôle of the instinct of mastery and the constant association of this perversion with hate, anal erotism and the obsessional neurosis. As regards the second problem, the only positive knowledge we possess at present is the relationship to castration, this regarded both as a dreaded and as a desired experience.

To approach a more complete understanding I will go a little further afield, harking back to the very roots of love and hate. Whoever has watched little children, from the new-born upwards, soon discovers that they learn to love those persons who are in constant attendance on their needs; first and foremost, naturally, come mother, foster-mother and nurse. But in this an important modification must be made. It is less a question of assistance in their needs generally—this falls to the lot of all little children, just as it does to most young animals—but is a matter of sexual needs in particular. It must be remembered that the satisfaction of even the simplest and most elementary of the ego-needs—the appeasing of hunger and the cleansing of the body—cannot be attained without a simultaneous strong excitation of erotogenic zones. The suckling cannot be fed without the pleasurable stimulation and satisfaction of its oral erotism, cannot be washed and cleansed without powerfully titillating the erotism of its skin and mucous membranes.

In my book *Lehre von den Geschlechtsverirrungen*, I suggested that Nature seems purposely to have so arranged things that sucking breast or bottle should be in itself pleasurable. We do not know anything directly about the deepest sensations of the suckling and the new-born child. But from the later years of childhood we get analogies which allow of a correct deduction. Many people can remember that at Christmas they did not obtain the greatest pleasure from presents which satisfied real, practical needs, such as stockings, winter gloves or warm clothes, but from those which were regarded as tokens of love and which fulfilled sexual-symbolic wishes, for instance, a train with

engine and rails, or dolls which could be dressed and undressed or could be washed all over. As soon as a child believes himself unobserved he will investigate the middle of the doll's body, back and front, and not infrequently make a hole there. It is an unmistakably sexual pleasure, therefore, which is here being sought with the greatest eagerness. Further, we know how attached children often are and remain for the rest of their lives to those who 'corrupted' them by enlightening them sexually and giving them the desired full sexual knowledge. Even in the suckling, and still more in the infant child, it is unmistakable that its feelings of love are directly associated with being played with, i.e. with pleasurable stimulation and satisfaction, in the first place, of the erotism of its skin and mucous membrane, then from the indirect sources of sexual excitation (rocking, romping, being swung round, and so on). It is here that the love for the father, who on the whole has little to do with looking after the child, begins. He is only loved early and tenderly when he devotes himself to his child, plays a great deal with him, even takes him often into his bed—that is, when he stimulates and satisfies the child's sexuality in a way similar to that of mother or nurse.

That even a suckling is capable of the most powerful sensations of love and hate may be exemplified by a childhood's reminiscence of Tolstoy's, that writer of whom his wife says: 'There is something in you so all-wise, so childlike and simple, so faithful, and the whole of you resplendent with radiant goodness. And that glance that pierces right into the heart! You alone have it.' The great Russian says: 'These are my earliest recollections; I can't of course put them in exact order because I don't know what took place first and what later. Of a great many things I don't even know whether they were real experiences or merely dreams. But here they are: I am lying swaddled; I want to move my arm and cannot; I scream and cry and my shrieks hurt me but I cannot stop my screaming. Somebody bends over me . . . who it was I cannot now say. All these things are dim, but I know there were two persons. My screams rouse their pity and distress them, but they don't unfasten me as I hope; and so I shriek all the harder. They believe it is necessary that I should lie all swaddled up, whilst I know it is not necessary. I want to convince them of this and my screaming becomes convulsive, *detestable even to myself, but not to be suppressed.* I feel the injustice and cruelty, not of people, for they sympathize, but of Fate, and *I feel a great pity for myself.* I do not know and never shall know what it was exactly;

was I wrapped up in the infant's swaddling clothes and did I want to get my arm free, or was it later when I was a year old and my arms were tied to prevent my scratching some scabs; or is this a sum of impressions, as in a dream, brought together in one reminiscence? This much only is certain, that this was the earliest and most dominant impression of my life. It is not the recollection of my screaming that is imprinted on my memory, not even of my sufferings, but the multiplicity and contradiction in the impressions: I long for freedom, but my longing brings help from none; I who long for strength am weak, whilst they are strong.'

From this classic description by a great artist we may learn that not only our hatred, self-pity, the feeling of cruelty suffered and of coercion—all these are not only not foreign to the mind of a suckling babe or of a twelvemonth-old infant, but that they can form the earliest, the most powerful and the most fateful impressions of a whole life. In another place in his *Early Memories*, the same writer says: 'The impressions of earliest childhood are kept in the innermost recesses of memory, in a fashion incomprehensible to human understanding; not only are they kept there but they grow in unfathomable depths in the innermost part of the soul, like seed falling upon good soil, and then years later these impressions suddenly push their spring shoots aloft into God's world.' It is clear how this experience, a restriction upon the pleasure derived from the movements of the muscles and upon the erotism of the mucous membranes in those very early days, was of decisive importance for the child's character, determining Tolstoy's life-long, intense detestation of and resistance to any kind of coercion; we learn finally that there is very deep connection between hatred of cruelty and coercion and the experience of such oppression, finally we learn that self-pity is a reaction to coercion experienced.

I can now go a step further and put the matter briefly thus: Just as the suckling or the very young infant learns to love all those who stimulate and satisfy its sexuality, so it learns, on the other hand, to hate all those who in any way interfere with its sexual life, with the full satisfaction of its sexual needs.

This is the deepest root of love and hate and the source of their indissoluble connection. Nature seems after all to have arranged things very strangely, so that the child is bound to become ambivalent towards those who first look after him. He cannot do otherwise, he must love and hate them at the same time, because it is a postulate of

civilization that the child shall be constantly exposed to stimulation and yet denied his sexual desires—especially where the erotism of skin and mucous membrane are concerned. Is not the mother, who may be regarded as the prototype of the child's attendants, constantly compelled to make the child clean, several times a day and in the most sensitive erotogenic zones, the genital and anal regions, thus stimulating the child's love ? She gives him the breast, she puts the bottle or the comforter in his mouth, thus powerfully arousing his oral erotism. On the other hand she must swathe him tightly, perhaps to prevent him scratching himself, and even at a very tender age she must begin to educate him in the control of his bladder and bowels ; she has to prevent the child's uncovering himself and so on and so on—all this arouses hate against every kind of coercion and against the person employing the force. Clearly an ambivalent attitude, the arousal of love and likewise of hate, is unavoidable, even with the most sensible treatment of children ; and of course both must be directed at the outset towards those nearest to them. The fiercest feelings of hate are aroused finally when the suppression of onanism in the infant and young child is undertaken, with its outcome in a real or imagined threat of cutting off the male organ or some penis-symbol.

One cannot but stand amazed at the wisdom of Nature in placing the sexuality of mankind as the centre of man's development, endowing him with a mass of love but also with a capacity for hate such as is given to no other creature. Everything in man is ultimately based upon erotism, from the first breath which he draws to the last that he exhales. The child is placed at the breast and its oral erotism powerfully stimulated. But how often is this source of pleasure absent, because the mother or wet-nurse has too little milk or it is poor in quality. And the child has to exert itself and use its thirsty lips, avid for food and love, to squeeze out with but scant success what should be its unforced birthright. His oral erotism, his impulse to mastery, become forthwith linked with a great hate against all those who would not or could not satisfy his rightful needs.[1]

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[1] Just as in later years no inconsiderable part of the estrangement between father and son is brought about by cessation of the caresses bestowed by him on the child as it grows up. His romping with the little one may indeed lead to many an unseemliness from the strict pedagogical point of view, but it is perhaps necessary in order to cement the love between them which is now threatened by the great danger of the

But even when there is plenty of food for it the mother must wean her babe after a few months, thus bringing about an early castration and severely mortifying the child's primary impulse of mastery. The hunger-strike of many sucklings is a proof of how bitterly they feel this deprivation of their oral erotism, and we learn again that the love and hate of those nearest are not without a physiological foundation. The mother once stimulated the child's sensuousness and now without any reason—from the infant's point of view—deprives him of this source of pleasure ; thus are his anger and hate aroused.

The same holds good of all the customary and unavoidable nursery regulations. At first the child is pleasantly stimulated several times a day by his excretory functions, as well as by the necessary cleansing ; but towards the end of the first year, and still more during the second year, the duty of attending to his wants is laid upon the child himself. He is called upon to ask for the chamber in good time, and if he is lazy about this he is scolded, sometimes even slapped. Not only is he robbed of his auto-erotic gratification, but he is further threatened with a withdrawal of love, this necessarily leading to an attitude of obstinacy and hate against all those who look after him. Thus the tiny child's encounter with love and hate becomes a prototype of our conduct towards those nearest and dearest to us. Freud has shown us that there exist ambivalent feelings between those who most love each other, parents and children, brothers and sisters, husband and wife. But why this should be so was not hitherto known. The explanation seems to me now clear. This has been indicated above, so far as the relationship of children towards their parents is concerned ; but inversely, too, libido is being constantly stimulated and as constantly withheld. Every child knows that his mother takes pleasure in attending upon him and undressing him ; if, for one reason or another, the child is cross, he will not allow his mother to undress him or wash him. The father notices that his wife has more pleasure in looking after her babe than in his caresses, so that he becomes angry, secretly at any rate. And the wife cannot forgive her husband for demanding

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Œdipus complex. It cannot be too often repeated : Love arises only from sexual stimulation, whether purposeful or unintentional, in the very earliest years of life. It often comes to pass in the most harmless ways, for instance, when a father puts his little girl on the chamber or helps the boy to take out his organ. True love only exists in the first five years of life. If we fall passionately in love at a later stage it is only because the object in question is equated to the first true love-object.

her favours as his right, for her desire is just then far greater towards her child. And then the older brothers and sisters find themselves neglected in favour of the new arrival, upon whom they revenge themselves for this loss of love. This does not pass unnoticed by the babe himself, amid the general love and tenderness by which he is surrounded, and he requites this hostility with like feelings. All the same, the close contact of brothers and sisters necessarily leads to occasional sexual stimulation which at least makes possible the beginnings of love.

Experience teaches us that obstinacy and hatred are bound up with anal but not with urethral erotism. What is the cause of this peculiar difference ? Observation of little children will show that their urethral erotism is much more rarely manifested in retention of urine than in frequent and irregular micturition. Retention of urine, apart from direct pathological conditions, such as calculus, blood-clot in the urethra, is rare in childhood and scarcely ever calls for the nurse's assistance. It is otherwise with anal erotism. Retention of fæces, intentional or involuntary, plays a conspicuous part. The fond mother attaches much greater importance to this, too, and often attempts to relieve an inborn tendency to constipation by the use of enemas. The child is far more frequently implored, compelled, to do the big business than he is to do the little one ; the child is, so to say, urged to allow himself to be castrated of the contents of his lower bowel. From this the path leads forth directly to obsessional neurosis and to symbolic castration, both of which our experience has proved to be closely connected with sado-masochism. The concentration of effort upon giving up the bowel-contents arouses much greater hatred than does the attempt to control urethral erotism.

To summarise : the ambivalency of love and hate is explained by the fact that the infant's attendants first very powerfully rouse his sexuality but do not allow the pleasure to continue uninterruptedly ; at a point they are obliged energetically to cry a halt. Partly through withdrawal of the wonted stimulus (oral erotism), partly because of the necessity to sacrifice the anal gratification particularly to the demands of civilization, there is established a permanent link between hate, anal erotism, obsessional neurosis and castration, and of all these with sado-masochism.

Now I am in a position to put it more definitely : whoever hates more than he loves, that is, whoever originally felt more keenly the withdrawal of sexual stimuli than he had felt the positive pleasure these had afforded, will have a tendency to sadism. Sadists are all

vigorous haters. Great hate is actually the preliminary condition of this perversion.[2]

In another aspect sadism is connected, not with the anus, but with the mouth as an erotogenic zone. Freud, as we know, regarded the anal-sadistic as the second pregenital stage. In 1913 I showed, however, that there are two forms of sadism, viz. biting and blood sadism, which are inseparably linked with the first, oral, pregenital phase,[3] particularly when this, as so frequently happens, is constitutionally strong. Given this predisposition, but still more if the flow of milk is unsatisfactory, the infant will pull with all its force, press and squeeze the breast with its little hands, in order to get as much out as possible, will even bite the nipples till they bleed, often giving the mother a great deal of pain. The child would like to incorporate the breast into itself, so to say (there is here a relation to the impulse to mastery), in order to squeeze out as much as possible and further, as later phantasies prove, to bite off the nipples, i.e. castrate them. In this manner oral erotism, too, becomes linked with sadism.

On the other hand, an originally strong genital erotism, which is the rule with urnings, rather tends towards masochism, resulting in the very common combination of this with male inversion. In the enormous sensitivity of all the sexual organs of urnings and of the *membrum virile* of all urethral erotics this painful-pleasurable stimulus is easily produced, resembling that resulting from being washed and cleansed in babyhood, especially if the mother was ' nervous ' or of a violent temperament and rubbed harder than was needful, or when the father in play touched his baby's organ, or again when he or some older brother used to give the little one a ride on his shoulders. When a child darts away from having his genitals washed by his mother, running away in fun from his father, and then finds he must submit to the latter's superior strength, it is very easy for the excessive craving of the sexual organs, so fraught with feelings of voluptuous pain, to become linked with the primary feeling of being in the power of some stronger being ; this again forms the bridge to masochism in the strict sense. I have found the following type of corroboratory evidence

[2] Bismarck once said : ' I must always have someone to love and someone to hate. For love I have my wife, for hate Windthorst ' ; though of course the latter was not Bismarck's only object of hate. He was all his life known as an unusually violent hater.

[3] ' Ueber den Sado-masochistischen Komplex.' *Jahrbuch für psychoanalytischen und psychopathologischen Forschungen*, Bd. V.

among masochists: 'I am in the power of a strong woman' (of course the mother). 'She could do whatever she liked with me, if she wanted to; she could tear or cut off my penis, as my mother once could, but she is kind and does not do it.' It need scarcely be said that all these ideas relate to the infant's absolute helplessness by the side of his mother and the others who look after him, which, as Tolstoy's example shows, can retain its effect throughout life.

These connections seem to me of such great importance that I want to return to them once again. The connection between sado-masochism and castration is nowhere so obvious as in the usages of the nursery. When the mother dries the genitals a little energetically, possibly even rather violently, a child with a certain predisposition will experience both pain and pleasure, the foundation of the perversion in question. The child readily conceives the idea that the mother wishes to rub his genitals away, that is, to castrate him. The incident becomes all the pleasanter in the end, since after all the genitals are not taken away. The original anxiety becomes a stimulating game which his mother is playing with him, so as to afford him the greatest pleasure. Thus the early castration-*dread* becomes transformed into castration-*pleasure*, which is typical of the origin of the latter.

In conclusion, it appears to me that this matter touches upon a difficult problem in education, which needs must follow the natural path and thereby necessarily must awaken hate. Even the most devoted mother must at some time or other wean her child, and the child must be taught to control his bodily functions, and to relinquish onanistic play. And yet we now understand how readily these things, especially if there is a strong inborn erotism, lead to hate, obsessional neurosis and sadism. The more powerful the impulse, the more need of its suppression, but then all the sooner occur the unhappy consequences. And still it is hardly possible to abstain from these demands of civilization. It would almost seem that there is no escape between the Scylla of non-civilization and the Charybdis of a neurosis or perversion. There is nothing for it but to let the child be penetrated ever again and again with feelings of warm love and to endeavour gradually to diminish its hate and the soil upon which it feeds. Is not the best and most approved treatment even for masturbation its positive transference to a love-object? Our whole endeavour must be to induce a child to renounce its faults, its naughtiness, out of love for its parents and not from any educational compulsion.

ABSTRACTS

General

M. Hamblin Smith. Spinoza's Anticipation of Recent Psychological Developments. *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, Part 4, 1925, pp. 257–278.

Every epoch-making hypothesis has had its anticipators, who have groped after the truth without finding it. Freud's theory was, in part, anticipated by Spinoza, whose system, like that of Freud, is based upon a strict determinism. It is this determinism which has been one main cause of the opposition to Spinoza and Freud. Spinoza's system starts with a consideration of the nature of God. But the *Deus* of Spinoza is divested of all anthropomorphism. To Spinoza, ' good ' and ' bad ' are merely human, and relative conceptions. Mind and body are, in Spinoza's view, but two aspects of one reality, and it is to this reality that he gives the name of ' God '. Intellect and will are identical. Spinoza desires to deal with human emotions in a purely scientific spirit, and as conforming to the ordinary laws of nature. Only by thus understanding emotions can we obtain any power to control them. The conceptions of mental conflict and repression, and the distinction between conscious and unconscious desire, are contained in Spinoza's *Ethics*, although he, of course, does not use the terms. Everything endeavours to persist in its own being. For this endeavour, Spinoza uses the term *conatus*, and there is reason to regard this term as preferable to that of *libido*. Spinoza grasps the essential character of the sex instinct, and takes the term ' love ' in a very extended sense, although there are indications that he had not overcome his own sex repressions. He understands the influence of narcissism. And we could not have a better description of the manner in which a repressed desire may be replaced in consciousness by its opposite than that which he gives us. The state of mind which resignedly accepts what is necessary is treated of by Spinoza under the term *amor intellectualis Dei*, and bears a striking resemblance to that which is attained by complete analysis. The whole argument of the final part of the *Ethics* is devoted to the glorification of the ' free ' man, the fully analysed man as we should say. Piety and religion are not, in Spinoza's view, dependent upon an idea of personal immortality, but upon reason.

Author's Abstract.

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Clinical

Bernard Hart. The Development of Psychopathology and its Place in Medicine. *The Lancet*, March 20th, April 3rd, April 17th, 1926.

These are the Goulstonian lectures delivered before the Royal College

of Physicians. The chief aim is directed towards a criticism of the validity of psycho-analysis.

The first lecture traces the history of psychopathology from the days of magic through magnetism, mesmerism, hypnotism, and suggestion.

In lecture II the history is further traced through the schools of Dubois, Dejerine, Janet, etc., to the school of Freud. Most of the second and third lectures deal with a discussion of the Freudian theories. A short but accurate description of the history of psycho-analysis, from the abreaction period to the complicated structure built up in the libido theory, is given.

The question of how far the Freudian doctrines are consonant with the requirements of science is discussed at length. It is of immense importance to ascertain how far the facts observed by Freud justify his conclusions. If Freud is right then his work must be placed amongst the great achievements of the world.

A critical review of the Freudian theories begins with the conception of the unconscious. This is upheld as a justifiable conception to explain phenomena. The criticisms levelled at this conception, by those who denounce it as an absurdity resulting in a contradiction in terms, arise chiefly from a confusion of thought. The unconscious is not a phenomenal reality, but a concept to explain phenomenal reality, just as the ether is to explain the phenomena of light and sound. The question whether Freud's particular conception is valid is another matter. Great emphasis is here attached to whether Freud's conception is based upon accurately observed facts, whether it explains these facts, and whether the deductions which follow from it when tested by experience and experiment can always be verified. These are the only relevant criteria by which Freud's concept can be estimated. It is pointed out that the theories of conflict and repression and their effects on consciousness and behaviour have been widely accepted beyond the limited circle of Freud's orthodox followers, whilst the sexual theories have been the subject of most vigorous attacks and criticisms, but that these are often based on ethical and æsthetic grounds which should have no place or relevancy in positive science. Many of the criticisms are not based upon examination of the facts but have their foundation, too obviously, in prejudice.

Then follows a discussion on narcissism as a widening of the libido theory associated with research into dementia præcox and the psychoneuroses of the war. It is pointed out that the libido theory has been pushed into wider and wider fields, so that Freud's generalization that no neurosis can be present with a normal sexual life might be submerged in a wider one that might run ' without processes having their origin in sexual life the greater part of human activity would cease to exist '.

Justifiable criticism can only concern itself here with two questions :

(1) Are the facts as observed ? (2) Are the concepts built thereon valid ? The first question discloses at once both the strength and the weakness of the psycho-analytic position. Hart takes the contention that anyone who investigates for himself by Freud's method will find the facts observed to be as Freud has stated. It may be accepted that the majority who have done this have confirmed Freud's observations, and this applies to such observers as Jung who have, however, drawn very different conclusions from those facts. Yet the acceptance of the facts has by no means that complete confirmatory significance which it appears to carry at first sight. It is necessary to examine the particular method by which these facts are observed. Until the method as a weapon of investigation has been proved reliable, the value of the facts cannot be determined, even if it can be shown that all users of the method have observed identical phenomena.

A short and inadequate paragraph is devoted to the method of psycho-analysis in which the process of free association is unfortunately described. Thus, the patient talks freely about any subject which occurs to him, avoiding any deliberate attempt to curtail or direct the flow of his associations.

The psycho-analytical theory, it is stated, is based on facts, but they are not obtained by simple observation, the method of psycho-analysis intervenes, and therefore the possibility of distortion cannot be excluded.

The difficulty Hart finds is to be satisfied that the facts observed are not distorted by the method of investigation employed. So long as the distorting factors arise within the patient's own mind the title of facts of observation may be applied. But it is quite a different matter when the flow of thought is influenced by the psycho-analyst. It is not easy to avoid the conclusion that the method of psycho-analysis contains potential sources of distortion. It is stated that objections to the method of psycho-analysis are of a grave character, and make it impossible to accept the contention that Freud's theories are based on facts of observation in the same sense as this term is applied to the other sciences. If this is so the conceptions and theories cannot be solidly constructed. The method must first be proved trustworthy. The claim that an enquirer can convince himself of the validity of the method of psycho-analysis by subjecting himself to analysis can have no weight when the problem at issue is the reliability of the method itself. This may be all right in acquiring the necessary technique and removing resistances which would otherwise distort his judgement of the patient's mental processes.

A number of the more elementary Freudian conceptions and theories, it is stated, are built solidly upon facts which approximate to the standard which science demands. These more elementary conceptions are of the first importance and have thrown more light on the problem of nervous disorders than the work of any other psychopathologist.

Except for the facts of introspection all other psychological facts are inferences. Accordingly the method of psycho-analysis is an imperfect weapon of investigation, and one seriously capable of distorting the facts it elicits. Can the facts elicited by psycho-analysis be confirmed from any other sources ? It is claimed that the therapeutic results do this, but this is the *post hoc ergo propter hoc* kind of argument. This argument has no weight, therefore, and still less has that of the opponents who seek to enumerate the failures. The study of myths and folk-lore is said to be another source of confirmation ; but here again the validity of the conclusions must be doubted because the facts observed in the research are admixed with a multitude of inferred facts. In regard to another field of application, namely, insanity, the evidence is more convincing than in any other, because the influence of the physician is excluded by the nature of the case.

To sum up, the gist of the criticism is that fault is found with the method of psycho-analysis because the facts observed are not facts of observation but inferred facts. This is the whole weakness of the Freudian doctrine, introducing as it does numerous potentialities for distortion. However, many of the simpler conceptions are based on inductions in which both the measure of inference and the possibility of distortion is small. The conclusion is therefore drawn that the theories of Freud do not satisfy the standard demanded by the canons of science. Some approximate very near to that standard. It is a reasonable demand therefore, to ask for every possible means of investigation of the method of psycho-analysis with a view to establishing its validity and eliminating or controlling the sources of error which seem to be inherent in it. In therapeutics it is justifiable to act on hypotheses which lack full or perhaps any scientific validity. Medicine has always claimed this right in a liberal measure. The principle must therefore be applied to the sanctioning of such therapeutic measures as psycho-analysis until they can be given or denied a sure place in our professional armoury.

Warburton Brown.

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Trigant Burrow. Psychiatry as an Objective Science. *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, Vol. V, Part 4, 1925, pp. 298–309.

The accuracy of all scientific observation depends upon a common accord of sense perceptions among the observers. This is shown upon analysis to be really the essence of a common agreement in terms. But we are accustomed to employ one mode of evaluation within the realm of objective phenomena and a quite different mode within the sphere of our subjective images. In the field of psychiatry, in which habitually personal feelings become the materials of an objective enquiry, we fail to apply the exact methods appropriate to the scientific laboratory of objective observa-

tion. Psychopathologists are too involved in their own subjective moods to observe them scientifically. In the clinic the emotional state of the patient is regarded as an isolated manifestation. But a consensual laboratory observation of emotional states requires the recognition by the observers *subjectively* of identical emotional states within themselves. The present subjective confusion of psychiatry obscures a clear objective evaluation of its material. In order that emotions be demonstrated there must be the conditions of observation that preclude the private prejudices of the observer. A social consensus of observers is the requisite basis for conscious stabilized observation within the field of psychiatry.

Author's Abstract.

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L. Pierce Clark. A Psycho-Analytic Introduction to a Study of the Disorders of Lethargic Encephalitis. *Medical Journal and Record,* May 5th, 19th, and June 2nd, 1926.

Three lectures read before the New York Neurological Society with the object of showing that the conduct disorders following an attack of Encephalitis Lethargica are of a psychogenic nature and amenable to treatment by psycho-analysis in some cases. A plan for the treatment of these cases is outlined.

Owing to the progress of psychopathology in the past decade we find two distinct lines of research. The older has perfected our comprehension of the transference neuroses, makes more plain their genetic origin and gives us a more secure and lasting therapy. The other line of research is a more venturesome effort to resolve the ego neuroses into their component origins, and even to approximate some means of direct handling of organic disease supposedly based on functional or constitutional defect.

In this latter field there are two methods of approach. The first is to recognize that there is an array of functional disturbances present as in disorders of motility, circulatory disturbances and the like. The aim has been to reduce these syndromes to their supposed psychogenic origin for amelioration or cure. It is an attempt to comprehend neurotic disorders upon a neurological or biological basis.

The second method recognizes the physical disorders as entities, but looks upon such sick persons as possessing far graver disorders of character and personality of which the immediate and pressing syndromes are but a part of their real disorder. To accept functional and constitutional disorders as organic neuroses which are slightly removed or more deeply set into the structural pattern than the now more definitely outlined narcissistic neuroses, requires only a little more courage than was shown by Freud and his co-workers a few decades ago when they rescued the transference neuroses from the category of organic disease.

Perhaps we shall make more rapid progress in understanding these

so-called functional or true neuroses as well as many constitutional diseases, even such as tuberculosis and arterio-sclerosis, by a more careful analysis of the ego neuroses and their narcissistic fixations. The latter can be best understood only by a painstaking analysis of the derivations of character in the infantile period.

From the reaction-formations induced by the educational repression of the instincts we may infer the influence in all adult living and any direct testimony of their objective or subjective dominance will be doubly welcome.

The final admixture of instincts and their repression which form character in its broadest sense will be the next attack for understanding behaviour as well as all life-reactions independent of immediate social adaptations. This study then has been primarily undertaken with a desire to advance our understanding of the ego neuroses and finally so-called organic disease.

There is no evidence that the residual lesion left in encephalitis lethargica cases has any direct bearing upon the conduct syndrome as such, any more than the occurrence of this neurosis in general is caused by an organic lesion. What then is the causal relationship between the organic lesion and its neurotic sequela ? The lesion has to be looked upon as one that singularly wounds the psyche and personality of the victim, not in a somatic and physiological sense but in a psychological one.

Hollós and Ferenczi have shown that even in a disease like general paresis the mental symptoms are for a great part to be explained by the idea of the lesion acting as a sort of release of unconscious and repressed instinctive forces.

In encephalitis the sequential conduct disorders do not differ essentially from the neurotic disorders where no such lesions occur. There is no sustained ratio between cerebral lesions and psychic symptoms. It is stated (Southard) that dementia is as marked in cases showing no cerebral lesion as in those presenting it. Renewed efforts are nevertheless being made to bridge the gap between neural and psychic patterns upon an organic basis. But even Sherrington is frank in saying he at present sees no possible bridge.

The main difficulty in any thorough analysis up to the present is that this conduct disorder is an ego neurosis and incapable of ordinary transference or else the transference is too slender and unstable for a complete analysis. In psycho-analytic terms these conduct disorders are none other than acute narcissistic neuroses organically conditioned. The anal and oral erotic behaviours in these conduct disorders are glaringly manifest in post-encephalitic adolescents.

The psychical symptoms are defect symptoms and irritations directly resulting from the somatic process. The conduct disorders are a special

form of cerebral pathoneurosis in which the ego organ, the brain, is injured. The excess of libido complement (narcissism) which has been mobilized to drive the ego to accomplish or fulfil its functions breaks down the adaptations of the pre-encephalitic state. Regression is therefore brought about to earlier modes of behaviour and stages of development more or less successfully passed. The ego libido is the part singularly deeply wounded in encephalitis. As the lethargic state disappears the conduct disorders put in an appearance in proportion as the totality of libido egoistically or objectively is withdrawn from the previous living activities. As the lethargy passes away the neurasthenic symptoms are quickly transformed into hypochondriacal symptoms physically manifested most usually in the field of ambition or ego outlets.

When a patient makes use of a narcissistic transference there is marked alleviation of many of the mental and conduct disorders. If the storing up of narcissistic libido in the ego functions surpasses its utilization it must be mastered psychically (endured or repressed by effort of will). If this is insufficient the patient suffers from conduct disorders. The periodic stages of lethargy may possibly be a secondary effort at compensation, acting as a sort of miniature psychic reverberation of the shock of the original lesion or a re-enactment of its affect comparable to a repetition compulsion physically shown in the post-traumatic neuroses. That the ego organ is deeply wounded is shown by the oral and anal erotism (sadism) which almost invariably obtrudes in every severe case of encephalitis.

If in the encephalitic injury certain specific structures are destroyed, and if self-observation sends reports to the ego nucleus that bodily processes as well as important psychic functions have been enduringly damaged, the ego nucleus reacts in dejection and despair if not in an actual psychoneurosis. If adjustment cannot take place at this level regression occurs, and the most primitive activities are indulged in.

Comparatively few of the gross number of encephalitics present enduring conduct disorders or psychoses. Either the previous ego development has been comparatively sound or the injury has not grossly wounded those structures which disable so profoundly the ego ideal. When however the lesion injures those structures immediately subtending the psychic processes of conscious adaptation, the cortex and thalamic subcortical structures, then the narcissistic libido creeps after these conditions even more regressively until the juvenile or even infantile behaviours are called into action. All past stages of erotic and libido organizations are revived. They are inclined towards incest, homosexuality, exhibitionism, sadism and masochism in all degrees. Those encephalitics in whom the narcissistic type is over-pronounced will bear the disease process quite differently from the transference type.

Empirical rules of types and the degrees of structural damage to brain

tissue give some clues to prognosis. It is largely a question of how suddenly and completely the disorganization of the ego nucleus and its correlated structures takes place, as to whether we have a unity in the disorganization of the total conduct or not.

Two cases are given of a girl of ten and a man of twenty-five whose conduct became completely altered after an attack of encephalitis. The first case was treated by psycho-analytic re-education and greatly improved after some months of treatment although she had been abnormal for three years. The young man at the time of the report had had three weeks only of psycho-analytic treatment which showed a very strong mother-fixation at the oral phase of libido development.

'Clinical and theoretical data allow me to postulate that the conduct disorder of post-encephalitis lethargica is an ego (narcissistic) neurosis which may be studied not only objectively and managed more understandingly than in the past, but that it is not inaccessible to psycho-analytical investigation.'

Warburton Brown.

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Donald E. Core. Some Clinical Aspects of Certain Emotions. *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 1925, Vol. V, p. 310.

This paper is an attempt to correlate certain psychical phenomena with groups of clinical symptoms and to assess the biological value of functional nervous diseases. An emotional tone indicates the reaction of an organism to its surroundings, emotionalism being characteristic of either harmony or discord. This dual aspect has an important bearing on the genesis of certain clinical states. It is pointed out that an acute difference exists between reproduction and flight when considered from various standpoints. The emotion of tenderness never has a sudden conscious onset and its maximum period is maintained for some time. Fear, on the contrary, has a sudden onset, and its maximum intensity is attained immediately and rapidly declines. The mental state of the animal, when afraid, is one of confusion, but in the case of the tender emotion, one of concentration on a specific object. The emotions are further compared in relation to the re-inducibility of the emotion and the state of the animal in the intervals. The value of emotional control is contrasted. In the case of reproduction this may be harmful, whereas in fear, the value is reinforced by control. In considering *psychical dissociation* the author thinks that a terrifying experience subjected to amnesia, is always re-experienced *de novo*, as far as the empirical ego is concerned. The associated emotionalism eventually disappears unless the initial experience recurs. The degree of amnesia developed varies according to the amount of conscious attention at the time, the confusion of the animal varying with this. If the experience recurs in similar form a similar somatic response will occur. This response will tend

to become habitual with progressive lessening of the emotional intensity, becoming of great use to the animal. Should there be no amnesia, the ultimate exhaustion of the emotional tone leads to a de-emotionalized attitude of the animal to the incident. In the case quoted, of a cat who, when her kittens were removed, transferred her affection to the survivor of a previous litter, the emotional tone is connected more with the somatic state of the mother than with the development of the offspring. Psychical dissociation always accompanies an emotional incident unless such an incident is necessarily associated with gross anatomical alterations.

Comparing the human with the non-human animal, Core emphasizes the ability of man to recall terrifying experiences in pictorial memory and to ' control ' his behaviour. In the human species, the fundamental difference is that psychical dissociation is not required for effective experiences. It is suggested that defective development of emotional control in man enables psychical dissociation to occur as in the case of hysteria ; this constitutes psychical regression to a non-human type, and this dissociation is normal in childhood. Because emotional control is a recent acquisition its development may be irregular. During its development strongly felt emotion becomes separated from conative activity. Core bases his explanation of the ' terror neurosis ' on this assumption. The terror neuroses become the converse of the retrograde neuroses ; instead of amnesia for terrifying experiences, there is a concentration of control which ultimately breaks down. These ' instinct distortion ' neuroses are considered to be progressive as distinct from the regressive hysterical neuroses. The ' neurosis of unsatisfied desire ' is also included in this progressive group and these two disabilities serve to illustrate the clinical duality of emotionalism. The term ' dysthymia ' is coined for these instinct distortion neuroses. The two groups are also referred to as ' centrifugal ' and ' centripetal '. Core states that functional pain is always associated with rising blood pressure and that the combination of the two postulates the existence of dread. He distinguishes this group from the toxic neuroses exhibiting symptoms dependent upon a sympathetic nervous system. Emotionalism is divided into two clinical groups, centripetal (emotions concerned with reproduction) and centrifugal (self-preservation). Abnormalities in the sphere of dread are included in Core's memory or memoneurosis. Having discussed psychopathology under his own clinical headings and terminology, the author gives an example of a case of agoraphobia genuinely hysterical in its inception. He states that no psycho-analysis could unearth the ' memory ' of the initial incident because it was not at the time registered in pictorial memory. He thinks, however, that an approximately accurate conception of the incident might be gained through auto-suggestion. Core appears to believe that amnesia depends on non-registration of responsible experiences rather than upon repression. The

phobias, according to this view, would depend upon habitual action and not upon an experience registered in pictorial memory which has become dissociated and capable of a recall. He admits that certain cases have been relieved and even cured by psycho-analysis but thinks that in these cases the disagreeable experience has been registered in pictorial memory and has been so forcibly repressed that its revival is impossible unless the patient is assisted.

Robert M. Riggall.

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CHILDHOOD

Mary Chadwick. Education of the Educationist. *Journal of Proceedings Child Study Society*, Vol. V, 1926.

This paper was read before the education section of the British Psychological Society, June, 1925. The term educationist is here used in its wider sense to embrace all those who by design or propinquity exercise some influence over the children with whom they come in contact. It is shown to be a process laid down as stratification, the lowest layer of which is the basic formative influence of the mother; later phases represent the repetitive faculty of the child, and his or her reactions to the behaviour of those who are engaged in the operation of 'bringing up children', by means of imitation or reaction-formation, both of which enter into the construction of the ego-ideal.

The question of suitable preparation for the educationist, amateur or professional, is a problem of immense difficulty, because, more often than not, no thought is taken of the unconscious mind and unconscious processes, nor of the functions of these, as far as they affect the behaviour or reactions of the children, or that the influence of the unconscious mind and its processes are also strongly operative where the opinions and reactions of the teacher are concerned. This is a serious blank in the training of the educationist.

The educationist shows a greater willingness to study the child rather than him or herself. He often identifies himself with the children, to the extent of promulgating what might be called a Peter Pan doctrine, joining hands with the more rebellious pupils in the school in order to set aside the idea of authority and leadership and to erect in its place the standard of equality and fraternity. This standard must be rooted deeply in the personal psychology of the teacher, for it is followed blindly and eagerly, without any suggestion on the part of teachers that harmful results could possibly accrue from the method.

A short survey of the reasons which have lead to the adoption of the educational profession follows, illustrated from notes taken from psycho-analytic investigation of two persons, showing how one little girl took teaching as her ideal, in order to be able to pass on to others knowledge

that had been denied to herself ; and the causes underlying a man's choice in becoming a schoolmaster of boys ranging from nine to thirteen.

Author's Abstract.

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Mary Chadwick. Trials of the Little Child. *Maternity and Child Welfare,* March and May, 1926.

These two articles form the first two numbers of a series showing the many unnecessary trials that small children are forced to endure by the ' thoughtlessness ' of the grown-up persons who have charge of them.

They deal with questions such as the undue hurrying of tiny children, to keep pace with the long stride of the adult, not only literally and physically, but also psychologically.

Author's Abstract.

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Barbara Low. Education and Mental Health. *National Health,* May, 1926, Vol. XVIII, pp. 411–413.

This article, based upon a course of lectures for teachers given in London during February and March, 1926, begins by pointing out the striking difference between the creative energy and free emotion of the very young child and the human being's later development, which so normally is characterized by loss of capacity and mental activity. It goes on to ask what explanation can be found and what method of education, if any, can be adopted to effect some more advantageous condition of affairs. An explanation, one at least which covers many of the problems involved, is to be found by a psycho-analytic study of the individual, and by the same process guidance is afforded towards a more productive educational system. Two main considerations are then dealt with : first, the effect of unconscious emotions (carried over from the family relationships) operating between pupil and teacher : secondly, the influence of these emotions on intellectual development. Without understanding on the teacher's part, it is impossible even to recognize the child's psychic situation, much less deal with it in any profitable manner. Further, the teacher's own unconscious trends are profoundly significant for the child, and may be helping to strengthen the latter's difficulties. Examples illustrating this are the teacher's helplessness in face of the pupil's ' stupidity ' or ' slowness', which is regarded as an intellectual defect, the emotional causation being entirely unrealized : or, again, the teacher's own unconscious guilt which may make the question of exercising authority so difficult a one that he reacts either by tyranny or by putting himself on a level with his pupil. The immense gain in the development of a real science of teaching when psycho-analytic knowledge is available is pointed out, since without it we are unable to reach the whole personality Finally, the importance of adequate equipment for the teacher in

the shape of psycho-analytic understanding is emphasized, not at all in order to enable the teacher to analyse his pupils, either within or without the class-room, but to give him comprehension, at least to some degree, of the child's inner situation, and ability to perceive when the need for a skilled analysis arises.

Author's Abstract.

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Mary Chadwick. Rudimentary Forms of Self-expression prior to Speech. *Journal of Proceedings Child Study Society.* Vol. IV, 1924, (Published 1925.)

When we come to investigate the earliest ways in which a child establishes contact with the outer world we are forced to recognize that it makes use of various means of communication with others long before it becomes proficient in the use of human speech. These forms will be found, speaking broadly, to be of two kinds, those typical of all children at certain stages of their development, as well as representative of different cultural levels in the history of civilization, and those peculiar to individual children ; thus, besides the general forms which may be found approximately in all children, it is by no means seldom that we find some children departing from the customs of their contemporaries or even family forms in use among brothers and sisters, and establishing particular methods of their own.

The paper gives with some considerable detail descriptions of the pre-speech methods of four children in whose early days such individual methods of communication were in use, and attempting at the same time to trace the causes leading to their adoption. It was clear that this individualistic method was nearly always used as a secret language or love-bond between the child and a beloved parent or nurse and was relinquished with difficulty proportionate to the degree of satisfaction it had formerly provided. The results of these peculiar methods of pre-speech communication were many and various, good and bad. Frequently they gave rise to subsequent difficulties and neurotic symptoms, but occasionally seemed to predict talent of which the future would probably see the maturity, especially in those cases where drawing was a favourite means of expression, or when musical harmonies and rhythm represented emotional experience and feelings beyond the capacity of language at command of the child at the time.

An attempt to acquire two languages at the same time seems constantly to lead to confusion and a sense of unreality of things or of the meaning of all words. This probably is connected with the child's frequent identification of the word and the object for which it stands and its habit of bestowing a concrete value upon words, one which the adult has already lost.

These rudimentary forms of self-expression in use among children are equally prevalent among savage tribes and primitive peoples ; formerly the strange shapes on curtains and pottery once told their own tale, as surely as the interwoven lines of colour upon the Highland tartans recorded the complicated intermarriages of ancestral clans.

The attitude adopted by the child towards the acquisition of speech is the key-note of its character, and we can also watch in this process the formative influence of the child's first teacher upon its individuality. Usually the child learns the rudiments of speech from its mother or her surrogate the nurse, and this first language always plays an important part. *The Mother-tongue* is a familiar expression, as general as that of *Father-land*, and brings with it an echo of the primitive mother who in her laments or cradle-songs transmits the language and history of her own race to the next generation.

Author's Abstract.

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Rachel Stutsman. Tests for Children of Pre-School Age. *Genetic Psychology Monographs*, Vol. I, No. 1, January, 1926.

Here we have clear evidence of the amount of influence that may be exerted upon children subjected to psychological tests at an early age. The children vary in age from 18 to 71 months. It is difficult to see that much real scientific interest can be attached to a research of this kind when we read in the pages of the book itself statements such as the following : ' As long as the examiner was able to maintain an attitude of delight and interest in the tests, there was no difficulty in inducing it in the child,' and ' children as a rule enjoy answering the questions, if they are given with skill by the examiner, who should be, at least apparently, bubbling over with enthusiasm for the " game." ' We feel that it is more an investigation of the suggestive influence of the examiners than any true test of the child's performance ability. It seems scarcely to be wondered that many of the children indulged in ' tantrums ' during the tests or threw the apparatus on the floor when we are told that tests were continued for as long as 30 to 45 minutes. A young child should not be expected to concentrate upon one thing for such a long span of time.

M. Chadwick.

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Mary Chadwick. Mental Investigation of Children. *The Child*, May 1925, Vol. XVI, No. 8.

It would be well to consider the consequence of the mental investigation of children which takes place either in laboratories for experimental psychology, behaviour clinics, or at schools, where the teachers practise their own version of psycho-analysis, called variously psych-analysis, ped-

analysis, or simply new psychology, upon them, or even in the still more prevalent forms of child inquisition known as ' intelligence tests.'

These methods may be used by those who are skilled in their use and application, or by clumsy beginners, or again, by those who have never taken the trouble seriously to train for the intricate task ; hundreds of children are subjected to this investigation entirely without consideration what results may follow or even whether it is possible that harmful results can arise. This paper points out that the consequences are in all probability harmful, giving reasons why this should be so, for the psychological well-being of the child, and it calls attention to the fact that it might be as well if some steps were taken to inquire into the amount of injury so caused, to rectify this when it has been found, and, if necessary or possible, to limit this investigation to those who are really qualified to carry it out.

Author's Abstract.

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Mary Chadwick. The Psychological Dangers of Tight Clothing in Childhood. *National Health*, May, Vol. XVIII, No. 200.

The harmfulness, from the psychological standpoint, of tight clothing in little children is seldom explained. Here it is shown that short and tight clothing is both cold and uncomfortable, especially of course in winter, and is bad for the temper of the child, as well as having a more serious aspect. The child will avoid play, any unnecessary movement, as well as being the recipient of affection on the part of others which involves being lifted up, because of the additional discomfort caused by restricting clothing ; it then earns the character of being bad-tempered, or lacking in affection by the adults, who never notice the red marks on its limbs made by the harmful but fashionable elastic. Psychological causes underlying the mother's vanity connected with the child's smart appearance, and the possible cause of fondness for childish bare limbs, are the subject of further remarks, as well as the danger that may follow from the extreme tightness causing undue pressure upon the external genitals of boy or girl, overstimulating these parts, and so increasing the tendency to infantile masturbation and creation of morbid phantasies.

Author's Abstract.

BOOK REVIEWS

Collected Papers, Vol. IV. By Sigmund Freud, M.D., LL.D. Authorized Translation under the supervision of Joan Riviere. (Hogarth Press and The Institute of Psycho-Analysis, London, 1925. Pp. 508. Price 21*s*.)

This volume, which constitutes No. 10 of the International Psycho-Analytical Library, completes the present edition of Freud's Collected Papers in their English form; an event upon which all concerned—editor, supervisor, translators, publishers, and, last but not least, all English-speaking students of psycho-analysis—are heartily to be congratulated. The publication of this well-arranged and scholarly translation of practically all Freud's shorter papers should constitute an event of real importance for the history of psychology in English-speaking countries.

As in the case of first and second volumes, the translations have been carried out by various hands, but all collaborators appear to have conscientiously and for the most part successfully endeavoured to preserve the characteristics which, though not easy to define, are nevertheless important elements of the total effect produced by Freud's writings, and which perhaps more than anything else seem to afford the reader some fascinating insight into the nature and qualities of a most remarkable mind.

The twenty-four papers contained in this volume are divided into two main groups, headed respectively: 'Papers on Metapsychology' and 'Papers on Applied Psycho-Analysis.' As is well known in psycho-analytical circles (but probably very little as yet outside these circles), Freud uses the term 'Metapsychology' in a special technical sense to denote the theoretical treatment of a psychological problem in terms of the topography, economics and dynamics of the processes concerned—but in practice, as Freud himself admits (p. 114), in the present state of our knowledge such a treatment can only be given at 'isolated points.' Probably for this reason there is a tendency to use the term for any serious theoretical discussion along psycho-analytical lines, even when the topographical, economic and dynamic aspects are not separately treated or explicitly formulated, as is to a certain extent the case with some of the earlier essays included in this section. Indeed, in view of the use that has so far been made of it, it seems doubtful whether the term is really required and still more doubtful whether it is really appropriate. This latter doubt is evidently shared by the editor, who suggests in his preface to this volume that the word is 'perhaps not too happily chosen.' To the present reviewer the chief arguments against the term seem to be (1) that it has already been used by recent authors in another sense, i.e. to designate what is more usually known as 'Psychical Research'; (2) that, as under-

stood by Freud, Metapsychology does not—as the word inevitably suggests—stand in the same relation to Psychology as Metaphysics stands to Physics. Metapsychology, in Freud's sense, is perfectly legitimate psychological theory. All science demands the erection of working hypotheses, and the psycho-analyst, in using Freud's ' topographical ' or ' economic ' conceptions as such hypotheses, is no more guilty of passing beyond the boundaries of his own appointed territory within the sphere of natural science than is the physicist when he makes use of, say, the undulatory theory of light.

Readers of this JOURNAL are already familiar with the main ideas expounded in many of the more recent papers contained in this volume through the admirable summaries contained in Dr. Ernest Jones' paper on ' Recent Advances in Psycho-Analysis ' (Vol. I, p. 161). There is therefore no necessity to deal with the content of these papers here. Among the ' metapsychological ' papers this applies to all except the two first, entitled respectively ' Formulations Regarding the Two Principles in Mental Functioning,' and ' A Note on the Unconscious in Psycho-Analysis.' The first of these is a presentation of the distinction between the Pleasure Principle and the Reality Principle, while the second briefly describes the distinction between the *Ucs.*, *Pcs.*, and *Cs.*, and it is interesting as being, so far as the present writer is aware, the only one of Freud's papers originally written in English, having appeared in the Special Medical Supplement of the Proceedings of the (British) Society for Psychical Research in 1912.

The remaining papers of this group deal with ' Narcissism ' (we note that the translators, in common with other English writers, have not adopted the abbreviated form, corresponding to ' Narcissmus,' as employed by Freud in German), ' Instincts and their Vicissitudes,' ' Repression, ' The Unconscious ', ' Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams ', and ' Mourning and Melancholia '. A note attached to one of these papers informs us that the last five of the above are fragments of material which the author originally intended to publish in book form under the title ' Preliminary Material for a Metapsychological Theory '. This is tantalizing news. A consistent theoretical exposition from Professor Freud's pen would constitute a most fascinating work, one that would appeal especially to the pure psychologist, who—unlike the majority of practising psycho-analysts—has been much puzzled in his attempts to place psycho-analytical doctrine in its correct relationship to ' pre-analytic ' psychology. But we must console ourselves with the thought that as the modest title of the intended book (' Preliminary Material ') seems to indicate, Freud never intended to give us more than the rough outlines of a theory, outlines which—here as elsewhere—he was prepared to alter ruthlessly whenever new facts or deeper insight appeared to invite alteration. Psycho-analysts have taught that the increasing adaptation of

thought to things that is implied in the advance of science necessitates an increasing tolerance of that unpleasant tension constituted by uncertainty. In this matter Freud has practised what his school has preached. In the present state of our knowledge no completely harmonious, consistent and well-rounded body of psycho-analytical theory is possible, unless we allow *a priori* speculation to lead us far beyond the ascertained facts. No such body of theory is here attempted, hence these essays—highly illuminating and suggestive as they must surely be to all readers—will prove (and have indeed already proved) profoundly disappointing to those who are looking for clarity and consistency of general theory rather than for a means of illuminating and linking up the facts immediately before us. This latter task permits theory to advance only slightly beyond the relevant facts—facts with which it must never be out of touch. Hence, in such theorizing as this task permits it may even happen that our theoretical constructions (at best only in the nature of temporary scaffolding) at different points may appear unrelated or even inconsistent. This is, of course, intensely unsatisfying, but it is no part of the business of science to produce philosophic or æsthetic gratification by the erection and contemplation of elaborate *a priori* schemes. Scientific theorizing, like analytic treatment, demands a not inconsiderable degree of abstinence from those who would gain the full advantages to be derived from it.

The second group of papers comprise no less than sixteen communications of very varying lengths and on very varying subjects. Some of the most important of these also have been dealt with in Dr. Jones' paper already referred to, notably the very illuminating series of contributions on the ' Psychology of Love ', and the paper on ' Some Character Types met with in Psycho-Analytic Work ', while two others (' One of the Difficulties of Psycho-Analysis ' and ' Dreams and Telepathy ') have already appeared in this JOURNAL in full. Of the remainder, three deal principally with the application of psycho-analysis to the psychological problems of literature. These are ' The Relation of the Poet to Day-Dreaming ', ' The Theme of the Three Caskets ', and ' The Uncanny '. The first of these is general in nature, while the latter two, as their titles indicate, deal with specific themes or specific material. These are both brilliant examples of the way in which psycho-analytic conclusions throw light upon the problems of literary creation and appreciation and receive in turn corroboration and extension from literary sources. The first of this pair starts with a consideration of the celebrated choice of caskets in ' The Merchant of Venice ', and leads us in the end, unexpectedly enough, to the human attitude towards death, and the psychical relationship between the ideas of death and love. The second illustrates the ' uncanny ' (*das Unheimliche*) chiefly from the works of Hoffmann, and shows that the feeling of the uncanny is connected with the stirrings of some repressed com-

plex or of some superseded mode of thought. This paper also deals to some extent with philological material, showing how opposite meanings may be conveyed by the same word, a theme which is dealt with more systematically in another paper—' On the Antithetical Sense of Primal Words '—a discussion of a pamphlet by the philologist, Karl Abel, published in 1884. The two papers entitled respectively ' A Childhood Recollection from *Dichtung und Wahrheit* ' and ' A Neurosis of Demoniacal Possession in the Seventeenth Century ' are very striking demonstrations of the application of clinical knowledge to the elucidation of biographical material; while two further papers, ' The Occurrence in Dreams of Material from Fairy Tales ' and ' A Mythological Parallel to a Visual Obsession ', deal with the relation between dreams or symptoms on the one hand and folkloristic material on the other. One paper on ' The Moses of Michelangelo ' was originally published anonymously in ' *Imago* '. Although marked by Freud's characteristic insight and powers of observation, it differs from all the other papers in this volume in that but little use is made of the material discoveries of psycho-analysis as distinct from certain formal aspects of psycho-analytic procedure, such as attention to apparently insignificant detail ; the ground is prepared for a strictly analytic examination of a fascinating problem of æsthetics, but the contribution ends in a somewhat disappointing manner just as the reader expects that this examination will begin. Finally, in ' Thoughts for the Times on War and Death ', Freud advances some general considerations on individual and social psychology which lose none of their interest on being read now some years after the conclusion of the great struggle in the midst of which they were penned. In its calm but yet sympathetic dignity this paper recalls vividly many of the poignant features of that terrible ordeal. But, unlike the contemporary writings of certain other authors on the same theme, its scientific impartiality is nowhere disfigured by the prejudices which the vast majority, even of scientifically-trained minds, found it impossible to resist.

The volume concludes with two most useful features—a chronological list of all Freud's papers included in the present collection, together with his books, and a lengthy index to the whole of the four volumes, compiled by Dr. Douglas Bryan.

These are volumes which every serious investigator of the human mind should possess and study.

J. C. F.

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Psycho-Analysis for Normal People. By Geraldine Coster, B.Litt. Oxon., Principal of Wychwood School, Oxford. (Oxford University Press, 1926. Pp. 232. Price 2*s.* 6*d.*)

In an accompanying pamphlet the publishers state that ' The body of

theory that centres round the names of Dr. Freud and Dr. Jung has been interpreted of recent years with a degree of hysterical partisanship that has tended to alienate the very people whom it should interest. Miss Coster's object throughout has been to maintain an attitude of sane common sense and to examine patiently and fairly the central theme of Psycho-analysis '. How many readers of this statement would suspect that the two modes of exposition referred to differ merely in that one is based on knowledge and investigation of the subject whereas the other dispenses with any such formality ? When we ask what qualification Miss Coster has for expounding this abstruse subject we are astonished to read in the preface an expression of her grateful acknowledgements to Dr. Good, of Littlemore Asylum, ' to whose patient and generous teaching I owe such understanding as I possess of the theory and practice of psycho-analysis '. It may be said at once that the expectations thus aroused are fully confirmed on reading the book.

The author begins with a repudiation of the idea that psycho-analysis is confined to the method introduced by Freud. No such distinction is permissible, in her opinion, between all the various schools of thought who choose to appropriate the term psycho-analysis, ' for Freud's term was in general use to designate all schools of the subject long before the effort to restrict it had been made '. This is an extremely misleading way of saying that Freud's term referred to psycho-analysis alone before other schools existed to exploit it.

The book needs no detailed criticism here, for the simple reason that it deals hardly at all with the subject of psycho-analysis. Actually it consists of a very superficial talk on various psychological topics, such as fear, the ' power instinct ', sexual enlightenment, and so on. The word ' unconscious ' is mentioned now and then, but obviously there is no appreciation of its significance, if even of its real existence. The essence of the book is on a purely conscious level. On this level the author is a very kindly and well-intentioned, if ill-informed, mentor, and her book will doubtless provide a pleasing syrup to a large class of people. In fact, it would be a quite helpful volume if only all reference to psycho-analysis had been omitted and the misleading impression avoided that the reader will learn anything about that subject from it. We recommend that this quite slight alteration be made in a future edition.

E. J.

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Instinct. A Study in Social Psychology. By L. L. Bernard, Professor of Sociology, University of Minnesota. (George Allen & Unwin, London. Pp. 550. Price 15*s*.)

Another of the American attacks on the use of ' instinct ' in psychology. The author has carried out a very considerable amount of literary research

into the various ways in which this term is employed, and has shown (as was to be expected) that the usage of different writers is extremely divergent. His own position is that instinct should be regarded as ' an inborn (in the sense of inherited) activity process which has remained intact, that is, which has not been remade through the process of learning or of making new adjustments by means of the substitution of new stimuli or responses for the old which were inherited ' (p. 84). From this point of view he criticizes both the connotation and the denotation of ' instinct ' as found in many other writers and has no difficulty in showing that many of the actions that these writers regard as instinctive are not innately organized but are in the nature of habits acquired through experience. In the course of this demonstration there is much interesting discussion and review of detailed points, and the reader is made to realize very vividly the extremely loose and varied way in which the term ' instinct ' is currently employed. Nevertheless, as regards the main issue, this elaborate proof of the presence of acquired elements in so-called instinctive behaviour does not seem a very profitable undertaking, since the authors concerned obviously hold, explicitly or implicitly, a very different view of instinct to that adopted by Professor Bernard. The real point at issue is, surely, not so much what is inherited and what acquired as what is the relative justification and value of two very different views of instinct : (1) the narrower view which would confine the term to innately organized and unmodified simple reactions of the stimulus-response pattern and (2) the wider view according to which an instinctive tendency may seek satisfaction through a whole succession of different and often complex actions, most of which have been acquired or at any rate modified through experience. Nowhere in this book does Professor Bernard get seriously to grips with this latter problem ; he does not attempt for instance to deal with McDougall's more recent vindications of the wider view, in spite of the fact that he obviously regards McDougall as one of the leading upholders of what seems to him a most erroneous and unscientific attitude.

The general view of instinct which Professor Bernard combats is the view that is held also by psycho-analysts, whom in this matter he regards as being ' hopelessly at sea without line or compass '. He does not however deal specifically with psycho-analysis in this book, as he has already done so in a previous paper on ' Instinct and the Psycho-analysts ' in the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology* for 1923 (abstracted in this JOURNAL, Vol. V, p. 202).

In view of the growing number of psychologists (nearly all American) who tend, like the present author, to narrow down the meaning of ' instinct ' till it becomes practically synonymous with ' reflex ' (it seems to be admitted that what Professor Bernard regards as instincts are ' among the reflexes or chains of reflexes '—p. 300, or ' are in reality reflexes '—p. 372), it looks

as though the issues at stake are destined to play a most important part in the history of psychology in the near future. There seems little doubt as to which side the psycho-analyst will join in this dispute. With regard to the general bearing of psycho-analytical theory upon the questions involved, the present reviewer need add nothing to what he has already said in dealing with another recent book of similar tendency—Professor Josey's *Social Philosophy of Instinct* (reviewed in this JOURNAL, Vol. V, p. 232).

J. C. F.

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Instinct, Intelligence and Character. By Godfrey H. Thomson. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1924. Pp. 282.)

This book consists of a series of lectures which were delivered at the Teachers' College, Columbia University, in 1923–4. As is so often the case in a book which has this origin, it ranges widely and deals in a fresh and stimulating way with the various topics raised. It touches upon a number of controversial subjects, but takes these perhaps too easily and lightly. This is particularly so in the sections which are of special interest to the readers of this JOURNAL. The chapter on repression and sublimation is led up to by the earlier general discussions of instinct. Professor Thomson emphasizes throughout the great plasticity of the instincts in man and the vast significance of the learning process, and he conceives the problem of sublimation in these terms. In attempting to explain repression and sublimation he develops the analogy of the water drainage system very fully and forcibly. His general attitude to psycho-analytical theory is sympathetic and undisturbed, but his broad eclecticism and readiness to see the significance of the psycho-analytical contribution to the theory of instincts in relation to education is a shade undiscriminating. Professor Thomson is untechnical not only in the sense of writing clearly and simply and popularly, but in the sense of being himself vague about the terms he uses and the detailed facts he describes, as in the following passage (p. 157): 'From another point of view, however, man's superiority is in the greater plasticity of his instincts, and the emotional drives associated with them, so that they can be directed away from the bestial gutters in which their untrammelled course would lie, into other channels. And so began in man the conflict of good and evil, for while the primordial path of expression of an instinct cannot be either blameworthy or praiseworthy in a beast of the field which can respond in no other way, in man the channels into which instincts are diverted may be either noble or ignoble. The former choice is what the technical language of the new psychology calls sublimation, as when the sex instinct finds expression for its energy in the ideals of chivalry and knighthood. The latter is perversion, as when the same sex instinct finds an outlet in pornography, or in secret or

social vice.' Or again when he says (p. 161), ' According to Freud, the sex instinct is strong even in infancy, and directed towards the parents, especially the parent of opposite sex. Not, of course, the animal sex instinct of puberty, but its emotional core, together with pleasure in bodily contact, kissing and endearment '. That ' of course ' covers up the failure to get clear the precise and technical distinction between infantile sexuality and the mature impulse. In discussing sex education, Professor Thomson accepts the common opinion that the ' botanical approach ' to specific sex knowledge is more valuable than the zoological. One would like to hear the grounds on which he accepts this view. There is little doubt that the preference for the facts of sex in plants over animals is itself due to repression, and is quite unsound pedagogically, for little children are vastly more interested in the structure and function of animals than in the parts of plants and flowers. One suspects that it is only possible for Professor Thomson to agree to this because he has not given it careful thought. It is, as a whole, very cheering to meet in an educationist the sensible and frank attitude expressed in this chapter, but one wishes that the treatment of this subject had been as precise and as knowledgeable as the discussion of intelligence tests and the transfer of training.

Susan Isaacs.

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Migraine and other Common Neuroses. By F. G. Crookshank, M.D., F.R.C.P. (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd., 1926. Pp. 92. Price 2*s.* 6*d.*)

This little book is a reprint of two lectures by the author: (1) The physiological interest in the common neuroses, and (2) Migraine and its allies. It serves a useful purpose in calling attention to a psychical aspect of all organic disease and a physical aspect of the neuroses. From our point of view the latter is stressed too much, the author being a faithful disciple of Adler, who regards the inferiority of some organ as an important factor of neuroses.

An interesting case is reported of a man who complained of sacro-lumbar pain with faintness, associated with a lipoma in the same region. On psychological investigation, it associated with an unjust thrashing at school. ' After this conversation the pain never returned. Moreover, the lipoma disappeared '. This scarcely seems to support the ' organ-inferiority ' idea.

As to migraine, we are told that ' there is more or less definite facial asymmetry manifested by asymmetrical play of facial muscles, by deviation of the nasal septum, by lack of balance between ocular muscles, and sometimes by dental irregularities and the like. Slight degrees of hypermetropia or myopia, associated with astigmatism, or with imbalance, are

nearly always present and, as a rule, the error of refraction is itself asymmetrical. The importance of this organ-inferiority is very great '.

On the psychical side, the migrainous suffer in ' rage and humiliation ' at the consciousness of their own errors in the management of their lives. Now the reviewer (probably in common with most other people) fits into this clinical picture with considerable precision, but he has never had a headache in his life.

Dr. Crookshank complains that the psycho-analysts have written nothing about migraine. The only reason is that these patients have not presented themselves for psycho-analytic investigation and treatment. Otherwise a more satisfying explanation than that which Dr. Crookshank gives us would be forthcoming. He gives us no explanation why the pain is in the head and not in the eyes ; and we are not told the meaning of the fortification spectrum, transitory hemianopia which sometimes occurs, and and so forth.

Nevertheless the book is clearly written and deserves a wide circulation

W. H. H. Stoddart.

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On Education, especially in Early Childhood. By Bertrand Russell. (London : Geo. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1926. Pp. 254.)

The proper person to review this book would be Mr. Russell himself, the Mr. Russell of *Icarus*. For the author of *Icarus* and the author of *On Education* would seem to be two, not one. It is hard to believe that he who wrote ' It is of the greatest importance to inquire whether any method of strengthening kindly impulses exists . . . let us assume that it depends upon the glands. If so, an international secret society of physiologists could bring about the millenium by kidnapping, on a given day, all the rulers of the world, and injecting into their blood some substance which would fill them with benevolence towards their fellow-creatures. . . . But alas, the physiologists would first have to administer the love philtre to themselves before they would undertake such a task. Otherwise, they would prefer to win titles and fortunes by injecting military ferocity into recruits. And so we come back to the old dilemma ; only kindliness can save the world, and even if we knew how to produce kindliness we should not do so unless we were already kindly ' can also write, ' And when children are doing what they like there is, of course, no reason for external discipline. A few simple rules—no child must interfere with another child, no child must have more than one sort of apparatus at a time—are easily comprehended, and felt to be reasonable, so that there is no difficulty in getting them observed '. These two statements can only both be true if there is an extraordinary difference between children and adults. What we find ourselves driven to ask is how it comes about that

the pessimist here turns into the optimist, that the disillusioned critic becomes here so cheerful and believing and constructive. Do the facts warrant the change ? And in attempting to answer this we are led at once into our most serious criticism of a book which has given us all the delight we have come to look for from Mr. Russell's writings.

To come to this after reading any of the professional books on education is to see the dry bones stir and rise to life. Mr. Russell's beautiful simplicity of statement, his superb clarity of vision and freedom from idolatry are characteristically here. The book is not so much a contribution to educational theory as to educational literature. Its great value lies in the personal note, as a statement of the *credo* of one of the free minds of our times. It is Mr. Russell's ' What I Believe ' in education. The most important parts of his discussion seem to us to be those dealing with the aims of education, and the relation of these to the broad social purposes of our time. It is here that one has the sense of a free intelligence coming to bear upon the cloistered virtues of education—opening the doors of the schoolroom to the common air. If in a review addressed to the readers of a technical journal, we find ourselves apparently giving the greatest weight to a destructive criticism, that is not because we are ungrateful for the positive contribution that Mr. Russell makes, but because the scope of this JOURNAL happens to coincide with the direction in which we feel Mr. Russell to be most open to serious criticism.

Mr. Russell seems at several points to assume a far higher degree of pliability in children than most observers see, as, for instance, whenever he discusses education in relation to bellicosity or pacifism. Education is a powerful instrument, we agree, but it is not a magic, it has not unlimited power, and it cannot alter the fact that in the last resort children and their parents are made of the same stuff. In the nursery it is possible to feel more hopeful and more cheerful than it is when we look at our daily paper during an election, a war, or a general strike. But no one with any wide experience of young children would find it easy to feel quite so cheerful and optimistic as Mr. Russell seems to feel about the power of sweet reasonableness or of any technical method at present known to bring about a world sane, mild, and intelligent. We need not stay to demonstrate that children have native impulses of greed and selfishness and anger and bullying, no less than those of affection and sympathy and pleasure in co-operation and intellectual delight in the world. We find ourselves asking, is Mr. Russell able to offer us an educational technique, either devised by himself or found at large and welcomed, a technique which can justify this faith in the power of education ? He does offer us specifics here and there, some of which show insight into the child's problem, and others by no means so. But there are none offered, we think, sufficient to justify his apparent view of the simplicity of the educational problem. Mr. Russell might possibly

say that education is a difficult problem because the educators are themselves not educated. He might apply our first quotation to our second, and say that if we could start with a generation of children *de novo*, or if we could bring to a given generation of children a group of educators specially imported from a truly reasonably world, then the problem of education would be simple. But that, of course, is an idle thought, and it would be useless to consider whether it is true or not, since we cannot in fact break the circle which binds one generation to the next. The educator, even when he is not the actual parent of the child, has very definite emotional relations with him. Parent and child, educator and child are bound together in an unbreakable nexus of passions and desires and ambitions. And, again, we find ourselves asking why it is that Mr. Russell so easily discounts the blind passions of adults in relation to their children, although no one has done more justice than he to the strength of these passions among adults in relation to each other. Mr. Russell says in his Introduction (p. 11), ' In addressing parents one may assume a sincere desire for the welfare of their offspring, and this alone, in conjunction with modern knowledge, suffices to decide a very large number of educational problems '. In what sense may one assume this ? Does the politician, the soldier, the man of business, the lover of power and possessions become simple-minded and sincere and wholly of goodwill when he enters his own nursery ? Do any of us ? Is not the ' supposed welfare of their offspring ' too often a function of the parents' own prejudices, ambitions, greed, social fears, shames and hate, as well as of their love ?

How is it possible for Mr. Russell to overlook the complexity of human motive in this relation of parent and child ? He over-estimates both the simplicity of the parent's mind in relation to the child, and the power of reasonableness as applied to the child himself. These two things, of course, hang together, and they hang together with the fact that he finds himself able to dismiss the so-called ' Œdipus Complex ' as ' misleading ' or more airily as ' moonshine '. We cannot avoid the conclusion that this delightful belief in the goodwill of the parent and the reasonableness of the child spring from the fact that Mr. Russell, face to face with his children, is unable to tolerate the possibility of hostility on either side ; or, at any rate, of a hostility that will not yield to mild justice and a gentle logic. Here he is compelled to believe in goodwill and the power of reason. He can admit much, as when, on page 35, he says ' The man who, in youth, would have liked to murder his father, finds satisfaction later on in flogging his son, under the impression that he is chastising " moral evil " ', or when he refers to the woman who ' is apt to seek from her children an illegitimate and spurious gratification of desires '. But he seems only to admit these as exceptions and abnormalities. He gets over the disturbing facts by

this way of treating them as unnecessary evils, and offering remedies for them, as when he says ' The right woman to deal with children ' is ' a woman whose instinct is not seeking from them satisfaction for herself which they ought not to be expected to provide. A woman who is happily married will belong to this type without effort ; but any other woman will need an almost impossible subtlety of self-control '. Mr. Russell attains his simplification of this problem in part by making a stringent distinction between the sex instinct and the parental instinct, clearly meaning by the latter his own formal and schematic view of the ' healthy parental instinct ' as it should be. ' Whatever psycho-analysts may say, the parental instinct is essentially different from the sex instinct, and is damaged by the intrusion of emotions appropriate to sex '. He speaks of ' the parental instinct in its purity ' (p. 154), and of ' different kinds of natural affection ' (p. 158). He has a similar quaint simplification of the sexual life in his discussion of sex education, where he taboos ' obscenity ', and would seem to shut it out not merely from education and morality, but from psychology also. In fact, Mr. Russell is not letting his right hand know what his left hand is doing ; he is at one and the same time saying that certain things are undesirable and that they do not occur. The tactics of his position was beautifully stated by the small boy who recently said to the reviewer, ' I do not like dreams, they are horrid things ; and another thing, I don't have them '. The difficulties are not for Mr. Russell something inherent in the relation of parent and child, and universally present in varying intensities. For him the parental relation has to be envisaged as a clear and simple one. For him it is in itself, and apart from easily avoidable accidents, one of simple creative goodwill and disinterested care on the part of the parent ; and affection, tinged with a shade of fear and a lessening sense of dependence, on the part of the child. This is what, looking backward and forward on human life, we should agree it is desirable that it should be. This is a schematic statement of the logic and biology of the parent-child relation, which Mr. Russell appears to confuse with the concrete psychology of parent and child. He is, in fact, not free from the suspicion that his psychology is still suffused with moral values, the moral hiding behind the ' natural ', as when (on p. 35) he speaks of the ' natural channel ' of a desire. It is in this respect that Mr. Russell's book is a profound disappointment. We find ourselves strongly arrested by the phenomenon of a mind which we have come to look upon as one of the great representative intelligences of our time showing such a gap in its freedom, so uncharacteristic a blindness as Mr. Russell shows here. Keeping the matter on the open ground of objective controversy, it is only possible to say that his off-handed rejection of the facts covered by the term ' Œdipus Complex ' can only spring from insufficient acquaintance with the evidence as to the intimate nature of the child's emotional life and the parental

relation. Mr. Russell speaks of ' inadequate evidence '. It is, of course, always difficult to assign a quantitative measure to the ' adequacy ' of evidence, but here we can affirm that, leaving on one side altogether the evidence from the psycho-analytic studies of normal and neurotic adults, which Mr. Russell might believe he could meet by talk of exceptions, the actual bulk of purely behaviouristic evidence gained directly from ordinary small children is now so great that the ' inadequacy ' can apply only to the immediate, first-hand experience of Mr. Russell himself.

The essential point of our criticism is that Mr. Russell's undue optimism with regard to the power of social logic as a solvent of the child's impulses of greed and anger, and his feeling that the simple and sincere goodwill of the parent may be safely assumed, are both functions of the psychological attitude which blinds him to the facts of the ' Œdipus Complex '. He might meet a part of our criticism by saying that he has not been concerned here with the psychology of the parent, that he would readily agree that parents are imperfect, and that the method suggested will be imperfectly carried out. He might say that he has only been concerned with stating the purely theoretical case, given an honest goodwill on the part of the parent. We would, however, strongly suggest that this is, on the one hand, an unsafe thing to do, that it is a disservice to practical education to suggest to parents themselves that their sincere goodwill may be safely assumed, since the capacity for constant self-criticism in the light of objective factors is a very necessary element in the discipline of parenthood. Parents cannot afford to be left in a fool's paradise of innocence as regards their own motives towards their children. And, on the other hand, the theory itself is bound to suffer unless it is broadly based on the full psychological facts, the complex emotional inter-relations of parent and child being part of the essential data of any theory of education for social life. An incomplete and therefore false psychology cannot be the final guide for the practical business of education.

Susan Isaacs.

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The Language and Thought of the Child. By Jean Piaget. Preface by Professor E. Claparède. Translated by Marjorie Warden. (Kegan Paul. International Library of Psychology, 1925. Pp. 238. Price 10*s.* 6*d.* net.)

We cannot but be grateful for the publication of this work and the translator's skill, who has so ably rendered the remarks and conversations of the children into childish colloquialisms, for placing at the disposal of all who are interested in the subject of child psychology the rich and valuable material it affords, in the many actual conversations of the two little boys as well as numberless other remarks and questions of other children. At the same time we cannot help some feeling of disappointment that this data has not been turned to still better account.

In his Preface, Professor Claparède leads us to expect that for once the adult standard and the statistical method, with its main interest concentrated upon classification and division into categories, is to be dispensed with, but our hopes are raised in vain. We are given the information that Piaget began his scientific career with the study of zoology and won fame for himself by a monograph upon the different varieties of molluscs in the Valasian Alps. We are assured that he has not simply turned from the classification and labelling of the snails to the psychology of children, in which he uses the same methods ; but after one has read the book one is not so sure that he has not. We find that he certainly does look down upon the mind of the child as an organ that shows great ' debility ', and it is plain throughout the chapters which ensue that he is all the time measuring and comparing it with the adult standard.

In his first chapters we are referred to the discoveries and research into the early expressions of child speech that have been carried out by Freud and other well-known psycho-analysts, emphasis being laid upon the child's conception of the magic relation between words and the things for which they stand, as well as on his use of symbolism in language and thought ; in the later chapters of the book, however, the writer seems to carry out the process which he remarks is typical of the child, that of possessing knowledge without allowing it to influence his speech or thought to any considerable extent, for except in one or two quite trivial comments and footnotes no more notice is taken of this aspect of the child's mental activities.

Again, it is somewhat of a disappointment to find that the two little boys with whom the research is mainly concerned were already six years old, and one cannot but feel that their linguistic powers were very rudimentary for their age. It would be interesting to know from what cultural milieu they came and the educational standard of their parents, since it is now generally accepted that the language and thought development of little children varies very considerably according to their environment, and whether the adults in charge of them consider it necessary to talk to the children in absurd baby talk, which even Piaget mentions as ' their kind coming down to the level of the child ', or allow the child to learn their more or less correct language from the first.

After the functions of speech have been arranged into categories, the chief interest of the investigators seems to be to arrange the remarks of the children neatly into these various groups. The thoughts, or rather thought-content of these apparently haphazard remarks of the children, and concomitantly the thought-processes which have stimulated them, are for the most part ignored. This shows that it is *classification* which is still of paramount importance to Piaget; the grammatical formulæ interest him more profoundly than the rich phantasy-life that prompts the remarks,

and which to him seem for that reason so disconnected and unreasonable, proving nothing but the expression of the child's lack of social means or wish for communication with his fellows.

He divides all speech of children into two main sections,

(1) *Ego-Centric*, sub-divided again into three categories, (*a*) *Repetition* (echolalia), (*b*) *Monologue*, (*c*) *Dual or Collective Monologue*, in all of which the child is really indulging in autistic thought, thinking aloud and paying little attention to those around.

(2) In *Socialised Speech* we find the child more interested in others, taking into consideration their point of view, trying to change it and talking with some definite purpose. Under this heading we find, (*a*) Adapted Information, (*b*) Criticism, (*c*) Commands, requests, threats, (*d*) Questions, (*e*) Answers.

The following conversation : G. (aged 6 years), 'My Daddy is a tiger.' Geo. (7 years 2 months), 'No, he can't be. I've seen him. My Daddy is a god-father and my Mummy a god-mother', aroused no comment except that 'Geo. implicitly justifies his assertion, "He can't be", with the proof, "I've seen him". But there is no explicit connection between the two sentences'. Here we have more evidence that it is the manner rather than the matter with which the author concerns himself.

In one experiment most valuable material is presented, again without remark concerning the aspect which would seem to be of the greatest importance ; the writer is certain the phenomenon is due neither to misunderstanding on the part of the child nor to his deficient memory. A simple story was related to a child, who had then to repeat this to another, either in the hearing of an investigator or alone. In the latter case, the second child did so and the last version was ultimately compared with the first. Now two of the tales were such as might well be considered to stir the phantasies of many children, and thus lead to inhibitions in recounting it to another or to the making of alterations, either consciously or unconsciously. These substitutions actually occurred, and this is the phenomenon already mentioned as being incomprehensible to Piaget. It is a well-known fact that children immediately identify themselves with the chief character in a story ; should any unpleasant adventure occur they will omit it altogether, distort it into something less alarming or more applicable to their own case. This is demonstrated many times in the course of the book, although it is not mentioned as a possibility. Yet Piaget merely discusses the child's faculty for 'romancing', ignoring the purpose behind it, the substitution of one idea for another, just as he ignores the content of the remark because he wishes to classify the remark itself or discover whether the presence of a 'because' or 'perhaps' will necessitate its removal from one section to another.

The author states that the child's idea of language is *syncretic*, he

recognizes and repeats the sentence as a whole, rather than the word, and gains a composite idea from the sentence rather than becoming familiar with the meaning of each separate word. In connection with this habit on the part of the child another experiment was carried out. The process was described exceedingly vaguely in the book and it was only by slow degrees that we discovered what the children had been required to do. The nature of the experiment itself left one with the impression that the methods employed might have been more scientifically adjusted to the capabilities of the children tested. The method was as follows: 'The tests employed were originally intended for children between 11 and 16. The children on whom we worked were below the level required for most of the proverbs. In order, however, that the experiment should not be absurd, we analysed only the answers given by the children who had been able to discover and defend the correct correspondence for at least one or two proverbs, and had thus proved their capacity for carrying out the instructions necessary for the experiment'.

Results show clearly enough that if the instructions were understood the proverbs were not. Several pages later we find a description of the instructions to the children. 'Moreover, as we have repeatedly pointed out, the child does not know at the beginning of the experiment that the proverb has a hidden meaning. All we do is to remind him that a proverb is a sentence that means something, and ask him to find a sentence which means the same thing'. Many of the most complicated proverbs for a child's comprehension follow and corresponding sentences have been found for them, showing that the children could have had but the vaguest idea of the meaning of the set proverb. We rather pity the child who, bidden to find a sentence corresponding to 'Drunken once will get drunk again'! chose, 'By pleasing some, we displease others', explaining it thus, 'because when someone is drinking you go and disturb him', which seems to recall unpleasant consequences that have been known to arise from such procedure. Still more interesting was the instance of a child who connected the proverb, 'So often goes the jug to water, that in the end it breaks', with the sentence, 'As we grow older we grow better'; the connecting link was the explanation, 'The older you get the better you get, and the more obedient you become;' obviously this is an equivalent to being broken, the reasoning of a child of ten, doubtless also from experience.

Whatever one may think of these experiments and the methods by which their results are handled, the material remains of the utmost value: and since so little is offered by way of explanation of these interesting remarks and questions of the children, it leaves the reader with corresponding freedom to draw his own deductions and to find therein corroboration of personal observations made upon early attempts of language on the part

of children in their struggle to convey thought. However much Piaget may state that children are always convinced that they understand and are understood, the psycho-analysis of both children and grown men and women proves the contrary, that the child suffers considerably from the knowledge that there are many occasions when it does not understand and cannot be understood, while the well-meaning misunderstandings of the adult, or their purposeful ignoring of the child's incapacity to express his thoughts, produce instant anxiety and may lead to serious speech inhibitions in the future.

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M. Chadwick.

The Problem Child. By A. S. Neill. (Herbert Jenkins, Ltd. Pp. 256. Price 5*s.* net.)

If this writer could view the parent with the same degree of tolerance and understanding that he bestows upon the child, the book would be of greater value. It is strange that a student of psychology should have so little insight for one section of the problem with which he is dealing. He can see that the ' child is not naughty, but ill '. Yet parents, he seems to consider, pour out their prejudices upon their children and blight their lives because they deliberately choose to do so ; or else because it is a traditional affair that must be continued, this battle between the past and the future.

The parent makes a convenient Aunt Sally for the quips of Mr. Neill's facile journalism. But he has very little understanding of the problems underlying the parental attitude, nor, apparently, for the causes which have led to its existence. Parents, one might think the author would have realized, cannot be bludgeoned into reformation, or even brow-beaten into better behaviour or into a clearer understanding of their own mistakes, by literature of this type. ' To be tolerant is to have charity ! ' Cannot our charity stretch a little further and cover the parents too ? On the whole they are well-meaning folk and their mistakes are made with the best intentions ! On the whole they are much to be pitied, since they are so often in the unhappy position of the mother hen that one day hatched a duckling instead of the chick she expected. However, we are forced to believe from reading this book that were there no more parents to shock, and no conventions to contend with, this type of warfare would cease for want of interest.

M. Chadwick.

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The Foundations of Education. By J. J. Findlay, Sarah Fielden Professor of Education in the University of Manchester. Vol. I., The Aims and Organization of Education. (University of London Press, London, 1925. Pp. 274. Price 7*s.* 6*d.* net.)

Professor Findlay's name is held in respect among all who are interested

in education and in efforts towards clearer thinking, and as might be expected, *The Foundations of Education* is characterized by a cautious yet enquiring and courageous spirit, and by a very serious approach to problems whose complexity the author always endeavours to appreciate. This is the first volume of his *Foundations of Education*, and is mainly concerned with an enquiry into ' Principles and Projects ', especially into educational aims and the means of achieving these : the second volume will embody the author's views on the bases of some of our educational doctrines and the need for a more philosophical foundation.

It is, necessarily, a matter of interest in dealing with a work which seeks to investigate foundations in educational theory and practice to enquire how far the author shows, directly or indirectly, knowledge and appreciation of psycho-analytical theory, since little foundational work of value can be achieved without such equipment. There is much in Professor Findlay's volume which reveals wisdom, insight, and, above all, intuitive understanding of the motives which influence our educators and our educational methods ; further, one realizes clearly that many of his ideas and conclusions could hardly exist were it not for the influence that psycho-analysis has created. At the same time, he is at some pains to hold aloof, and at times throws out deprecatory and even disparaging criticism in regard to psycho-analytic findings, though admitting that he makes ' no pretension to have mastered the full import of these researches so as to discriminate closely between the conclusions of Freud, Jung, and the late Dr. Rivers ' (p. 40.) After this he goes on to say, somewhat illogically, ' I am very sure that the layman, however ardent he may be in the search for truth, should abstain from probing into his own consciousness by the procedure of psycho-analysis, unless he and others wiser than himself are convinced that his behaviour needs to be examined in the dry light of science ' (p. 41.) One would wish to point out that if Professor Findlay thinks it worth while to probe into educational foundations in order to discover their validity or otherwise, surely he must not exclude from his research one of—or should one say, the chief of—the vital elements in those foundations, namely, the mind of the teacher, exerting its conscious and unconscious influence upon the unconscious of the pupil.

It is in Chapters III. (' The Supreme Aim '), IV. (' Constituent Values '), and V. (' Harmonious Development ') which are the specially interesting chapters of Volume I, that the lack of deeper investigation makes itself so plainly felt. What the author gives us is nearly always wise and valid *as far as it goes*, but it stops short too often, leaving one standing at the entrance to a blind alley. Take, in illustration, the following, from ' Constituent Values ' (Chapter IV, pp. 47, 48) : ' The outstanding fact about the body is that all the appetites, whether for sustenance or for the satisfactions of sex, have to be *controlled*, and that the little folk are much

at the mercy of their elders as to whether good or bad habits shall be formed. I need not dwell on the theme, for everyone knows how restraint in infancy simplifies enormously the tasks of moral life for the adult; the newborn babe at least leads the simple life '.

How does this attitude bring us any foundational guidance? We are left in exactly the same place wherein countless generations of educational writers have deposited us, standing outside a ring fence of preconceived ideas which will fulfil unconscious wishes. Professor Findlay here sets forth as a desideratum the simplification of the adult's moral life, apparently ignoring any considerations as to what such a goal signifies and the motives involved, and then proceeds to frame a system which will bring man to this goal. A more fundamental enquiry would surely consider the question of ' restraint in infancy ' on its own merits, so to say, and at least recognize the motivations, the processes, the losses and gains involved, upon all of which Freud's work has thrown such a flood of light. Throughout this chapter, and in Chapter V (' Harmonious Development '), one is continually struck by the fact that, had the author added to his equipment knowledge of those dynamic sources of character and conduct which are so largely hidden from consciousness, he would have furnished many more valuable and helpful judgements and conclusions. It is much to be hoped that the second volume will reckon with some, at least, of the most relevant psycho-analytic findings.

Barbara Low.

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The Changing School. By Philip Boswood Ballard, M.A., D.Litt. (Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd., London, 1925. Pp. 332. Price 6*s.* net.)

This volume consists of twenty-two rather loosely strung together essays dealing, in the main, with modern educational theories and practices (such as the Discipline of Natural Consequences, the method of Individual work, the Nursery School, Script Writing, etc.), and written with all the ease and liveliness which make Dr. Ballard's writings and speeches invariably entertaining. A wide range of topics, all of present-moment interest, is covered by the book, and though it suffers somewhat from lack of continuity and of a central idea, on the other hand it is full of variety and touches deftly, if but slightly, on many important and still much-argued problems. Some of the best chapters, containing wise, sympathetic and very human points of view, are ' The Discipline of Natural Consequences ' (Chapter V), ' Facing the Music ' (Chapter VIII), ' Accuracy ' (Chapter XVI), and ' The Nursery School ', the last chapter in the book. In all of these Dr. Ballard's plea is for greater elasticity on the one hand, and on the other more close and careful investigation by educators of their own principles and practice. To give example, he points out in his chapter on ' Freedom ' (Chapter VI) how variable and relative a thing is denoted by

the term; yet the educator constantl employs it as though it stood for an unchanging absolute. Again, in a valuable chapter on 'Accuracy' (Chapter XVI), he points out how devastating it may be to create as an ideal an accuracy of a merely formal kind ,of the 'letter' only, whereas a true accuracy he claims to be 'the morality of the intellect: it prescribes what it ought to strive for in the pursuit of its own proper ideal' (p. 257).

In view, therefore, of much which is helpful in this volume, it is particularly unfortunate that so serious a blemish should occur in it as the chapter called 'The Unconscious' (Chapter XI). It is very difficult to account for such a chapter, especially as we are told explicitly by Dr. Ballard in his Preface (p. x) that: 'Changes are inevitable. New ideas, large and small, will press upon us from all quarters. How are we to receive them? The obvious answer is: With an open mind. Certainly not with a closed mind. . . . *The ideal mind is biassed towards neither the old, nor towards the new; it is biassed only towards the true. It will hospitably receive new ideas even though they quarrel with the old—as they almost certainly will'.* (Reviewer's italics.)

Unfortunately the chapter on 'The Unconscious' fails completely to carry out the admirable precepts laid down in the passage quoted above: it is safe to say that throughout it there is hardly an idea expressed, a statement made, or a term employed which has relevance to the unconscious as it exists in the human mind and as it has been made manifest by the work of Freud and his co-workers. Rather, this is an 'unconscious' fashioned out of Dr. Ballard's desire to create some ludicrous kind of Aunt Sally which he may then proceed to bowl over with shouts of glee: quite a pleasant occupation, and not uncommon among mankind of all sorts, but hardly to be confused with scientific investigation, nor is it very good evidence of a mind 'biassed only towards the true', a mind which 'will hospitably receive new ideas, even though they quarrel with the old' (p. x, Preface).

But is it, perhaps, possible that the author has never yet managed to obtain knowledge on the subject beyond a *réchauffé* compounded from material in the daily and weekly Press? One is led to such a conclusion by the extraordinary statements on every page, usually ushered in by 'the psycho-analysts think' so and so: one or two examples must suffice.

'To the psycho-analyst, however, there is only one kind of love. To him all love is lust, lust in various stages of sublimation' (p. 138). What Dr. Ballard himself understands by the above, I cannot profess to know, but it is very certain he will not find any such 'belief' expressed in the work of any accredited psycho-analyst.

'In the unconscious, as revealed by the psycho-analyst however, we

find none of these ' high instincts ', but in their place the brute instincts which we have inherited from our remote ancestors ' (p. 116).

Perhaps these two specimens are sufficient to show that though the author has taken upon himself the gratuitous task of writing about psycho-analysis, he has not considered it sufficiently worth his while to learn first what it is.

Barbara Low.

*

The Worship of Nature, Vol. I. By Sir James George Frazer, O.M., F.R.S., F.B.A. (Macmillan & Co., Ltd., London, 1926. Pp. 672. Price 25*s*. net.)

This distinguished and tireless author here offers the first of two volumes that consist of an amplification of the Gifford lectures delivered in 1924 and 1925. The following list of chapter headings will give some idea of the extent of ground covered : The worship of the sky among the Aryan peoples of antiquity : The worship of the sky among non-Aryan peoples of antiquity : The worship of the sky among the Civilized peoples of the Far East : The worship of the sky in Africa : The worship of the earth among the Aryan peoples of antiquity : The worship of the earth among non-Aryan peoples of antiquity : The worship of the earth in China ; The worship of the earth in modern India : The worship of the earth in Africa : The worship of the earth in America : The worship of the sun among the Aryan peoples of antiquity : The worship of the sun among the non-Aryan peoples of antiquity : The worship of the sun in modern India : The worship of the sun in Japan : The worship of the sun in Indonesia.

The book is a magnificent collection, written in the author's well-known graceful style, of all the mythical beliefs on these topics. Throughout he refrains from any serious psychological analysis of his material, and nowhere does he refer to the work done by psycho-analysts on some of the most important themes. There is no attempt to trace the beliefs to a personal and human origin. For instance, when describing how Cronus first castrated and then displaced his father Uranus, he terms him ' this unnatural son ', and accepts the old view that the story simply relates to an ancient belief that the sky and earth were once united nuptially. There is no hint that this nuptial union, with the corresponding behaviour on the part of the son, had anything to do with earthly situations or why primitive people should have held such a belief.

Nevertheless the volume will in time rank as one of the series of psycho-analytical text-books that Sir James Frazer is unwittingly providing. For psycho-analysts, and for all psychologists who recognize that the psychology of the individual cannot be separated from that of the race, the volume is of irreplaceable value.

E. J.

Scientific Humanism. By Lothrop Stoddard, A.M., Ph.D.(Harvard). (Charles Scribner Sons, London, 1926. Pp. 177. Price 7*s.* 6*d.*)

A brief but sound and (except for the inclusion of too many quotations) eloquently written exposition of some of the hopes, difficulties and dangers of our present age. Dr. Stoddard draws a striking picture of the contrast between the progress of science, with its immense promise of benefit to man, and the social and psychological obstacles which prevent full utilization of scientific achievement and which even threaten to turn this achievement into a curse rather than a blessing. His suggested remedy (with which psycho-analysts will certainly agree) is the fostering of a scientific spirit of toleration and freedom from emotional prejudice—a task which, he very rightly suggests, is of far greater importance for human progress than the inculcation of any particular kind of scientific knowledge or religious principle. Unfortunately he does not in this volume deal with the further question as to how this desirable mental attitude (which he terms Scientific Humanism) is itself to be brought about—a problem which is at once perhaps the most difficult and yet the most important of those which are waiting to be solved by applied psychology and sociology, a problem also to which psycho-analysis has assuredly, as Dr. Stoddard would doubtless recognize, contributed data of much value.

J. C. F.

*

Pygmalion or *The Doctor of the Future.* By R. McNair Wilson, M.B., Ch.B. (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd., London, and E. P. Dutton & Co., New York, 1925. Pp. 71. Price 2*s.* 6*d.*)

This little volume, although slight, is of considerable value. It is written in a fresh and stimulating way and well sustains the high standard of the excellent series in which it is published. The author has the gift of simple lucidity. He sketches clearly the general principles on which the most modern conceptions of disease are based, showing first how much of disease is a reaction rather than a primary process. He goes on to define it not as a reaction to the disease process, but as an altered reaction to life occasioned by the presence of disease.

The author lays great stress on the importance of the mind and the close connection between it and the body in regard to disease. He even comments not unfavourably on psycho-analytic work. He comprehends how rapidly medicine is growing beyond its old confines and writes:—'Once upon a time, the priest was the doctor; to-morrow the doctor may well have become the priest, in a new sense of the word.'

E. J.

*

Witchcraft and the Black Art. A Book dealing with the Psychology and Folklore of the Witches. By J. W. Wickwar. (Herbert Jenkins, Ltd., London, 1925. Pp. 320. Price 8*s.* 6*d.*)

This is an interesting account of some of the historical aspects of witchcraft. It deals on the whole with the subject in a conventional way, the main part of the book being taken up with historical aspects of certain trials. The epidemic nature of the witchcraft obsession and the remarkable way in which its component elements were temporarily fused into an obsession for some three centuries, after which it dissolved again into its elements, is not made clear. The importance of the relation to the Church and religion is inadequately dealt with. Above all the central part played by sexuality is kept entirely in the background. The book, therefore, though very interestingly written, gives a very imperfect presentation of the subject.

The author adopts, without mentioning her, Miss Murray's theory that witchcraft was in itself a religious cult, an extremely doubtful proposition. The psychopathology of the problem is grossly neglected : to mention a small instance alone, the author does not appear to know the connection between the ' witches' marks ' and hysterical anæsthesia.

No mention is made of the extensive work that has been done psychoanalytically on this subject, but the author has evolved an extraordinary and most original technique for the application of psycho-analysis to such problems. It is so nearly incredible that it must be described at length. Throughout the whole book there is not a glimmering of any psychological insight into the nature of the innumerable phenomena referred to. The nearest approach to an ' explanation ' is an occasional remark of the kind that one is accustomed to find in books on folklore, invoking the label suggestion, imitation and the like. No hint is given that there are such factors as unconscious influences in the human mind. Nevertheless, on the very last page of the book the reader is startled to come across the following piece of bold effrontery :

' One word more : although throughout this book the beliefs and practices of the witches for the most part have been subjected to the recognized up-to-date psycho-analytical tests, the writer has purposely refrained from giving the resultant interpretations in what has come to be known as " the usual psycho-analytical way ", as, apart from objections that would certainly come from those not altogether conversant with psycho-analytical expressions, it is unnecessary ; the inner meaning or psychological explanation of much of the witches' ritual being at once only too obvious to all intellectual readers having but the slightest knowledge of psycho-analytical axioms. Readers must, therefore, to some extent—so far as this account of witchcraft is concerned—make their own analysis. . . .'

This is certainly a royal road. By means of it, it would no longer be necessary to do any laborious work in psycho-analysis or in the use of it for solving the complicated problems of the neuroses of folklore, mythology, etc., etc. ; one has only to say the application of psycho-analysis is too

obvious to mention, and the whole work is done. In fact, we have here that so-longed-for desideratum : psycho-analysis without tears.

E. J.

✶

Notes on Spiritual Healing. By Herbert Hensley Henson, D.D. Lord Bishop of Durham. (Williams and Norgate, Ltd., 1925. Pp. 197. Price 5*s*.)

The Bishop of Durham sums up the issues of faith-healing and criticizes the cures attributed to Lourdes, also the methods employed by such spiritual healers as Hickson and Maillard. He criticizes Anson's book on Spiritual Healing and suspects that the theological foundation of the argument for spiritual healing is unsound. He thinks that the opinions expressed in the Lambeth Conference of 1920 led to confusion. We find ourselves in sympathy with some of his opinions. He implies, for instance, that psycho-therapy is a part of medical science and that no one, whether priest or layman, should be allowed to practise physical healing unless medically trained and licensed. He is of the opinion that the clergyman's duties do not include physical healing. Dr. Hensley Henson evidently thinks that he as a clergyman is entitled to criticize psycho-analysis, which is another branch of medical science. In his introduction we find the extraordinary statement that ' spiritual healing ' adopts Freud's method of psycho-analysis. Later he proceeds to criticize what he is pleased to call ' Freud's crazy and disgusting over-emphasis of the sexual factor '. It is not surprising to find that he is ignorant of psycho-analytical science and that he indulges in the stereotyped objections, but it is difficult to understand his confusion of the terms ' physical ' and ' psychical ' as applied to therapy.

Robert M. Riggall.

✶

The New Age of Faith. By John Langdon Davies. (The Viking Press, New York, 1925.)

This is a stimulating, if discursive, attack upon many of the popular fallacies concerning modern scientific thought. It would seem rather timely in America, where pseudoscientific philosophers arise and clash the cymbals and strive to twist the latest theory in pure science into the service of the current political, sociological or theological dogma.

Had the author turned his attention to the schismatic field of psychology, he might have found myths as well worth exploding as that of the ' Nordic Blond ' or the ' heredity fiends ', to which attention is divertingly drawn in this volume.

L. Rothschild.

✶

Le Mystère de Jésus. By P. L. Couchoud. (F. Rieder & Cie., Éditeurs, Paris, 1924. Pp. 186. Price-Frs. 6.50.)

Each country seems in turn to produce an author who expresses doubts about the historical personality of Jesus. This book is one of the kind. It has created some sensation in France and has called forth extensive criticisms at the hands of such authorities as Maurice Goguel and Alfred Loisy. The author's point of view is essentially that the Pauline tradition is our oldest authority, and there we already find Jesus described in abstract and mythological language. He believes that the human figure of Jesus has been, so to speak, condensed from this general nebula rather than that the reverse was the order of events.

E. J.

BULLETIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

BERLIN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

First Quarter, 1926

January 23, 1926. General Meeting.

The reports of the Council, the Director of the Polyclinic, the Training Committee, the Treasurer and the 'Committee for the Administration of the Scholarship Fund' were read and adopted. The subscription for membership was fixed at 60 marks a year, to include the subscription for the *Zeitschrift* and *Imago*.

The following associate members were elected to full membership: Dr. med. Hans Lampl, Dr. med. Heinrich Meng (Stuttgart), and Frau Ada Müller-Braunschweig. Dr. med. Otto Fenichel transferred his membership from the Vienna Society. Dr. med. Alfred Gross (Berlin-Halensee, Küstrinerstrasse 4) was elected an associate member. Frau Alice Bálint resigned from the Berlin Society in order to join the Budapest Society.

Owing to the death of its founder and President, Dr. Karl Abraham, the Society had to elect a new President. In the discussions beforehand Dr. Max Eitingon, the Director of the Polyclinic and Secretary of the Society, was unanimously proposed. When it was ascertained that he did not wish to accept office, the following were appointed to the Council: President, Dr. Simmel; Secretary, Dr. Radó; Treasurer, Frau Dr. Horney. The following were appointed members of the Training Committee: President, Dr. Eitingon; Secretaries, Frau Horney, Dr. Müller-Braunschweig, Drs. Radó, Sachs and Simmel. The following were appointed to the Scholarship Fund Committee: Drs. Boehm, Hárnik and Liebermann.

January 26, 1926. Rechtsauwalt Dr. Hugo Staub (guest of the Society): Psycho-Analysis and penal law.

February 9, 1926. Continuation of the discussion on Psycho-Analysis and penal law.

At the Business Meeting Frau Dr. med. Elisabeth Naef (Berlin, W. 62, Lutherstrasse 6), was elected an associate member.

February 20, 1926. Dr. Erwin Cohn (guest of the Society): Lassalle as a leader.

March 2, 1926. Short communications:

Dr. Walter Cohn (guest of the Society): An account of Freud's recent supplement to the interpretation of dreams.

Frau Klein: *a*. Two corresponding mistakes in a school-exercise. *b*. Ideas which a five-year-old boy associated with the methods by which he was educated.

C. Müller-Braunschweig : *a.* What young children know about sexuality

b. Negative hallucination and the castration-complex.

Dr. Fenichel : Some childish sexual phantasies not hitherto described.

March 13, 1926. Dr. Simmel : The ' doctor-game ', compulsion to repetition and the profession of medicine.

Dr. Walter Cohn (guest of the Society) : Account of Freud's supplementary notes on the interpretation of dreams.

At the Business Meeting Dr. phil. Erwin Cohn (Berlin, W. 50, Pragerstrasse 35) was elected an associate member.

March 27, 1926. Discussion on ' Psycho-Analysis and Publicity '. Opening speeches by Dr. Alexander and Dr. Bernfeld.

During the first quarter of 1926 the Society organized at the Institute (Berlin, W. 35, Potsdamerstrasse 29) the following courses of lectures for practitioners and students of psycho-analysis :

1. Dr. Sándor Radó : Introduction to Psycho-Analysis : Part II. (Clinical practice and theory of the neuroses). Lectures, six. Attendance, thirty-two.

2. Dr. Carl Müller-Braunschweig : The Psycho-Analytical System : Part I. (Concept of the libido, theory of instinct, structure of the mental organism, repression, the unconscious). Lectures, five. Attendance, eleven.

3. Dr. Siegfried Bernfeld (Vienna, guest of the Society) : Educational Psychology on the basis of Psycho-Analysis. Lectures, five. Attendance, seventy-five.

4. Dr. Franz Alexander : Neurosis and the whole Personality. (The more recent development of psycho-analytical theory in its practical application.) Lectures, four. Attendance, twenty.

5. Dr. Hanns Sachs : Psycho-Analytic Technique : Part II. Practical application (for advanced students only). Lectures, seven. Attendance, seventeen.

6. Dr. Felix Boehm : Seminars on selected chapters from the writings of Freud (for advanced students). Number of seminars, eight. Attendance, twenty.

7. Dr. Sándor Radó : Discussions on Technical and Therapeutic aspects of Psycho-Analysis. (For practising analysts only, and in particular for those training at the Institute. Admission by personal application.) Number of meetings, three. Attendance, fourteen.

8. Dr. Eitingon, Dr. Simmel and Dr. Radó : Practical introductory Exercises in Psycho-Analytic Therapy. (For students only.) Attendance, eleven.

Dr. Sándor Radó,

Secretary.

BRITISH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

First Quarter, 1926

January 6, 1926. Dr. Ernest Jones referred to the lamented death of Dr. Karl Abraham. He particularly mentioned Dr. Abraham's value as a pioneering investigator, the high esteem with which he was held by all, and that he was an honoured leader. He also reminded members that Dr. Abraham was an honorary member of our Society.

A discussion took place on a recent Press campaign against psycho-analysis.

January 20, 1926. Dr. James Glover read a short paper to open a discussion on the ' Ego '. This paper is to appear in the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS.

February 3, 1926. Mr. L. S. Penrose: Psycho-analytic notes on negation. Freud's statement that denial of a thought-process proclaims its presence in the unconscious. Corollary to this, that overtoned assertion is equivalent to unconscious denial. Three methods of overtoned assertion. (1) Emphasis; (2) repetition; (3) tautology or disguised repetition. Suggestion as to how the criticism that psycho-analysts do not observe the law of criticism should be met. Analysis of the symbol for negation and assertion. The intellectual acceptance of the unconscious. The relation of this to mathematical reasoning, which is all deductive. Inductive reasoning is the characteristic of genital libido. It is not strictly logical, and involves taking risks which pure logic does not.

The laws of logic are not (as Alexander states) introjected reality, but projected fundamental psychological mechanisms. Reality gives us faith in induction (what has been will be) but we have to take the risk of it not being so. In the normal mind pure reasoning is a servant and not a master, and serves in the rapid and efficient handling of memories so as to know, when a stimulus turns up, how we reacted before and what was the effect.

February 17, 1926. The subject chosen for discussion was ' Cathexis '. Members had previously been asked to bring a precise definition of Cathexis, or failing this a statement of what type of phenomenon they regard Cathexis to be, and their views on the importance of the concept in psycho-analytical theory.

Mr. L. S. Penrose, 7, Caroline Place, Mecklenburgh Square, London, W.C. 1, was elected an associate member.

March 3, 1926. Mr. A. G. Tansley read a short note on a definite type of masturbation-phantasy, in which he described a variety of phantasy turning on the procuring of a virginal sexual object for the masturbator by an older woman, and suggested that the imagery was determined by the early splitting of the subject's libido between mother and sister. Dr. James Glover and Dr. Ernest Jones, however, thought it more likely that

the two female persons of the phantasy represented a splitting of the mother-imago.

Dr. Douglas Bryan gave an account of an attack of severe hiccoughs in a patient which occurred during the psycho-analytic hour as a transitory symptom. The symptom immediately disappeared when the patient recalled that when he was three years old a servant had got him to press his face close against her sexual organs, and that he had experienced both attraction to and repulsion from these parts.

Dr. Ernest Jones gave an account of a castration-symbol in a small child.

Dr. John Rickman gave a short note on ' E. R. A.' The electrical apparatus employed in the ' electronic reaction ' is known to be ridiculous; no examinations of the psychical responses of those using the method have yet been published. An account was given of an investigation and the deductions drawn.

Dr. Edward Glover referred to a ' technical ' form of resistance. The use of technical concepts during association for purposes of unconscious expression. A patient regards the super-ego as a phallic symbol, and views with anxiety any analytical modification of or interference with this ego-institution. Analysis of this attitude uncovers strong resistances. Similar mechanisms in other cases described.

March 17, 1926. Short communications:

These were chiefly concerned with birth-dreams.

Change of Address: Miss M. Chadwick, 48, Tavistock Square, London, W.C. 1.

Douglas Bryan,
Hon. Secretary.

DUTCH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

First Quarter, 1926

January 30, 1926. Annual meeting in Amsterdam. The first part of the meeting was dedicated to the memory of Dr. Karl Abraham, the late President of the International Psycho-Analytical Association. The Chairman, Dr. van Emden, spoke in appreciation of Dr. Abraham's exceptional services to psycho-analysis, and gave a short survey of his life and work as physician, investigator and organizer. Dr. van Emden said that he and other members of the Society had been closely connected with Dr. Abraham in affectionate and long-standing friendship. Recently, when he visited Holland, the whole Society had had the opportunity of making his acquaintance, and all the members had retained a deep and lasting impression of his charming personality.

Dr. F. P. Muller read the report of the Training Committee. The officers were re-elected.

Dr. Westerman Holstijn read a paper on a case of pseudoparanoia. While on military service the patient began to simulate certain symptoms and subsequently could not distinguish between what he had simulated and homosexual delusions of persecution of which he could not rid himself. The speaker regarded the illness as an hysterical reaction. The patient was finally cured.

A. Endtz,
Secretary.

HUNGARIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

First Quarter, 1926

January 9, 1926. The meeting began with the announcement of the death of Dr. Karl Abraham, late President of the International Psycho-Analytical Association. Dr. S. Ferenczi, President of the Hungarian Society, paid a tribute to the services rendered to science by Dr. Abraham and to his distinguished personal qualities and the tact and firmness with which he had directed the International Association. Dr. Ferenczi told the meeting that he had been present at the funeral ceremonies in Berlin, and, as representing Professor Freud, had given a short valedictory address. The Hungarian Society recorded its sympathy with Dr. Abraham's family and laid a wreath on the coffin of the Association's honoured leader.

Dr. W. Reich (Vienna): Psychic disturbances of orgasm.

January 23, 1926. Business meeting. The arrangements for conducting the Society's business were revised in accordance with statutory requirements. Dr. S. Pfeiffer, as the third Committee member, was appointed Treasurer. The Training Committee entered on its work.

February 6, 1926. Dr. jur. G. Dukes (guest of the Society): A new theory of penal law. (Th. Reik's theory considered and criticized.)

February 20, 1926. Clinical communications:

Dr. Michael Bálint: *a*. A case of agoraphobia accompanied by extrasystole.

b. The analytical interpretation of gastric symptoms.

c. Immediate identification with a deceased person.

Dr. S. Pfeiffer: Anal-oral relations in a case of disturbance of speech.

Dr. I. Hermann: Notes from the analyses of a stammerer.

March 13, 1926. Dr. S. Ferenczi: The problem of the acceptance of unpleasant ideas.

March 27, 1926: Dr. M. J. Eisler: The biological meaning of reflexes and their disturbance in *tabes dorsalis*.

Dr. M. Bálint was elected a member and Dr. G. Dukes an associate member of the Society. Frau Alice Bálint, an associate member of the Berlin Society, was admitted to membership of the Budapest Society.

Dr. Imre Hermann,
Secretary.

NEW YORK PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

First Quarter, 1926.

January 26, 1926. (*a*) Dr. L. Pierce Clark: The Phantasy Method of Analysing Narcissistic Neuroses.

This paper dealt with an innovation in psycho-analytic technique adapted particularly for the treatment of the narcissistic neuroses. Dr. Clark supplemented his paper with the presentation of opinions expressed by a number of psycho-analysts who discussed his views at the last International Psycho-analytic Congress. A brief abstract of Dr. Clark's thesis appeared in the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS, Volume VII., Part 1, January, 1926, p. 124.

(*b*) Dr. Adolph Stern: Clinical Note on a Case of Anxiety-Hysteria.

For the first six weeks of analysis the patient in Dr. Stern's case seemed to present material dealing solely with the pre-Œdipus level. Dr. Stern requested the opinion of other members as to the frequency of such a situation. Several expressed opinions that such occurrences were not uncommon.

At the business session a resolution on the death of Dr. Karl Abraham of Berlin was submitted by Dr. S. E. Jelliffe and unanimously adopted by the Society.

The following officers were elected for the year 1926.

President: Dr. A. A. Brill.

Vice-President: Dr. Leonard Blumgart.

Secretary-Treasurer: Dr. Albert Polon.

Council: Drs. C. P. Oberndorf, S. E. Jelliffe, Adolph Stern.

February 23, 1926. (*a*) Dr. A. A. Brill: Annual Address of the President-elect.

This address dealt with certain problems confronting the psycho-analyst in his practice and in his position before scientific societies. Dr. Brill stressed the desirability and importance of selecting those patients whose ultimate aim is to become practising analysts very carefully with reference to their character integrity. He also emphasized that the subject-matter of psycho-analytic papers read before the medical public should be of a suitable nature. He suggested that such papers deal with clinical material illustrating basic psycho-analytic principles rather than consist of theoretical expositions of psycho-analytic innovations.

(*b*) Dr. Oswald Boltz: Some Precipitating Causes of Schizophrenia in Males.

This paper dealt with material from several schizophrenic cases in which either direct or symbolic homosexual experiences precipitated the outbreak of the disease.

At the business session Dr. Wearne of the Central Islip State Hospital, Long Island, N.Y., was elected to associate membership.

March 30, 1926. (*a*) Drs. D. D. Shoenfeld and W. V. Silverberg: A Suggested Approach to the Behaviour Problems of Children.

The authors of this paper described a method whereby the behaviour reactions of problem children were considered as located on a scale of behaviour patterns, in which infantile responses on the one hand and mature responses on the other constituted the polarities. The child's reaction to desire and attainment proved a practical criterion in terms of which to judge the level of behaviour in a given case. The aim of the therapy is to adjust the child to behaviour patterns consistent with his age by indicating to him the significance of his responses to the environment in terms of the above-mentioned polarities. The method is, to be sure, not a psycho-analysis, but does take cognizance of psycho-analytic principles (transference, ego-ideal formation, etc.), and of fundamental factors in the relationship of psycho-analysis to child training.

At the business session official action was taken on the death of Dr. Albert Polon (March 15, 1926). Dr. Brill delivered a short address on the career of Dr. Polon. A special committee was appointed to frame suitable resolutions on this sad event. Dr. Abraham Kardener was appointed to fill the office of Secretary-Treasurer, which was left vacant by Dr. Polon's death.

Monroe A. Meyer,
Corresponding Secretary.

SWISS PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY.

January 16, 1926. M. Müller: Conditions under which analysis is or is not indicated. (Subject for debate.)

January 30, 1926. H. Pfenninger: Notes from psychotherapeutic practice.

February 13, 1926: Ph. Sarasin: Analysis of a case of *impotentia ejaculandi*.

March 13, 1926. R. Brun: Biological contributions to the psycho-analytical theory of instinct.

DEATH OF DR. JAMES GLOVER

We deeply regret to have to announce the sad news of the death of Dr. James Glover on August 25, 1926, at Barcelona, of diabetic acidosis. The loss of such a valuable worker and outstanding personality will be keenly felt not only in England but throughout the psycho-analytical world. A full obituary will appear in the next number of the JOURNAL.

P.R.[illegible] International Journal

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2. Correspondence relating to translations should be addressed to the Translation Editor, Mrs. Joan Riviere, 10 Nottingham Terrace, London, N.W. 1.

3. Manuscripts should be type-written, and a copy should always be retained by the author.

4. Authors will understand that translations of their articles may be published in the *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse* or *Imago* if thought suitable.

5. Authors of original papers will be sent free of charge six copies of the Journal by the Publishers on application. If they require reprints at their own cost application should be made to the Publishers stating how many are required.

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